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This thesis attempts to examine the proposition that a
surprise attack, in which one body politic tries to overwhelm
another, is a process and not a happening. The method applied -
an analysis of a complex of systems involved in the preparation
and execution of a total violent encounter - in itself implies
that there can be no over-simplified, one facet explanation for
the failure to perceive and anticipate an unexpected onslaught.
The first chapter attempts to show the difficulties which
Soviet historigraphy encountered when it grappled with the titter
awareness that the first months of the war were a humiliating and
perhaps an unnecessary defeat. The second chapter is an attempt
to elaborate on the theoretical background from which Soviet
military doctrine evolved. It also provides some data about
military technology and training based on the same doctrine. The
third chapter looks at some of the effects of a belligerent
environment on a neutral but involved party. The same chapter
also dwells on the diplomatic and military moves of Germany's highly
mobilized and efficient machine as against those of the slow and
cumbersome rachine of the Soviet Union. The fourth chapter follows
the institutional and military awakening of the Soviet government to
the sense of danger and examines the tortuous policy employed
thereby. It also observes the impact of such a policy on the armed
forces. The fifth chapter analyses in some detail the effects of
surprise on military and political systems.
CHAPTER I
SOME ASPECTS OF SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY
1.
In both unconscious and subconscious fashion Soviet historio¬
graphy carries on the struggle against wartime Nazism. Under the
weight of 20 million dead scattered over the scorched earth of Russia
it has not yet dared to tell the truth. As early as 1941-42 Soviet
writers were attempting to account for the initial German success.1
A painful process of heartsearching went on in the literature and
poetry of those difficult days, written under the impact of the long
and agonising series of setbacks which lasted until after the Soviet
victory in Stalingrad. Ruin, starvation and misery on the Soviet
side; arrogance, cruelty and atrocities on the part of the Germans;
these factors, and the overwhelming emotions which they evoked,
simplified the issues. The bitter struggle for survival overshadowed
for a while the all-important questions of national preparedness and
combat readiness for surprise attack on the eve of the war, though
this is not to say that the wartime records themselves and the
operational narratives compiled on the morrow of many great engage¬
ments lack value.
Post-war history writing was based on genuine, factual
elements of the preceding period of history-making. Themes were
taken from orders of the day - the original documents of the war, and
from diplomatic correspondence which had been published at the time.
But the years 1944-48 saw a deliberate process of suppression,
engineered by the central institutions and gradually engulfing every
sector of Soviet intellectual life. Since it was the time of an
1. Soviet sources have cited many attempts at explaining the set¬
backs during the first months of the war. See for example:
Istoriya russkoi sovetskoi literatury, Moscow, Nauka, 1968,
Vol.Ill, pp.523-530."
immense reconstruction effort, the greatest need was to rise above
earlier failures and assert national unity over intellectual
curiosity. Stalin, Zhdanov and those of their aides who carried out
the censorship crusade were not fooling themselves. They were aware
of the millions who knew about the confused orders and lack of leader¬
ship during the first weeks of the war. They were not deaf to the
questions and they knew many of the answers, but they would not allow
their countrymen to indulge in intellectual altercations which might
have caused far-reaching changes in the regime. Instead they plunged
headlong into a gigantic process of re-orientation. They selected
only those facts from the war experience which would serve a unifying
historical explanation. Other facts were eliminated and crowds of
witnesses were either temporarily or permanently silenced. The
effect was not a straightforward lie, more a bizarre kind of truth.
The post-war historians were faced with two major problems,
neither of their own choice: whether to write at all and, if so,
what to omit. The period 1941-43 provided them with an ample source
of documents produced spontaneously under the impact of the German
attack, or in the frantic attempt to stem it. The initial dichotomy
seemed to be clear-out. On the one hand there was a rich crop of
literature, poetry, newsletters, articles, letters and pamphlets; on
the other there were orders of the day, telegrams, recorded telephone
conversations, the usual correspondence between military headquarters
and civilian institutions, and many professional articles. In both
these sectors there had at the time been an intensive correspondence
between Soviet writers and their colleagues abroad, as well as between
the Soviet Government and foreign governments. However, the sifting
of this material proved to be a difficult undertaking even with the
best of intentions.
The whole literary world was called to arms one week after
the German attack:-
Every Soviet Author is prepared to participate in
the sacred cause of the People's war against the
enemies of our Motherland, with all his power, all
his experience and talent, if necessary with every
drop of his blood.2
Many Soviet writers carried out this mission to the letter and were
killed in action. All of them contributed to the be3t of their
creative abilities. Among them were people of integrity, keen
insight and candid style. In their works these writers attempted
to come to terms with the basic concepts like 'motherland', 'courage',
'hatred' and 'defiance', and to express feelings dear to every
soldier like 'home', 'mother' and 'son'.3
2* Literaturnaya Gazeta, 29th June, 1941.
3. For representative samples of this genre see Alexei Surkov,
'Serdtsa Materei', September, 1942; 'Ni Shagy Nazad' Listovlca
So Stikhami 1942; 'Stikhi 0 Nenavisti' Sbornik Voennykh
Stikhotvorenii 1943, I.I. Anisiroov et al (editors)
Literaturnoe nasledstvo sovetskie pisateli na frontakh
Veiikoi 0techestvennoi voiny, Moscow, Nauka, 1966; see also
A. Werth, The Year of Stalingrad, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1946,
pp.81, 143-6, 169, 304, 468, for an account of Surkov the
'Soldier's Poet'. A. Surkov took part in the 'Accursed War'
(klyatva voina) from 26th June, 1941. I am using Surkov words
as a direct quote from tape recorded interview, 1967, see,
Soviet Military Materials Collection (Professor J. Erickson,
Higher Defence Studies, University of Edinburgh, henceforth
cited as SMMC), see also, K. Simonov, 'Russkie Lyudi' 1941-42;
L. Leonov, 'Nashestvie', 1941; A. Korneichuk, 'Front' 1942,
Velilcaya Otechestvennaya, Moscow, IChudozhestvennaya Literatura,
1966; also V. Grossman, Narod bessmerten, Moscow, Goslitizdat,
1942.
'The war has made it our duty to understand the
Russian person as a historical phenomenon'
('ponyat russkogo cheloveka kak istoricheskogo
phenomena' )**
In his first war article, Shto mi zashchishchaem (What do we defend?),
Tolstoi reminded his readers of Russia's long and difficult history.
Another writer, B. Gorbatov, wrote in 1942:-
'Motherland is a general word. There are
twenty million square kilometers and two
hundred million people on the land. But
to every one Motherland is the very neigh¬
bourhood, the very hut where he was born ' ^
I. Ehrenburg, dealing with the duty of the writer, wrote:-
'It is not the right time now to talk about
the influence the war has on the creative power
of one poet or another. Far more important is
to establish what influence the creative writer
has upon the soldier'.6
Apart from coming to terms with the significance of the war they were
fighting, Soviet writers had to define their image of the enemy.
4. A. Tolstoi, 'Russkii Kharakter', Istoriya russkoi sovetskoi
literatury, Vol.Ill p.31.
5. Ibid., p.33.
6. Ibid., (Quoted from Literatura i iskusstvo, 3rd February, 1942).
Despite political reasons to do otherwise7, the general line taken
in articles and literary works during the early years of the war was
unlimited hatred developed into the 'scientific' exploitation of
emotion 'nauka nenavisti', the 'science of hate'8. The Germans were
portrayed as monsters who did not deserve humane treatment and who
only got it because no Soviet soldier would descent so low as the
German-Fascists own standard8.
7. The official line finally made a distinction between 'Hitler and
hi.s Gang' and the German People. See for instance S. Colikov,
Vidayushchicsya Pobedy Sovetskoi Armii v Velikoi 0teche3tvennoi
voine, Gospolitizdat, 1954, p.55 'The Soviet people destroy the
German-Fascist occupiers not because they hate the German nation
but because the German-Fascist aggressors dared to encroach on a
sacred Soviet soil'. Compare Marshall I.V. Stalin, On The Great
Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, Speeches, Orders of the Day,
and answers to foreign press correspondents, London, Hutchison
and Co., Ltd., 1943. 'Speech at celebration meeting of the
Moscow Soviet of Working People's Deputies and Moscow Party and
Public Organisations' 6th November, 1941, p.l7j*The German
invaders want a war of extermination with the peoples of the
U.S.S.R. well, if the Germans want to have a war of extermination,
they will get it', to 'Order of the Day No.55, 23rd February,
1942, p.27 'The foreign press sometires carries such twaddle as
that the Soviet people hate the Germans just as Germans, that the
Red ^rray exterminate German soldiers out of hatred for everything
German and that therefore the Red Army does not take German
soldiers prisoner, that of course is a similar stupid lie '.
8. iuiuke Nenavisti is the name of a book of short stories by
Sholokhov, published by Pravda, ly42; see also A. Werth, op.cit.
pp.80-81.
9. Wartime hatred was built on former emotional layers consisting of
suspicion, fear, but also longstanding cultural influence and even
admiration, see: M.T. Florinsky, Russia, a History and an Inter-
pretation, New York, Macmillan, 12th printing, 1967, vol.11
pp.808, 936, also Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Spirit of Russia,
London, Drayton House, 1961, pp.120-125; also, Von Karl-Heinz
Jansen, 'Solscheaizyn: August Vierzehn', Die Zeit, No.31, 4th
August, 1972, p.11, emphasising the author's admiration for the
German soldier.
Grossman, Gholokhov, Sinonov, Nekrasov, Tikhooov, Surkov,
Polevoi, A. iiek and others contributed by writing stories and poetry.
Articles had some elements of pathos (V publitsistike vozradilis
elemcnti patetichesky proai)10 while stories were written in simple
'front-line' language. An impressive, impressionistic book like
K. Siuonov's Ani i ..oehi (first published in Arasnaya Zvezda 24th
September 1242, and as a book in 1944) usee, a language which strikes
the reader with its 'appealing absence of bombast'.1* 11. Aliger,12
Anna Akhmatova, A. Surkov and Tvardovski,13 to mention but a few,
used their poetical power to touch emotions which no other form of
art can move. On top of all this the historians found innumerable
newsletters, personal letters and diaries as well as films and press
releases. The selection of these documents carrying the direct
impact of the war made the history books of the post-war period.
The first miserable year of the war called for harsh, real¬
istic treatment. Later, the first confrontation vith die Germans
x,*as to be a source of embarrassment, and frank narration of Simonov's
10. Istori^a_Sovetskoi Literatury, Vol.111, p.31.
11. G. Struve, Soviet Russian Literature 1917^1950, University of
Oklahoma Press, 1951, p.301.
12. Margarita Aliger, Zoya, Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya, 1943. Some
of the poems in this volume were written during the first year
of war, for instance: 'Sokol'nxki' September, 1941; 'Kiev',
December, 1941; 'Vesny v Leningrad', 1942, is a most powerful
poem from that terrible year. See also A. Werth, op.cit.,
p.146 for the significance of the name 'Zoya' ana Lidov's
reportage about her.
13. Tvardovskii, 'Vasili Terkin' Krasnoartaeiskaya Pravda No.425,
4th September, 1942 (quoted in Literaturnoe nasledstvo).
type frowned upon. A. Bek's Volokolamskoe Sliossei (1344), which had
dealt with the defence of Moscow during the terrible winter of 1941,
raised the all-important question of the Red Army officer's role.
This too was to be treated differently later, after the war was won.
Poems and pamphlets praising the allies and the Grand Alliance, or
merely describing Great Britain and the U.S.A. in favourable terms,
were to be equally embarrassing in times to come.
War-time literature had been written with patriotic zeal by
people who were undoubtedly devotee to the cause. Only a few of them
touched on controversial issues; the rest wrote simple, patriotic
material of indifferent literary value which could be used anytime,
sometimes with alterations like the Molodays Gvardiya by Fadeev.ll+
The bulk of this material was doomed to temporary oblivion, but some
of it was to be alternately shelved and re-published.15
The military side did not fare any better, although the post
mortem was easier. Books, poems and pamphlets were published and
distributed with the state's blessing. Hundreds of thousands of
books and leaflets found their way into private libraries. It was a
laborious, indeed impossible task to withdraw them all.16 With
official documents it was a different story. They were restricted
and were meant to reach as few people as possible. This was the case
14. M. Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II, hew York, London,
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, p.58. Kultura i zhizn, November
1947, criticized Molodaya Gvardiya saying that the party was not
represented correctly in the book.
15. Harrison E. Salisbury, The Siege of Leningrad, London, Seeker
and Warburg, 1969, pp.571-580.
16. A. Werth, op.cit., p.146 of the 1942 edition of Tvardovskii's
Vasili Terkin 80,000 copies were printed.
8.
with maps, orders and certainly telegrams and telephone conversations.
Whereas the official line concerning literature was tortuous and
erratic the line concerning documents was clear-cut. Although
complete silence might have been the best solution the Soviet Govern¬
ment could not follow this course. Mass media had ever been essential
in the Soviet Union. Second best was selection.
The months preceding, and the first hours, days and weeks of
the Great Patriotic War were baffling and confused. Political
directives were ambiguous, both calling for alertness and warning
against provocation and orders were given and withdrawn.17 However,
since the beginning of the war all the orders were consistent in at
least one respect: they were all permeated with defiance, all aimed
at the destruction of the enemy. Many orders were belated, confusing,
equivocal and impossible to carry out, but none was defeatist, not a
single one called upon the Red Army to surrender. At times, during
the first retreats and encirclements, this very determination worked
to the detriment of the army, but the spirit in which these orders
were promulgated and often their very wording helped, later, to con¬
struct a better image of the initial period of the war. Thus, in
order of the day No.308 of 18th September, 1941, Stalin mentioned
active defence (aktivnaya oborona).18 Irrespective of whether this
17. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe narodu, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p.205;
see also Bagramyan, Tak nachinalas voina, Moscow, Voenizdat,
1971, p.68; see also Nekrasov, Front Line JStalingrad, London,
Sphere Books, 1970, pp.9-10.
18. R. Garthoff, How Russia Makes War, London, Bradford and Dickens,
1954, p.439. 'Active Defence' in the form of counter-attacks
was conducted from the very first days of the war.
type cf defence had been necessary in September 1941, the expression
was used later co mould the Stalinist version cf the war.
)n the otner hand, attempts to deal squarely and profession¬
ally with the disasters of the initial period, like Calnktiouov's
article in Voennaya mysl No.6, 1942,15 were not encouraged, later,
when the official line had changed. In the order of tne day, 2"ird
February, 1942, there had been an evaluation of surprise attack which
was deprecated in favour of the 'permanently operating factors' as
defined by Stalin, namely the stability of tne rear, the morale of
the army, the ^uantity and quality of the divisions, the armaments
available and the organizing ability of the cor and personnel. The
'permanent' were contrasted with the 'transitory' factors of which
only one was mentioned by Stalin - 'surprise attack'.20 In the con¬
text of 1942, when the outcome of the war was still in the balance,21
it was a brave and politically shrewd thing to say, but later, in a
new context, it became another element of 'Stalinist military
science'. When the 'Stalinist version' of the war was taking shape,
an attempt was made to cover up the real nature of the surprise at
the beginning of the war, and to present the retreats and defeats of
that period as a pre-planned scheme which had aimed to trade territory
19. Gallagher, op.cit. p.73. Analysing tin failure of the
blitzkrieg Major-General Galaktionov said that the basic German
weakness was luck of sufficiently strong strategic forces
capable of deciding the outcome of the war before? the Red Army
uau succeeded in re-establisuing its defence front.
20. Garthoff, op.cit. pp.18, 34-33, 450 K.27.
21. A. berth, op.cit. pp.12b, 139, 148, 152-155. A sample of
uiary entries of July, 1>42, depicting the situation, the mood
and the propaganda lines in the Soviet Union in tho3c days.
for the time needed to mobilize and concentrate the Red Army. The
fact that the army had not been ready before was explained by the
treacherous nature of the German attack. A pre-planned scheme like
that could only have been implemented if the rear was stable, the
morale of the army high, and the other 'permanent factors' were
operative. Since the ideological assumption was that the Soviet
'art of war' was superior to any other, indeed unique, it followed
that no 'transitory factor' like surprise could prevail. Con¬
sequently any attempt to deal with the nature of surprise attack was
frowned upon because it meant the deprecation of Stalinist military
science. Whatever had been the reasons for the war-time termin¬
ology, those phrases later assumed a different political role. The
damaging ones were conveniently dropped, the useful ones were
tailored for their new ideological place in post-war historiography.
The Grand Alliance had its share of thi3 tribulation.
During the period 1941-43 British and American aid was absolutely
necessary. The led Army was dreadfully mauled; the war industry,
in the process of its evacuation to the east, could harly cope with
the tremendous task of keeping the war machine going, and the cry for
'a second front now' was both genuine and desperate. So were the
suspicions and frustrations on the Soviet side when it did not
materialize until 1944. Both these contradictory imperatives found
expression at the time, for instance in Stalin's May-day speech in
1942, when Great Britain and the U.S.A. x-/ere assigned first place
among freedom loving countries, and in many articles in the Soviet
press at the time, as well as in some stormy meetings between Stalin
and Churchill.22 However, during the Cold War only the frustrations
and the suspicions were emphasized, the positive aspects of the
alliance and of the allies' contribution to the war effort being
forgotten.23
The tone of the writing changed considerably during 1943
when the Soviet leadership, still facing bitter fighting, had grounds
to believe that the black days of Kiev, Kharkov and the retreat to
the Volga would not return. At the beginning of 1944 the Soviet
Union no longer faced destruction, but there were still fierce battles
ahead, and the immense devastation of nearly three years of war was
gradually becoming impressed on people's minds. The problem of
victory and reconstruction pushed aside for a while the painful quest
for the causes of the initial defeats. Post-war Europe was be¬
ginning to take shape even before the landing in Normandy.
22. Herbert Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, The War They waged and
the Peace They Sought, Princeton University Press, 1957, pp.74-79;
see also; Churchill, The Second World War, Cassell and Co., Ltd.,
1950, Vol.IV. pp.60-63, 70.
23. Gallagher, op.cit., pp.24N,50,70,88; see also Stalin's
correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman,
1941-1945, London Lawrence and Wis'nart. 1.953, p. 12 (18 July, 1941)
pp.20-22 (6 September, 1941) Note in particular p.22 - 'Our common
liberation cause', p.38 (27 December, 1941), p.40 (14 February,
1942), p.56 (23 July, 1942) the 'Second Front' is the recurrent
theme in many of the documents, but starting from July there is a
noticeable urgency and impatience on the Soviet side. p.178
(26 December, 1941), pp.160-181 (27 December, 1944) pp.200-201
(29 March, 1945) pp.205-206 (3 April, 1945). These documents
are a sample testifying to the rudiments of the cold war. See
also. Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror, the onset of the cold
war 1945-1950, London, Anthony Blond, 1970 pp.15-16, 20-26;
also David Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam, Penguin Books,
1969, p.25-26, 31-33. Both Feis and Horowitz emphasise the
decisive effect of Roosevelt's death on Soviet-American relations.
The nations's attention had to be turned from the terrible past,
about which many a good writer still wrote, towards the future which
was being moulded and planned in the minds of Churchill, Truman (who
replaced Roosevelt on 12th April, 1944) and Stalin. Not only
material devastation faced the victors at the end of the war; the
burden of their spiritual wounds was as heavy. Ruined cities could
be reconstructed with money and toil, but maimed spirits needed
soothing, encouragement and inspiring leadership.
At the end of the war Stalin paid an astonishing tribute to
the Russian people.21* There was still hope of keeping the unity of
leadership and people as it had been formulated during the war, but
that meant paying tribute to the living as well as to the dead; the
praising of victory as well as investigating defeat; condemning
those responsible for the initial debacle while rewarding the heroes.
The risk of free discussion was its prize - the truth. On 9th
February 1946, Stalin made it clear he was not going to take this
course. In a speech to the electors of the Stalin district in
Moscow he inaugurated the official reinterpretation of the war.
According to this, the German attack did not come as a surprise; the
Party and the Soviet system had prepared the country for war. Hence
there were no defeats; it had all been well planned. Soon, the
outline of a retroactive strategy was discernible, while the nascent
hope for a better future was dashed. During the period 1946-48
there were still various voices, reminiscent of the heroic past.
Pravda's editorial on Victory Day 1946 mentioned Stalin's tribute of
24. Gallagher, op.cit. p.21.
13.
the previous year to his fellow countrymen, and to the soldiers who
raised the flag on the Reichstag. On 22nd June 1946, in Pravda, the
historian Mints praised the people and the military leaders, while
Zamyatim wrote on the same date, in the same paper, about the Stavka
and 'our generals and officers'. Yet the Stalin version was
gradually being shaped into an all-pervasive ideology of the Great
Patriotic War. In February 1947 Stalin wrote his letter to Colonel
Razin25 in which he claimed that he had applied a complex and subtle
strategy of counter-offensive.26 This was the cue; other writers
followed suit. Thereafter German perfidy, British slyness and
American imperialism became easy targets. They were accused of a
colossal conspiracy against the Soviet Union. They had taken part
in the intervention, they were parties to German reconstruction after
both the first and second world wars and they X7ere in collusion over
the Munich Agreement, which was described as 'the price of an under¬
taking (by Germany) to launch war on the Soviet Union'.27 Thus the
allies' contribution was not merely played down but actually
denigrated.
In 1949, on his 70th birthday, Stalin reviewed the whole
course of the war without mentioning the name of any general.28
Having established himself as the sole hero of the Great Patriotic
War and a military innovator of genius, he proceeded to revise both
25. Gallagher, op.cit., p.42.
26. See Note 20.
27. Gallagher, op.cit., p.24. Compare to sentiments expressed in
Stalin, op.cit., p.12.
28. Gallagher, op.cit., p.19.
14.
past history (The Tarle dispute29) and recent history. The war in
the Facific was by and large a Japanese venture and since the Battle
of Midway basically an American commitment. The Russians acknow¬
ledged this fact as well as their own weakness at sea, and Avarin's
book Bojr'ba za Tikhii Okean which was published in 1947 did not dispute
the fact. However by that time the Cold War had already been under
way and the Stalin version of the war was nearly completed. Under
such circumstances there was no room for praise of the U.S.A. navy.
By 1947 the American maritime capability was no longer considered part
of a 'Grand Alliance' aimed at a Fascist aggressor, but a tool of
'World Imperialism' designed to threaten the Soviet Union. The new
version of the book which was published in 1952 was overtly anti-
American. 30
In the new version of the war, the initial defeats were de¬
picted as part of a pre-planned strategy. In this description there
was no room for surprise attack.31 The Germans were treacherous and
in collusion with other imperialist powers - the former allies - and
they attacked the peace-loving first Socialist country in the world.
But the wise leader had foreseen it all and, together with the
Communist Party, or even alone, had prepared the country for the
contest between Socialism and Capitalism in its basest form -
Imperialism. The Stalin version of the History of the Great
Patriotic War, 1941-1945, had to account for strategic and global
29. M. Gallagher, op.cit., p.54.
30. Ibid., pp.85,88.
31. Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, (Second Edition), Leningrad,
1951, Vol.8 p.439.
15.
problems as well as tactical and national ones. The easiest problems
to gloss over were the global ones. Only a few people were involved
in decision-making in the highest Soviet echelons. The problems were
of a different nature, however, lower down in the command, and worse
still among the soldiers baptized in battle between 22nd June and
3rd July 1941. Those who survived the war were mature enough after¬
wards to understand what had happened. The theoretical, and indeed
the practical significance of surprise attack was diminished in the
Stalin version of the war, contrary to their personal experiences
which were, more often than not, private hells.
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the period is the
scarcity of writing about the war. Altogether, up to 1947, there
was only one pamphlet of 71 pages - Professor I.I. Mints' Velikaya
Otechestvennaya voina Sovetskogo Soyuza - published in Moscow in
1947.32 The History of the Second World War was re-written, inter¬
spersed with episodes taken from reality but interpreted according to
contemporary policies and needs. From 1948-53 the Stalin version
was the only one. S. Golikov's book Vidayushchiesya pobedy
Sovetskoi Armii v Velikoi 0techestvennoi voine, the second edition of
which was printed in 1954, is one of the finest examples of the
32. S. Bialer, (Editor), Stalin and his Generals, New York, Pegasus,
1969, p,16N. During the war and immediately afterwards there
were several works describing particular campaigns. The
following list is a sample: Osvobozhdennii Tikhvin, sbornik
dokumentov i materialov o razgrome nemetsko - fashistskikh voisk
pod Tikhvinom v Dekabre, 1941 goda, Leningrad, Leninzdat, 1941;
also A.S. Chuyanov, Bolsheviki Stalingrad - gorod - geroya,
gorod slavy, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1946; also E.A. Shilovskii
et al, Vostochno-Pruskaya operatsiya krasnoi Armii 1945g.,
Moscow, Voenizdat, 1946, also, N. Artem'ev Razgrom nemetsko -
fashistkikh voisk v Vengrii, desyati udar Oktyabr1944 - Mart
1945g, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1947.
'Stalin Version', in which defeat, disorder, cowardice, surprise and
shock were not to be mentioned. This version, however, was fraught
with pitfalls which became apparent very soon after Stalin's death.
3ut even though the post-Stalin version tended to generalise less
than the previous one, the approach was still on the large scales
that is to say, no attempt was made to analyse what really happened
to the soldiers who died on the western border before they were given
the order to open fire. The brilliance of the ultimate victory
covered up the misery of the initial setbacks. The use of general¬
isations like the 'Communist Party won', the 'Leader of genius
planned', 'the Great Soviet People fought' made it impossible to
find out what individual communists were doing, whether plans existed
and, if so, whether they worked. Was it true that the Great Soviet
People fought, or did only part of it fight? Did it fight all the
time or only part of the time, and with what degree of success at each
period?
The new approach to the problem of surprise attack is closely
associated with the rising influence of Zhukov, who became Minister of
Defence on 3th February, 1955. (In March, 1955 six officers were
promoted to the rank of Marshall of the Soviet Union and four to
Marshal of a branch of the armed forces.) Throughout his life as an
adult Zhukov was a professional soldier. Although it was inevitable
that his growing influence on the armed forces and the assertiveness
of the military in the first years following Stalin's death, would
have political undertones, Zhukov's main interest was professional.33
33. R. Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party,
Princeton University Press, 1967, pp.245-248 for a different
interpretation of the period 1953-1957.
17.
The tievr balance of power in Europe and beyond forced a new
outlook on both strategists and politicians. Preoccupation concern¬
ing a future nuclear war imposed a different attitude towards past
events on some writers. The unified picture of a pre-planned, well
conducted Soviet war strategy crumbled under endless blows from many
directions. A reappraisal of surprise attack was necessitated by
the contemporary preponderance of nuclear weapons. In order to
prepare for a possible nuclear surprise attack it was necessary to
understand the causes of the previous failure to anticipate the
German one. Thus the increasing influence of the military and the
considerable 'nuclear gap' between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. com¬
bined to create a more sober approach to the Great Patriotic War than
hitherto. Proryv podgotviennoi oborony sterlkovyni soyedineniyami,
(breakthrough rifle units prepared line of defence) is a collection of
professional articles (published in 1957) 31* about the ways and the
means used by the Red Army during 41 operations from 7-8 December,
1941, to 16-18 April, 1945. Every article is accompanied by a
schematic map and complete data about artillery. Although A.M.
Samsonov's book Velikaya Bitva pod Uoskvoi33 deals with the political
side of the war, it is basically a balanced account of the war
and its historiography. It is a step forward in Soviet
34. Proryv podgotovlennoi oborony strelkovyiai soedineniyarai, po
opytu Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-45, sbornik statei,
Moscow, Voenizdat, 1957; also, Major General N.M. Mironov,
Lieutenant-Colonel V.A. Matsulenko (Editors), Sbornik materialov
po is torii Sovetskogo voennogo iskusstva v Velikoi Otecheatvennoi
voine 1941-45, (Frunze Academy), Voenizdat, 1956.
35. A.M. Samsonov, Velikaya Bitva pod Moskvoi, Moscow, Akademii Nauk
SSSR, 1958, pp.7-13, 50.
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approach in stating that the Creat Patriotic War was part of the
Second World War. It is also stating that there were mistakes in
the conduct of the war during the first months. These books
together with books by Kharitonov - Boevie deistvie Sovetskoi Armii
pod Tikhvinom v 1941 godu, Moscow, 1958, and Bitva za Tula,, sbornik
raaterialov i dokumentov, Tula 1957 and by B. Borisov - Podvig
Sevastopolya, Moscow, 1957, and Vtoraya Mirovaya Voina 1939~45g.36
are but a few examples of the many works which saw light in that
period. The professional military approach on the one hand and a
more balanced political approach on the other paved the way to better
understanding of the first period of the war.
By a process of cross-fertilisation, the fine arts were
creating the climate for freer research. A Central Committee document
of 3rd July 1953, portrayed the war as a triumph of Party policy and
ignored Stalin.37 With Stalin's inhibiting figure phasing out,
rejuvenation of military thought became an easier matter, and this
happened none too soon. After the first Soviet Hydrogen explosion
it was high time to introduce new lines of thought to the Army. The
emergence of ideas like 'first strike capability1, 'pre-emptive strike'
and 'deterrence' made a study of the previous war experience a factor
of commanding importance. The first to broach the problem of
36. Lieutenant-General S.P. Platonov et_._al. (editors) Vtoraya
Mirovaya Voina, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1958.
37. Gallagher, op.cit. p.129.
NOTE:
The books mentioned in Notes Nos. 34,35,36 signify a change of
approach to history writings of the war, as such they facilitated
the way to better understanding of surprise attack and were fore¬
runners of the Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Sovetskogo
Soyuza 1941-1945 (henceforth cited as IVOV with relevant year of
publication and volume number). See also: U.S. Dinerstein,
War and the Soviet Union, London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, p.11.
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surprise attack and its significance was Marshal Rotmistrov in an
article which appeared in Voennaya mysi (February 1955) under the
title '0 role vnezapnosti v sovremennoi voine'. Voennaya r.iysl
(ho.3, 1955) claimed the official history led not only to distortion
of the actual military events of 1941, but also to idealisation of
the form of combat portrayed, 'and incorrectly orientates our
military cadres to the possibilities of repeating it in a future
war'.38 Literaturnaya Gazeta followed with an article (28tli May 1955)
by the Deputy Chief of the Main Political Administration, Lieutenant
General Shatilov, warning against the danger of Western attack and
calling for a reappraisal of surprise attack in World War II.
Marshal Rotmistrov pushed on in November 1955, in an article in
Voennii vestnik No.11, entitled Vnezapnost v istorii voin, which
proved that military circles were interested in the theoretical
discussion of surprise attack.
The road to the 20th Party Congress was wide open. Not all
the problems had been aired, and there were many disputes as to how
far criticism could go without undermining the very foundation of
authority, be it of the State, the Party, or the Military. In
literature some liberal critics went so far as to call into question
all and any authority. Prominent among these was V. Pomerantsev,
who argued persuasively that 'the degree of sincerity, i.e., the
spontaneity, of a work ... must be the main yardstick of its worth,
38. Gallagher, op.cit., p.133; see also, U.S. Dinerstein, op.cit.,
p.9; also Ibid., pp.170-174. A long quotation from Voennaya
mysl No.3, 1955, pp.3-17, alluding among other things to the
difficulties in publishing Marshal Rotmistrov's article.
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rather than its political correctness'.39 However, the problem on
the military side was different. The most ardent critics themselves
did not suggest that the authority of the state or even that of the
Party should be discarded. The revision of the past and the search
for a new cohesive interpretation, to be used as an ideology which
would improve combat-readiness in the future, were conducted
simultaneously. The 'secret speech' at the 20th Party Congress140
set the seal on the break from the mythical Stalinist version of the
war. It was a violent wrench which caused Togliatti to react:
Previously all the good was due to the superhuman
qualities of one man; now all the evil is
attributed to his equally exceptional and shocking
defects.41
Directly or indirectly, the 20th Party Congress precipitated the
revolts in Poland and Hungary, which in their turn halted the process
of de-Stalinisation. Although it was later to gather momentum once
more and along much the same lines, it was never to be entirely
satisfactory with regard to the vital re-evaluation of surprise
attack. It had a beneficial effect only within the context of other
39. V. Erlich, 'Soviet Literary Criticism: Past and Present'
A. Brumberg, (Editor), Russia under Khrushchev, Methuen and Co.
Ltd., London, 1962, p.354. This approach was criticized during
1955 as: 'Philistinism, Apolitical and Subjectivism'.
40. Jane Degras, 'Anatomy of Tyranny: Khrushchev attack on Stalin'
Ibid., pp.79-84, see also: Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin,
(translated by Helen Katel), Collins, London, 1969, pp.40-50;
also E. Crankshaw, Khrushchev, Collins, London, 1966, pp.227-243,
for the text of the speech, the authenticity of which has never
been denied by the Russians, see, T.H. Rigby (Editor), The Stalin
Dictatorship, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1966, pp.23-84.
41. M. Frankland, Khrushchev, Penguin Books, Ltd., 1966, p.124.
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liberalizing measures, such as rehabilitation of t^e Purges' victims,
and o£ prisoners of war, many of whom still languished defamed. As
Togliatti pointed out, there was no panacea in stressing the negative
aspects of what had previously been considered to have only positive
ones. Applying de-Stalinisation to the interpretation of the war
was but another form of over-simplification, as the problem seemed
highly complex, and the area of responsibility for ill-preparedness
before the war far too wide. No one person could be blamed for it,
not even one particular sector of the leadership. In short, many
more areas were opened up for research in the Khrushchev period, and
more material became available, but the research method was not yet
adjusted to deal with the real reasons for the success of the Herman
surprise attack.
Even though the 'thaw' was practically over, the relaxed
attitude of the Party was not slow in producing fruit. On 25th
February 1956 the 20th conference of the Communist Party unanimously
ratified the Khrushchev report about the 'Cult of the Personality'
which is 'foreign to Marxism-Leninism'**2 and asked the Central
Committee to liquidate its results. In April-May 1956 Voprosi
istorii called for a broad review of the whole of Stalin's historical
legacy, including the war. In September 1957 the Central Committee
decided to sponsor a new multi-volume history of the war and the
historians were carefully instructed as to the nature of the work
they were expected to produce:
42. Voprosy ideologicheskoi raboty sbornik vazhneishikh reshenii
KPSS (1954-1961 godi), Moscow, Politiclieskoi Literatury, 1961,
p.11.
It was deemed necessary to print during 1957-60
the 'History of the Great Patriotic War of the
Soviet Union in 1941-45'; in five volumes1*3
The 'History of the Great Patriotic War of the
Soviet Union in 1941-45' should present deep
Marxist research into all the aspects of the war
history during the years 1941-45 ....
The work should be an informative general review
and characterisation of the preparations of Fascist
Germany and other Imperialist powers to unleash
aggression against the Soviet Union; it should
show the heroic battle of the Soviet Union at both
front and rear; the most important operations of
the Soviet Army and Navy; the might of the armed
forces and the superiority of Soviet military art.1*1*
The sixth volume was apparently produced as an afterthought and on
tiie whole the Soviet historians were true to above terms of
reference. The six-volume 'History of the Great Patriotic War'
was a milestone on the road of Soviet historiography.
One of the results of the 'cult of personality'
(kult lichnosti) in the science of history was the
insufficiency of archival documents, the narrow¬
ness of the source substance and the limited
themes of research.1*0
The 'History of the Great Patriotic War' set out to correct these
shortcomings of the past, but it was still caught within the straight-
jacket of its own terms. The interpretation of the war was still
deficient (Stalin occupied his place at the dock, together with
Zhukov) but many new facts saw light for the first time. Although
43. IVGV, 1964, Vol.VI, p.405.
44. Voprosy ideologicheskoi raboty, p.Ill
45. IVOV, 1964, Vol.VI p.404.
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no order of battle of the Red Array prior to 21st June 1941 was
provided, there was ample data indicating procurement and production
difficulties in pre-war years. If, in Stalin's time the unprepared-
ness of the country in 1941 was a forbidden subject and the 1941
surprise wholly attributed to the treacherous nature of the attack,
in these books there was evidence enough of difficulties which caused
the state of unpreparedness, and of the blame attaching to Stalin.
Even though the Khrushchev period did not entirely open up
the question of surprise attack, it did point the way to a new mode
of writing about the war, and, consequently, made historical research
more fruitful. One thousand and two hundred books, pamphlets and
articles about the war were written during the years 1946-56, whereas
during the years 1956-61 there were over two thousand. In 1946-56
there were thirty-five books about the first period of the war and in
1956-60 there were one hundred and eighteen.4+6 Anfilov's book,
Nachalo Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,**7 which first came out in 1962,
marked a major breakthrough in the study of 1941 and surprise attack.
This book by Anfilov deals squarely with the first month of the war
(22nd June to mid-July 1941) basing its findings on personal experience
as well as on archival material. In the second edition Bessraertnyi
Podvig.4*8 Anfilov extends his reach, using more archival documents
46. IVOV, 1964, Vol.VI, p.406, Note, The key journal Voenno -
Istoricheskii Zhurnal began re-publication in 1959, (henceforth
cited as VIZ).
47. V.A. Anfilov, isacnalo Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, Moscow,
Voenizdat, 1962. It was published in 50,000 copies, indicating
a popular edition.
48. V.A. Anfilov, Bessinertnyi Podvig, Moscow, NAUKA, 1971. This
edition was published in only 25,000 copies.
to describe in great detail the activities of Armies and of small
units, sometimes as small as one artillery battery. He was
obviously interested in grand strategy but he concentrated his
attention more on the deeds of commanders in the field. At the same
time, the vastly increased bulk of the second edition can be explained
not merely by the addition of new material, particularly in the area
of viewing surprise attack in terms of Soviet doctrinal appreciation,
but also by long (even long-winded) political explanations which are
designed to exonerate the Party. This was absent in the first
edition and even in the second, for all this elaborate addition, it
is still apparent that the Party cannot be completely exonerated.
For obvious reasons, Anfilov's findings must form an appreciable
element of this present study: all that is intended at this juncture
is to place him in the chronology of fundamental writing on 1941.
As soon as rigorous censorship was relaxed and military
historians felt their hands freer, the discussion was brought down to
the battle-fields. Gradually it became possible to write in a
critical way about episodes in small sections of the enormous front.
Konstantin Simonov's book Zhivie 1 Mertvie gives an account of the
panic in Moscow on 16th October 1941**9 and probes the problems of
surprise.50 The above account and many others were in glaring
contrast to the neat picture of pre-planned, well organised retreat
and counter-offensive of the 'Stalin version'. The marshals and the
49. A. Werth, Russia at War, London, 1964, pp.228-233. For an
account of the panic in Moscow - bol'shoi drapi
50. K. Siraonov, Zhivie i Mertvie, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1961, p.281
16th October in Moscow; p.275, Masha and Zosima Ivanovich's
conversation.
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services were competing with each other as to who, or which, was the
first to sense the approaching war in June, May, even April 1941.
Every arm and service attempted to stress its own special contribution
to the war effort.
Only with very great difficulty did we prove the
necessity of creating anti-tank artillery
formations. For over a year the Hitlerite in¬
vaders had demonstrated the massive use of tanks
on the fields of Europe. We had to prepare
reliable artillery screens against them. 1
In his book V nachale voiny, A.I. Yeremenko says:
Generally speaking, many of us who seriously
analysed the problem of employing tanks in
modern warfare doubted the advisability of
organising tank forces in brigade-size units.52
These are only two of many such comments.
Throughout the Khrushchev period, 1957-64, Khrushchev's
personal role during the war was emphasised while Stalin's was
denigrated and Zhukov's slowly vanished. There were still many
distortions, too many omissions and too few primary sources.
51. Chief Marshal Artillery Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, Moscow,
Voenizdat, 1963, pp.166-167. See also Ibid., pp.157-162,
165-169. See also I.I. Fedyuninskii, Podnyatie po trevoge,
Moscow, Voenizdat, 1964, pp.5,10,12; also K.S. Moskalenko,
Na yugo-zapadnogo napravlenii, Moscow, Nauka, 1969, pp.14-28;
also, Anfilov, Eessmertnyi podvig, pp.95-96, 116-118,134, also
Marshal M.V. Zakharov 'Stranitsy istorii sovetskikh vooruzhennykh
sil nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny', Voprosy istorii,
No.5, 1970, pp.44-48.
52. A.I. Yeremenko, V nachale voine, Nauka, 1964, p.48, see also
pp.39-41,46 (A former edition, A.I. Yeremenko, Na zapadnom
napravlenii, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1959).
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The scientific quality of sources and archival
material (dealing with the history of the Great
Patriotic War. A.S.) was put in doubt. Archival
stocks were used, as a rule, to illustrate well-
known postulations. The regard for fact, with¬
out which history as a science is simply
impossible, was not there.53
Yet, with all this, there was notably less cogency in official
interpretation. Some marshals, who felt they would be protected by
Khrushchev, put out their own versions of what happened within their
special field of responsibility during the war, as did many other
commanders who published their memoirs during that period - P.I.
Batov, V pokhodakh i boyakh; S.S. Biryuzov, Kogda gremeli pushki;
A.V. Gorbatov, Gody i voiny and A.G. Golovko, Vroeste s^flotom were
but a few.51* Sometimes they wrote for an ulterior motive, for
reasons of personal exoneration or in order to praise or accuse. At
all events the personal intention proved stronger than the political
line, and after the fall of Khrushchev the trickle became a flood.
More and more people from the second and third ranks wanted to put
right not only the Stalinist wrongs but also those of the Khrushchev
era. The result was that instead of the sweeping scenarios of the
'Stalin version', which purported to cover rather than discover, the
new style penetrated deep into events at the level of small units or
remote areas.
53> IVQV» Vol.VI, p.410.
54. For complementary bibliography see IVOV 1964, Vol.VI p.413 N4
see also, J. Erickson, 'The Soviet Union at War (1941-1945):
An Essay on Sources and Studies', Soviet Studies, Vol.XIV
No.3, January, 1963, pp.272-274.
The post-Khrushchev period came nearer than ever to an
understanding of elusive surprise attack. On top of its problems,
the military now faced the problems posed by the Cuban Missiles
Crisis of 1962.55 The gravity of this experience added sobriety and
urgency to military thinking. The need for accurate answers to acute
problems of the present inevitably had a salutary influence on
historical writing. The choice, the outline of which had already
become clear, could not now be avoided. It was either not to write
at all, to write on two separate levels, or to open up the discussion
and link contemporary problems with past experience. The first two
possibilities were not practical because they entailed a return to
terror, and they would have left the military policy of the '60s' in
a void. Yet the third possibility was not easy either since free
discussion, open dispute and academic research necessitated more than
marginal changes in the regime. The result was a compromise. The
terminology, the form anu the access to primary sources remained the
same, but within this framework every writer, who was allowed to
publish, could do as he pleased.
Stalin's image had changed considerably between 1964 and the
present day.56 In Nekrich's controversial book 22 Iyuniya, 1941,
published in the summer of 1965, Stalin was cast as the arch-villain.
The argument of the book, couched in high patriotic terms, was that
55. M. Tatu, op.cit., pp.316-319. When Khrushchev position was
weakened after the 'missile crisis' he had to turn on the writers
and further constrain the remnants of the 'thaw' of 1954-1955.
56. 'Voenachalniki vspominayut', VIZ No.5, 1970, pp.52-101, but
especially Marshal Konev's contribution pp.70-72.
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many people in industry and management had advised Stalin to take the
correct course but he had snubbed them all, and had himself made the
wrong decisions. Nekrich penetrates deep into the problems of
Soviet industry prior to 1941. The book provides a useful 'Who's
who* of Soviet designers in several branches of military industry,57
while pointing up one of the most bedevilling problems of Soviet
industry in those years - serial production:
The tank industry has great possibilities
However, the war in Europe in 1939 40 showed
that the tanks that were in serial production
were outmoded.58
In what amounts to a combination of obituary and analysis hekrich goes
on to show the flaws in the Soviet military doctrine,50 tracing the
roots of the plot against the Soviet high command, which had origin¬
ated in Heydrich's office. At best, according to hekrich, Stalin
was duped by the Germans.60 Yet his final conclusion is:
The Soviet armed forces were not brought to a
condition of top military preparedness in the
face of the obvious threat.61
57. A.M. Nekrich, 22 Iyunya, 1941, Moscow, hauka, 1965, pp.73-75.
58. Ibi_d., op.cit. , p. 75.
59. Ibid., pp.79-88.
bO. Ibid., pp.121, 126-127.
61. Ibid., p.lb2; see also, V. Petrov, 'June 22, 1941' soviet
Historians and^ the German Invasion Columbia, University of
South Carolina Pres3, lbbo, pp.2ob-2bl. 'A meeting of tne
Division of History of the Great Patriotic War of the Institute
of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU, February 16, 1966.'
During the discussion of Nekrich's book conflicting ideas were
aired about tne responsibility of Stalin, Voroshilov budenny
and Golikov for the unpreparedness of the Soviet Union in
22 June, 1941.
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A conclusion both accurate and most confusing since the whole problem
is - was there an 'obvious threat'? A similar impression was conveyed
in I.I. Fedyuninskii's book Podnyatie po trevoge.62 Its argument was
that the army along the borders was aware of the imminent German threat,
that there were clear indications of the approaching attack, but the
fear of provocation paralysed Moscow. To go lovrer down the scale, a
similar sentiment was expressed in I.T. Starinov's book Mlny zhdut
svoego chasa Moscow 1964. Colonel Starinov was chief of the obstacle
and mine-laying section of the Army-Engineer Training Department in the
main Engineering Directorate (GVXU) of the Red Army. Like so many
others he found his way effectively blocked by high-minded Marshal
Kulik.63 Despite the bitter Finnish experience many in the Soviet
High Command found it difficult to think in defensive terms. Defence
and defeat became almost synonymous in the minds of many people in the
pre-war period. Hemmed in between the ideology of the invincible Red
Army and the fear of provocation, many elementary demands regarding
fortification, mine-laying, distribution of ammunition, camouflage and
dispersal of aircraft and airfields, were brushed aside and neglected
until it was too late. To understand what had happened in 1940-41 was
to expose these blunders, to find their causes, and to devise ways by
which they could be avoided in a future war. Some of the post-Khrushchev
writers realised that a surprise attack was not a surprise at all, in
the literal meaning of the word.61* The very fact that they linked
62. See p.25 K51.
63. P.A. Rotmistrov (Editor) Istoriya voennogo iskusstva, Moscow
Voeuizdat, 1963, Vol.11, p.52; see also; VIZ No.2, 1962, p.81
also; Yeremenko, op.cit., p.46.
64. See Appendix No.l.
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the experience of the previous war signified their realisation of the
true nature of the German surprise attack of 1941. They realised
that the establishment of a system of communications - roads, tele¬
phone, telegraph, radio-stations and railways - as well as the
establishment of war industry within the framework of heavy industry
is a long and intricate process; that the training of the army, and
re-armament, are not only capital-consuming processes, they also come
into violent conflict with peace-time operation of the economy. Thus
in a roundabout way Stalin's image began to take on a more human
aspect.65 Obviously he had played a far greater part in decision¬
making before the war, than any of his advisers and generals. Within
the intrinsic anti-militarist atmosphere which was part and parcel of
Communism no one man could have foreseen,let alone prepared the Soviet
Union for a strategic surprise attack, unless he had been ready to
pre-empt, that is to attack Germany. The whole course of Soviet
history since 1917 would have had to be different for the events of
22nd June, 1941, to have been otherwise.
For these reasons particularly the po3t~Khrushchev writers
plunged ever deeper into the history of the war. Painful episodes
were revised, elaborated upon and clarified. The 'second' battle
of Kiev66 which had not been mentioned for a very lone time and which
was related in a vague way in Yeremenko's book: V nachale voirvy, was
65. A.T. Yeremenko, Pomni voinu, Donbas, Donetsk, 1971, p.166.
66. The 'second' battle of Kiev was the result of Hitler's decision
to turn south instead of striking directly at Moscow. The
capture of the bridge across the Dniener near Okuninov on 23rd
August 1941 may be considered the beginning of this battle which
lasted until 19th September.
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presented later in a very different way in a review of that book,67
in Bagramyan's book Gorod-voin na Dnepr, Moscow, 1965 and in
K.S. Moskalenko's Na yugo zapadnoi napravlenni, Moscow 1969. Several
factors accounted for these revisions. Admittedly, censorship in the
late 60's was not as strict as it had been before, but basically it
was the need to come to terms with contemporary political and
military issues which made it necessary to reveal the whole truth about
the past. Notwithstanding the many crucial issues which remained
concealed, the breakthrough into a true evaluation of the past made
bold ventures into the future simpler.
In his book Nad kartoi bylykh srazhenii, Moscow, 1965, General
of the Army M.I. Kazakov pointed out that the Soviet high command was
well aware of the deficiencies in training, and in the war industry,
in December 1940. The December 1940 meeting of the military, to
which not enough attention has hitherto been paid either in the West
or in Soviet historiography, emerges as one of the most important
assemblies of the Soviet high command.68 For the first time since
the purges veteran commanders could fully realise how few of them were
still around. Many of the upstarts were pitiably lacking in experience.
Commanders, military theoreticians, people in charge of combat training
- all learned during the meeting that modern warfare, German-style had
caught them unawares, that no matter what they might do their war
machine would not be fully ready before 1942, and that they would not
be given a free hand to follow their military instincts even if they
67. General of the Army V. Ivanov, Colonel K. Cheremukhin, '0 Knige
"V nachale voiny" 1 VIZ No.6 1965, pp.74-78.
68. See under Chapter I: Also list of participants.
could all agree on what was to be done. No doubt Stalin had known
how dangerous was the proximity of the German Army to the borders,
but he also knew the situation in the Red Army. Moreover like some
of his generals he was spellbound by the First World War experience.
They simply could not conceive of modern warfare with high-speed air¬
craft, swift concentration of huge armoured forces and relentless
pounding of the rear. Conventional wisdom, rather than ignorance or
pusillanimity, was the stmnbling block which prevented any correct
understanding of the nature of the approaching war in 1940-41.
Therefore it is an over-simplification to divide the whole period 1944-
71 into Stalin, Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev sections. Stalin and
Khrushcnev no doubt had great influence on the writing in their
respective times, as indeed many other internal and external develop¬
ments had an influence, but there was also a natural period of gest¬
ation of new ideas. Tremendous changes in the global situation
forced the old rigid formulations to break up. New political-military
problems called for new solutions, and bred new thinking and new ideas.
Soviet strategy for the nuclear age was discussed at great
length in the book Voennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy) edited by
Marshal Sokolovsky. Apart from a general history of warfare, and an
attempt to show the unique nature of Soviet military doctrine, the
authors criticized not only the lack of combat readiness before 1941,
for which they blame Stalin, but also the mistakes in strategic
conception which had been the source of so much agony not only in
194169 but aiso before the battle of Stalingrad, when Soviet strategy
69. Marshal V.R. Sokolovsky (Editor), Military Strategy, London,
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, p. 153. An admission that it was a
mistake to keep the Soviet forces of South-western Front on the
left bank of the Dnieper in September 1941. The result was the
rout near Kiev.
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completely misunderstood the German operative plans. A comparison of
Golikov's and Sokolovsky's description70 of the decisions which led
to the retreat to the Volga and the Battle of Stalingrad puts in
sharp relief the difference between the 'Stalin version' and later
ones, and indicates the long way that Soviet historiography travelled
during the years 1954-63. Only on a basis as firm as that could
Sokolovsky go on to describe the Soviet command structure in the
nuclear age, and point to the danger of possible surprise attack in
the future. This book could not have seen the light of day without
the pioneering work of Galaktionov in 1S42 and Rotmistrov in 1955.
In his turn Sokolovsky opened the way to many other writers
who drew upon the Great Patriotic War experience in reaching con¬
clusions about a future war. Vasilievski, Zakharov, Zavialov and
Reznichenko are only a few among the many writers who made use of
their predecessors' work in order to establish the foundations of a
sound link between the surprise attack of 21-22 June 1941 and the idea
of pre-emptive nuclear attack in the future.71 By revealing the
disastrous effects of a successful surprise attack Meretskov,
Sandalov, Bagramyan, Zhukov, Anfilov and others made it possible to
translate the old ideas of their time - of preparedness, combat
readiness, management and leadership - into the environment of modern
70. Compare Golikov, op.cit. p.62 with Sokolovsky op.cit. p.151.
It is a striking example of the difference between the
'Stalin version' and Soviet outlook in the early sixties.
71. Pre-emptive nuclear attack is probably the most difficult




Many events of the war 3till await further clarification and
thorough research. The understanding of the enemy both in literature
and in history, leaves much to be desired. The German soldier is
still dealt with in an impersonal way, as a faceless representative
of a group of Fascists. In his story, "The Last Verst' Alim Keshokov
puts the following words in the mouth of one of his characters:
Soldiers have always been chivalrous, but these
are not people at all, only wild animals with
their fur turned inside out. To put it simply,
they're Fascists.73
The Germans were depicted as inhuman, cruel and fanatical, not
only at the beginning, when they were pushing ever deeper into the
heart of the Soviet Union, but also in the last period of the war when
they were on the retreat, when columns of German prisoners became a
common sight and when there were many dead and wounded Germans around.
There is some compassion for the wounded:
72. Sokolovsky, op.cit., pp.308-318 about combat readiness; also
pp.366-368 'possible agencies of leadership of the armed forces
of the Soviet Union under modem conditions' Sokolovsky's book
suggestion for a high command in war time suffers from the same
duality which had characterised this institution in June 1941.
See p.259, N.90. See also, V.E. Savkin, Osnovnie printsipy
operativnogo iskusstva i taktiki, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1971; Yu,
E. Novikov, F.D. Sverdlov, Manevr v obshcevoiskovom boyu, Moscow,
Voenizdat, 1967. This is a sample of Soviet hooks dealing with
the problem of modern warfare.
73. Oktyabr, No.3, 1968 (Quoted in Bulletin, Vol.XVIII, 1971, p.41).
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It might be possible to turn these people
into humans. **
This highly emotional attitude towards the Germans is typical of all
Soviet war literature, starting from the 'science of hatred' and up
to the present day. Underlining the emotional approach as manifested
in literature is the political failure to come to terms with Nazism
as a unique revolution which substituted a racial for the 'scientific'
approach to social order, and which represented low-key uninhibited
state violence as the moving force of history instead of high-key
inhibited class rule. Soviet ideology ignored Nazism as a
phenomenon and tackled Hitler and his movement as a brand of Fascism,75
i.e. a degenerate form of Imperialism. Germans are almost invariably
referred to in Soviet literature as 'Fascist-Germans' coming under
the all-embracing Kto-kovo (who will win over whom) which covers the
whole ground of the Soviet Union versus the Imperialist world from
1917 to date.
Only after Soviet historians began to attend to the German
documents could they have a balanced picture of surprise attack.
Russian books written before 1S59, such as B.S. Telpukhovskii
Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg,76 made
exaggerated suggestions about the size and the organisation of the
74. Oleg Smirnov, 'The Northern Crown, Moskva, 1968, Nos.11-12
(quoted in Bulletin Vol.XVIII, 1971, p.42.).
75. Marshal Stalin, op.cit. pp.15-16, for the reasons why the
Germans cannot be called 'National-Socialist'. Note the
irony in the dogmatic attempt at describing Imperialism as
more degenerate than Nazism.
76. B.S. Telpukhovskii, Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina Sovetskogo
Soyuza 1941-1945 gg, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1959.
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German attack. In 1959 two captured German documents were published,
one of 31st January 1941 and the other of 3rd April 1941, to be
followed in the same year by several more covering the period 1 June -
2 July 1941.77 It was only a glimpse of the rich German material,
but combined with later publications'7'3 it sufficed to help responsible
Soviet historians in their attempts at explaining the nature of sur¬
prise attack. The publication of Gentian documents in the Soviet
Union was further enhanced by the translation of the Haider Diary
(Kriegstagebuch) into Russian.75 There are now multiple references
in many Soviet studies to German military writing and to original
German documents.
To sum up, the failure to deal squarely with the surprise
attack of 22nd June 1941 originates from the Soviet approach to the
world around the borders of the Soviet Union. It touches upon the
inherent contradiction which had bedevilled Soviet ideology since
Lenin's time, namely that the Socialist revolution, which had been
launched to put an end to war on earth, found itself up in arms from
its very first days. The stronger the Soviet Union became and the
more eloquently its representatives spread the message of peace, the
larger grew its military budgets. As a national strategy these two
77. VIZ No. 1, 1959, pp.85-93; VIZ No.3, 1959, pp.82--93.
78. V.I. Dashichev (Editor) 'Sovershenno sekretnoi tolko dlya
k- andovaniya'. strategiya fashistskaya germaniya v voine
protiv SSSR. dokumenty i materialy, Moscow, Nauka, 1967.
79. V.I. Dashichev (Editor), General Polkovnik F. Galder, Voeiiaij
Dnevnik, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968.
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genuine trends characterise Soviet policy up to the present and they
have had evident implications in the role of the military in the
Soviet Union. At no time could the army assert itself politically,
nor was it ever given a free hand to react to danger and threats
outside the framework of political prudence, caution or shortsighted¬
ness .
Nor was the failure to perceive the threat in 1941 a result
of technical ineptitude. The Americans in Pearl Harbour had superior
technical facilities; they actually 'knew' that an attack was on the
way, as R. Wohlstetter aptly proved, but they failed to act.80 Nor
can one find a solution in Whaley's argument:
Specifically, the German attack achieved strategic
(and, largely, tactical) surprise by a deliberate
deception operation. ... The effect was to
eliminate ambiguity, making their enemies quite
certain, very decisive, and wrong.81
Neither of the above is fully acceptable although both suggest an
aspect of the solution. Basically the Russians did not believe in
a strategic blow that would end the war. But they were wrong in
stretching their doctrine of war in stages to such an extent that at
no sector of the front were there enough troops when the Germans
struck. Preparing for the second stage of mobilisation, Red Army
80. R. Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor. Warning and Decision, Stanford
University Press, California, 1965.
81. barton Whaley, Operation Larbarossa. A case study of Soviet
strategic information processing before the German invasion,
submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Massacnusetts Institute
of Technology, June 19b9, the introduction.
troops were caught on their \7ay to the front in various stages of
preparedness, and in depths from the border-line up to three hundred
kilometers or more inland. however their very movement westward
suggests that there was no complete deception on a strategic scale.
Their main trouble was that they were deployed in the wrong way from
a tactical point of view. The conclusion that the Russians reached,
when the nuclear age forced them out of their ideological-historical
straightjacket, was that there was no way to prepare against a
surprise attack other than to pre-empt it.82 This conclusion runs
contrary to Soviet military philosophy of the pre-World War II
period, as well as against the avowed Soviet political image. It
took the crisis of the Red Army during 1941-42, and a great deal of
heart searching since Stalin's death, to reach this conclusion, and
not all Soviet writers adhere to it even today.
82. Dinerstein, op.cit. p. 11: see also- Savkin, op.cit. p.118.
The idea that a future nuclear war may start with a surprise
strike and may not last very long which Savkin develops
originated by a line of argument introduced by Talenskii in




Soviet military doctrine rested on one fundamental concept -
the primacy of the offensive. All Field Regulations during the
inter-war years, namely from the Civil War to the Great Patriotic War,
turned on this major theme, which with all its ramifications was
conceived, amplified and sustained for eighteen years by a hard core
of Soviet commanders, theoreticians and weapon designers. Many of
them saw action together or on separate fronts during the First World
War, the Civil War in Spain, the incidents in the Far East and the
Finnish War. They established the Soviet military academies, studied
and taught in them. It is not surprising that they shared many ideas.
In addition, being young and revolutionary their minds were open to
new ideas from other countries. Between them they formulated the
Red Army doctrine. With all the tribulations of collectivisation,
industrialisation and the first two Five-Year plans, the basic tenets
of the Red Army did not change much after the second Field Regulations
were promulgated in 1925. The dominant idea throughout remained the
offensive.
Field Service Regulations 1925 (PU-25)1 Part II, Division and
Corps were worked out by a committee headed by M. Tukhachevsky, who
not only had proved himself as an able commander but had also
produced a book on military theory.2 The quick pace of military
development abroad and in the Soviet Union made it necessary to
improve on past performance of the Red Army and to create a theoretical
1. Polevoi Ustav RKKA 1925 (PU-25), Moscow Gosvoenizdat, 1926.
2. M.N. Tuknachevskii, Voina Klassov, Stat'i 1919-1920 g, Otdel
Voennoi Literatury pri Revolutsionnom Voennom Sovete Respubliki,
Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1921.
framework for future developments. Thus, Field Service Regulations
1929 were ratified by directive No.154 of the Revvoensoviet (The
Revolutionary Military Council) of June, 1929.
The Field Service Regulations of the Red Army
of Workers and Peasants preserved the basic
principal argument and the revolutionary
spirit of manoeuvrability of the Provisional
Field Regulations 1925.^
The major military theoretician who worked out these regulations was
the Chief of Operations in the Red Army Staff, V.K. Triandafillov
whose book, Kharakter operatsii sovrcnennykh armii1* became one of
the pillars of Soviet military thought for over a decade.
Triandafillov's book saw the light of day when the military
of both Western and Eastern European countries felt complacent and
satisfied that the conclusion drawn from the experience of the First
World War, would suffice to provide theoretical background for
military operations in the future. Only few military thinkers
could see the relevance of significant improvement in air-plane
motors or in tank and artillery construction. Cost-effect of new
weapons deterred all governments from adventurous and from what
seemed at the time, unnecessary rearmament. However, the first
Five Year Plan allocated enough funds to the military to keep a
reasonable pace of development.
3. Voprosy taktiki v sovetskikh voennykh trudakh 1917-1940 gg
Moscow, Voenizdat, 1970, p.i6. (Henceforth cited as Voprosy
taktiki.)
4. V. Triandafillov, Kharakter operatsii sovremennykh armii,
Moscow, Voenizdat, 1932, Second edition, see also: Col. V.
Matsulenko, 'Razviteye operativnogo iskusstva', VIZ 10, 1967,
p. 40.
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In his book, Triandafillov systematically analysed the
causes and effects of major operations of the First World War. he
compared the capability of combat units during the war with that of
contemporary (1928-1931) units. He evaluated in detail many
components of a fighting force, taking into consideration both
technical development and cost of production, use and maintenance.
His contribution consists of three major points - the significance
of a mass array; the prevalence of mechanisation; and the concept of
the 'depth of the battlefield'.
After dealing with the political reasons, which according to
him had led the Capitalist countries to the idea of a 3mall
professional array,^ Triandafillov went on to refute this 'naive' idea
and to support the idea of a mass army (millionnie artaii). A small
army, even though motorised and equipped with automatic weapons cannot
prowl on its own on enemy territory witnout the support of a large
array. ho single arm of the array can defeat a modern country.6
Triandafillov was well aware of the railitary dilemma which had forced
the idea of a small professional array on Western European theoreticians
- mass array and manoeuvrability seemed to them to be incompatible.
His verdict was:
It is impossible to create better conditions for
easy agile manoeuvre, wide tactical and operational
campaigning skill by falling back on the ideas of a
small array and an armchair war. The right way is
to supply the modern mass array with better transport
(automobiles, six wheel trucks and well developed
railways).7




The solution was full raobilisation and mechanisation. A country
that could mobilise its resources, that had more personnel and
better prepared commanders and soldiers in peace time, was more likely
to have the upper hand in war time.
Mechanisation was the key to manoeuvrability of large armies.
Triandafillov emphasised this point again and again.8 He summed up
A*WtS
his views about mechanisation and motorisation of modern as follows:
A Shock Army (including supplementary artillery
with its crews) cannot rely on horse drawn
transport. Transport must consist wholly of
automobiles.8
Only mobile artillery, motorised infantry and special motorised units
(mekhanicheskoi konnitsy) can make the difference between the pace of
manoeuvre during the First World War and the pace needed for the war
of the future.
Any large motorised-mechanised unit needs spacious room for
efficient manoeuvre. A modern army is deployed 'in depth' with first
line troops forward and considerable mechanised reserves in the rear
of the field of operations. These reserves are kept ready to deal
with enemy formations which broke through the first lines of defence
or to reinforce the attack. Tactical units, divisions and corps must
be deployed in some depth, strategic formations in even greater depth.
The 'depth' of the battlefield conditions the duration of the
operation - the deeper the battlefield the longer the operation.10




According to Triandafillov, a mass army is absolutely necessary for
modern warfare, it must be motorised and mechanised to make it
manoeuvrable and it can operate effectively only if it is deployed in
depth, i.e. if it is echeloned,1* both on the attack and in defence.12
Triandafillov never denied the uniqueness of the Red Army
and never doubted the ultimate victory of Socialism, but on the other
hand, he never thought in terms of an 'heroic army'. Morale -
political preparedness, unswerving desire for battle and devotion
are inevitable for success in battle and for victory in war, but:
A modern mass army cannot consist of one
hundred per cent of heroes.13
The average soldier is the true representative of a mass army.
Triandafillov did not leave one stone unturned. He dealt
with small automatic arms of the infantry and with heavy pieces of
artillery, with cavalry and tanks as well as with chemical warfare,
air-force, signalling, command and control and last but not least,
the cost effect of the military machine both in peace time and in war
time.
Many of the ideas expressed in the Regulations and in
Triandafillov's book could not be applied at the time. Soviet




industry had just recovered from the war and its aftermath and was
producing at about the level of its 1913 output.1!f There were no
armoured forces to speak of and no logistical transport. Altogether
there were only seven thousand guns of all calibres in the armed
forces.15 Advanced concepts about deep thrust could not be applied
for many years after 1929.
On December 30, 1929, a special commission headed by
the Director of Mechanisation and Motorisation of the
Red Army, l.A. Khalepski, and Defence Industrial
Representative D.F. Budniak, set out on a tour of
Europe and the U.S.A. They inspected the available
armoured vehicles under development or in the process
of testing, which might be considered adequate for
the new tactical roles envisaged by the Red Army. In
the U.S.A. they were greatly impressed by the new
wheel/track design built by J.W. Christie.
Of the nine first produced Christie M1931, designated
Medium Tank T-3 by the US Army, two were bought by the
Russians.16
After extensive tests, the first model, designated by the Russians,
BT-1, commenced production on 23rd May, 1931.
This first model, soon to be followed by a long line leading
up to the T-34, had a crew of 3, a weight of 10.2 tons, a maximum
14. L. Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Eyre and
Spottiswoode, London 1960, p.450. See also: Anatole G. Mazour,
Soviet Economic Development, D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc. Princeton,
N.J., 1967, p.125: also: W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic
Growth, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1971, (2nd ed.) p.94.
15. Maj. Gen. N.E. Nosovskii, 'Nadyezhniy arsenal vooruzheniya',
VIZ No.10, 1970, p.118: also IVOV, 1960 Vo.I, p.90 for number
of guns and tanks.
16. J.F. Milson, 'Russian BT Series', Profile AFV Weapons, no
pagination. The first soviet tank was actually produced on
31/8/1920 and was called 'Tvorets za svobodu Toy, Lenin', see
P. Rotmistrov, 'Moshchnaya udarnaya sila', Krasnaya Zvezda,
10 September, 1972, p.2.
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speed on wheels of 69 mph, and on tracks of 39 raph. It had two
7.62 mm. machineguns and its armour was 13 mm. for its cylindrical
turret but only 6-10 inms. on the rear, the floor and the roof.
Later, it was upgunned with a 76.2 mm. L.126 gun and two 7.62 mm.
machineguns, and its petrol engine was replaced by a 12 cylinder V
engine. Its armour, although increased,was still poor. The main
advantage of the first model BT-1, BT~3 and BT-4 was their speed.
This quality fitted very well into the tactical ideas expressed in
Soviet theoretical works in the thirties. Thus, S.H. Antmosov in his
book Taktilca motomekhsoyedinyenii (The tactics of motor-mechanised
unities) which was published in 1932, evaluated the characteristics
of the motor-mechanised unities as follows:
- great operative mobility, mainly on good roads
and in good weather conditions.
- high speed ....17
Early in the 1930s, Soviet industry could not supply the
transport necessary for the logistics of modern armoured force. In
an article Role mekhanizatsiya v sovremennoi operatsii, published in
1933 in Mekhanizatsiya i motorizatsiya RKKA, V. Favitskii calculated:
for 300 Vickers tanks, 75 one ton lorries are
needed to carry 75 tons of fuel, lubricating
oil and containers.18
Yet the Red Army High Command was already talking in terms of
17. Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voennykh
trudakh 1917-1940, Voenizdat, Moscow 1965, p.590.
[Henceforth cited as Voprosy strategii.]
*®• Voprosy strategii, pp.608-609.
47.
thousands of tanks and airplanes:
Thus, if during 1930-31, the aircraft industry
produced an average of 860 planes a year and
the tank industry 740 tanks a year, during
1932-33 they produced respectively about 2,600
planes and 2,770 tanks.19
The idea of a mass army was another cardinal component in
Soviet military doctrine as it emerged during the thirties.29 The
concepts of the 'revolutionary-class nature of war',21 and of a
class-based army combined with the emphasis put by Soviet military
doctrine on the unique manoeuvrability of the Red Army and its
offensive spirit, to present a new set of problems. In 1934 the Red
Army cadre forces increased to 940,000.22 Its social structure had
changed too and the
percentage of workers in the Red Army rose from
31.2% on 1st January 1930, to 43% in 1933 and to
45.8% on 1st January 1934. Also during the same
period, the percentage of Communist Party and
Komsomol members rose from 34.3 to 49.5%, so that,
by January 1934, approximately half the rank-and-
file of the Red Army were officially Communists.23
After this impressive increase the Red Army became for all practical
19. Marshal Zakharov, '0 teorii glubokoi operatsii, VIZ, No.10, 1970
p.11. Also: 50 let Vooruzhennikh Sil SSSR, Moscow; Voenizdat,
1968, p.183.
20. V. Triandafillov, op.cit., pp.24-26.
21. E.A. Shilovskii, 'Nachalniy period voiny', Voprosy strategii,
p.500.
22. J. Erickson, The Soviet High Command, Macmillan, 1962, p.372.
23. J. Erickson, op.cit., p.373.
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purposes a 'national array', whereas formerly it had been a revolu¬
tionary-class army. Its increasing size and complexity of armament
made it difficult for the High Command to marry mass-array with high
speed manoeuvres and a complex diversity of armament with a simple
notion of attack.
These problems were tackled in the years 1934-36. The
growth of the Red Army and the development of military industry called
for organisational and structural changes, and for a new Field Service
Regulations which were ratified by the People's Commissar of Defence
Voroshilov on 30th December, 1936. The main concept of these
Regulations (PU-36) was the glubokoi boi 'operation in depth*. PU-36
stated:
Contemporary technical means of warfare, mainly
tanks, artillery, air-force and motorised troops
in great masses, make it possible to organise
simultaneous attacks on all the battle formations
in all the depth of the enemy's deployment, in
order to isolate, surround and destroy it.24
The 'operation in depth' was the logical theoretical con¬
sequence of Soviet military thinking. In his book Kharakter
operatsii sovremenikh armii V.K. Triandafillov envisaged that:
a shock army consisting of 4-5 infantry
corps needs up to 4-5 artillery divisions (16-
20 artillery regiments), supplementary
artillery and up to 8-12 tank battalions.
24. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav RKKA 1936 (PU-36), Gosvoenizdat, Moscow
1937, p.63; see also: Voprosy Taktiki v Sovietskikh Voennykh
Trudokh 1917-1940, p.18.
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AA defence of such a mass of troops
needs no les3 than 4-5 fighter squadrons ...
1-2 AA artillery divisions are considered
necessary to defend each point (transport
parks, airfields, bridges, etc.,),
a minimum of one heavy bridge for each shock
corps 2-3 air force brigades
(light and heavy bombers) Finally
the shock army, of course, has powerful
chemical means of warfare.25
In this advanced book (although the first volume was published
in 1929, and the second in 1932 posthumously), there were many com¬
ponents of the concepts of trie 'operation in depth' and of the
balanced co-ordination between the services, or interaction of all
arms. Triandafillov dealt squarely with the 'Art of War', describing
in military idioms the harastiips which would face modern armies in
future wars. his ideas were not snared by all. Many adherents of
revolutionary-class army - and in 1933, according to Voroshilov -
'.... 96.7 per cent of the divisional and regimental commanders were
Civil War veterans ...,'26 could not accept sucn an 'old-fashioned'27
approach.
Presenting PU-36, Tukhachevskv said the following.
25. V. Triandafillov, op.cit., pp.92-94, for comparison see J.F.C.
Fuller The Reformation of War, Hutchison & Co. London 1923,
Ch. VI, p.120, Ch. VIII, pp.153, 157-59, 161-63.
26. J. Erickson, op.cmt., p.374.
27. The champions of the revolutionary-class army looked down on
the professional soldiers and considered the militarist approach
old-fashioned. For the roots of this attitude and the disputes
accompanying the shaping of the Red Army, see E.h. Carr,
Socialism in One Country 1924-26, Penguin 1970, Vol.2, pp.410-
415, see also: J. Erickson, Some Military and Political Aspects
of the "i'dlltla Army * controversy 1919-1920. Waverley Papers:
Series 'Soviet Military Studies7^"January 1972.
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When Comrade Triandafillov published his book
Kharakter operatsii sovremennykh armii, many
Comrades, adherents of this theory (the theory
about the unique manoeuvrability of the Red
Army, AS) attacked him bitterly. He was
accused of preaching positional warfare. The
supporters of this theory saw in the new man
(Chelovek), the Soviet worker, the Kolkhoznik,
all that was necessary to conduct a war of
manoeuvres. ... There were comrades, for
instance, who believed that the Red Army's
soldiers needed less artillery softening before
an attack than soldiers of the Capitalist
countries and they based this notion on the
moral advantage of the Red soldier.28
He went on to say that such an approach might lead to many
unnecessary casualties and failures and that it contradicted
Voroshilov's statement that the Red Army should:
learn how to win victory with little bloodshed.
(Maloi kroviu)29
The Field Service Regulations 1936 had already struggled with the
idea of mass-army versus professional army, but the problem was not
resolved for many years. One source of inspiration for Soviet
military theoreticians was J.F.C. Fuller.30 They grappled with his
pioneering ideas in the field of armoured forces. Yet, while
accepting his basic principles about modern motorised mechanised
28. M.N. Tukhachevskii, Izbranie proizvedeniya, Moscow, Voenizdat,
1964, Vol.2, p.246.
29. Ibid.
30. In particular his following works: J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in the
Great War, 1914-1918, London, John Murray, 1920, 'A prospect of
what tanks may do', pp.308-312; The Reformation of War, London,
Hutchinson & Co., 1923, Ch.IV, 'The weapon of the Future', p.120;
The Foundation of the Science of War, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd.,
1926.
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warfare, they developed their owa ideas about nass-ariny and the role
of infantry on the mderu battlefield:
The conditions under which the bourgeois military
theory had developed forced Fuller to abandon the
uaS3 character and to shift to the theory of small
professional armies, for which the problem of
attack. i3 raised in entirely different sectors.
This theory reflecting the class character of the
Imperialist system is in evident contradiction to
the reality of preparation for the future war.
Fuller does not consider that the battle in depth
is carried by a combination of the branches of the
army For us, operation in depth comprises
combination of branches of the army. Hence,
Fuller's point of view that a combination of tanks
and infantry is like harnessing a tractor with a
dray-horse is altogetner unacceptable. Infantry
has never been considered by ua as a dray-horse, and
even in contemporary offensive order of battle, it
has maintained its significance as a basic factor.31
Throughout the thirties a fierce dispute was in progress
concerning the role of the motorised-mechanised units and the role
of the tank in particular. In 1932, S.K. Ammosov wrote that:
Mechanised units are little suited for battle in
closed and broken terrain; without amphibious
tanks they are incapable of forcing rivers on
their own.32
and that the basic characteristics of the motor-mechanised units is
the following:
great operative mobility, mainly on good roads
and in eood weather conditions.33
31. G.S. Isserson, 'Istoricheski korni glubokoi taktiki' Voprosy
taktiki, pp.75-76.
32. Voprosy strategii p.590, also Ibid., p.760, note Ho.142.
33. Ibid., p.590.
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Since 1932, the number of tanks in the Red Array had increased
considerably and their performance improved.311 The tank was assuming
a much larger role than had been assigned to it formerly and it proved
capable of fulfilling its tasks. According to Tukhachevsky:
The tanks operate very well in Summer time and
in Winter time, in Spring time and in Autumn.35
The argument about co-ordination of infantry and mechanised
forces, the role of the tank, the offensive spirit and the operation
in depth was far from resolution when the men and their ideas were
brutally eliminated during the 1936-38 purges of the military. Not
only were people shot, banished, degraded and humiliated, but their
ideas were defamed and denigrated.
The complicated situation at the end of the thirties
proved harmful to the development of our theoretical-
military thinking. The fundamental propositions of
the theory concerning the use of mechanised troops in
such operations were put in doubt, as those commanders
of military cadres who took part in working out these
ideas were repressed and called enemies of the people.36
No matter what reasons Stalin had for slaughtering his best
commanders when wars in Europe and in the Far East were more than a
34. At the beginning of the thirties the Russians started the pro¬
duction of the light tank MS-1 and the BT series. During the
first 5-Year Plan the Red Army received 5,000 tanks. bee
M. Zakharov, 'KoiranunistichesVaya partiya i tekhnicheskoe
perevooruzhenie armii i flota v gody predvoennykh pyatiletok'
VIZ, 2, 1971, p.7.
35. H.N. Tukhachevskii, opucit., Vol.2, p.247, but see PD-^3j& pp.128-
131, for the roles assigned to infantry and tanks in forcing
water obstacles.
36. Voprosy strategic p.22, see also: P.A. Rotmistrov (Editor),
Istoriya voennogo iskusstva, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1963, Vol.11,
p.49.
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mere possibility, the Red Army was badly damaged.37 It would be an
exaggeration to claim that Soviet military thinking came to a stand¬
still during or after the purges, but with three out of five Marshals,
eleven Deputy Commissars for defence, thirteen army commanders, 55
out of 85 corps commanders, 110 out of 195 divisions commanders38
shot or vanished, the continuity, the unity and the quality of the
ideas became doubtful. Nor did the axe stop at the soldier: many
designers and administrators in the armament industry were disgraced,
or arrested or simply vanished.
The same decade 1930-40 witnessed the ascendancy of Japan as
a major Pacific power and of Germany as a major Continental power.
Throughout the thirties, including the period of the Yezhovshchina,
the Soviet Union was kept busy with extensive fortifications in the
Far East, intervention in the Civil War in Spain and a huge industrial¬
isation and armament programme. By that time the BT tanks had under¬
gone many improvements. The BT-7(V) model was fitted with a conical
turret with frame aerial and 15 mm. armour. The hull front armour
was also increased from 13 to 22 mm. The armour components of the
hull and turret which had formerly been riveted were now electro-
welded. The BT-7-2 was the first to have the twin-horn periscopes.
Its armament was a 45 mm. M-1932 gun with a muzzle velocity of 2350
fps. and a 7.62 mm. machinegun. A supporting artillery version of
the BT-7 mounted 76.2 mm. guns. The BT-5 tanks were sent to Spain
37. For an account of the military purges see J. Erickson, op.cit.,
pp.449-74; M. Mackintosh, Juggernaut, Seeker and Worburg, 1967
p.93,; L. Schapiro, op.cit., pp.419-21; R. Conquest,
The Great Terror, Macmillan 1968, pp.201-236.
38. J. Erickson, op.cit., p.505.
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as part of the Soviet military aid to the Republicans. These were
11 ton high-speed, wheel and track tanks (bistrokhodnyi,
kolesnogusenichnie tankii). Although they had no radio transmitter-
receivers, they were equipped with periscopes and an aiming optical
device.39 The appearance of tanks on the battlefield was decisive
on occasion, but only in small sectors of the front.110 Moreover,
since tanks were sent to Spain piecemeal, they could never tip the
balance of the whole front and their influence on the Republican side
was further diminished the more that tanks and anti-tank artillery
sppeared on the Nationalist side.
Some Russian tanks were seen in action as early as 24th
October,1*1 1936, but not until 29th October did several tanks take
part in an organised attack and made a real impact on a section of
the front near Madrid. They were all driven by Russians under the
command of General D.G. Pavlov, but since the infantry of the 5th
Regiment could not keep pace, the tanks could neither develop the
attack nor exploit their success.
39. Lieutenant-General A.A. Vetrov, 'Dobrovoltsy svobody',
Voprosy istorii, No.4, 1972, pp.108, 113.
40. Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, Penguin Books, 1971, p.401.
See also: Meretskov, op.cit., p.135, also Meretskov, 'Pod
Gvadalakharoi', VIZ 7, 1967, p.55n, see also: Voina i
Revolutsya v Ispanii 1936-39. Moscow, Izdatel^stvo 'Progress',
1968, Vol.1, p.505.
41. Hugh Thomas, op.cit., p.401n.
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Quite a few prominent Soviet advisors'*2 were sent to help
the Republicans in Spain, but they did not have an immediate and
overall influence on the conduct of the war1*3 nor were they sure
themselves how the war should be waged:
What are we going to face? How best are we to
conduct war against the enemy? Should we mass
all the regiments in one long-range group, (DD),
or should \<re disperse the tanks in small groups
for infantry close support (NPP)? What sort of
tanks does the enemy have and what should we
expect from its anti-tank artillery?1*1*
Altogether froxa October 1936 up to March 1938, 731 tanks,
703 guns and 234 aircraft were sent from the Soviet Union to Spain.1*5
Spread over 17 months these tanks, guns and aeroplanes could not
change the nature of the war. The Spanish Civil War could not be
considered modern warfare out was waged rather more on the lines of
the First World War (apart from massive air-raids) and the Republican
Army including the International Brigades could not be considered a
modern mechanised army.
However, many lessons were learned during this war about the
effects of mass bombardment on civil population and about the psychology
42. The most prominent Soviet military advisors were: N.G.
Kuznetsov, K.A. Meretskov, N.N. Voronov, G.M. Shtern, Ya.V.
Smushkevich, D.G. Pavlov, R.Ya. Malinovskii, P.I. Batov,
V.Ya. Kolpachki, A.I. Rodimtsav, N.P. Gur'ev, VA. Alafuzov,
N.A. Klich, W. Kopets, S.M. Krivoshein.
43. Meretskov, op.cit., p.136. 'During the meeting the problems of
co-ordination between the Republican's military leaders, and the
Soviet advisers has cropped up again (as it has on who knows how
many times before)'.
44. A.A. Vetrov, 'Dobrovoltsy svobody', Voprosy Istorii, No.4, 1972,
p.103.
45. Hugh Thomas, op.cit., p.803.
of combatant and non-combatant.
In the war, apart from strategy, tanks and territory
there is the problem of psychology. I remember the
painful day when the Fascists occupied Toledo
On this day the Republicans not only lost a provincial
city but also their faith in victory.1*6
Whether or not the Soviet military had learned the problems
of morale, they were evidently aware of the poor state of their
equipment both quantitatively and qualitatively, on the ground and
in the air.
When Meretskov arrived in Spain in October 1936, as one of
the chief advisers to the Republican military command, he received a
report from Vladimir Alexandrovich Antonov Ovseenko,1'7 who was then
Soviet Consul General in Barcelona, to the effect that 'the Fascists
have air supremacy'.1+8 Repeated reports had shown that the
Russian 1-15 anc 1-16 though highly manoeuvrable were too slow and
under-armed. Being no match for the German new ME-1Q9E they could
not protect the slow SB bombers. The 1-16 was armed with four 7.62
mm. machine guns which were badly located on the wings and had a
speed of 450 kmh. whereas the new ME-109E with a speed of 570 kmh.
was armed with two 20 mm. cannons. Throughout the war in Spain,
the Russians had no better planes and they had to go back to the
drawing board for better designs, trying meanwhile to make the best
46. Ilya Ehrenburg, Sobraniye Sochinenii v devyatl tomakh, Moscow;
'Khodozhestvennaya Literatura', 1966, Vol.7, p.588.
47. An old time Trotskyite: executed at the end of 1938.
48. Meretskov, op.cit., p.128.
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of their inferior machines.119 The conclusions drawn from the
military experience in Spain were more in line with the old school
of the Russian Civil War veterans and with many of the new political
workers who replaced the purges victims, than with the later ideas of
the now decimated group which had centred round Tukhachevsky. In a
book called Movie formy borby published in 1940, G.S. Isserson, one
of the survivors of the purges, wrote:
In the history of war it rarely happens that new
military means have an immediately decisive in¬
fluence on the nature of battle, because the art
and knowledge of their use usually are not born
at the time of their appearance.
When new means are applied in small quantities,
they generally represent a perversion of their
potential, and thus often distort the perspective
of their applications in general.
During the war in Spain, there was no occasion on
which mechanised forces moving through enemy lines,
and even if they reached an open area, had enough
space for manoeuvre.
Also, in Spain there was not enough heavy artillery
to have fired in great depth.50
An independent Soviet armoured force emerged as a consequence
of a process which had started officially in 1929. On 15th July
1929, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) promulgated the decree,
'State of the defence of the country' (0 sostoyanii oborony strany).
Two days later (17th July 1929), following V.K. Triandafillov's
report the Revvoensovet (Revolutionary Military Soviet) decided to
establish experimental mechanised units. The report read in part:
49. A. Yalcovlev, The Aim of a Lifetime, The story of Alexander
Yakovlev, Designer of the Yak Fighter Plane, Progress Publishers,
Moscow 1972, p.79.
50. Voprosy strategii p.424.
Having in mind that the new type of armament
namely the armoured force, was not sufficiently
studied both regarding its tactical applications
(for independent operation as well as for
operation in co-ordination with infantry and
cavalry) and its best form of organisation, it
became necessary to establish during 1929-30 a
permanent experimental unit.51
In 1929 Soviet industry had not yet been in a position to
produce tanks52 and the Red Army had altogether 200 tanks and
armoured cars, mainly remnants of the First World War. There was
no experience in armoured warfare, no ready-made organisational
forms, certainly no trained cadres to man the would-be force. The
general ideas as they were worked out in 1929 envisaged five types
of tanks none of which had actually been produced: tankette, light
tank (lekhkii tank) medium tank (srednii tank) heavy tank (bolshoi,
tyazhelyi tank) and bridge tank (mos tovoi tank).5 3 The new Chief
of General Staff was put in charge of the air force, navy and
motorised-mechanised troops.
The first mechanised regiment was formed in 1929 to be
developed in 1930 into a mechanised brigade under the command of
K.V. Kalinovskii. In 1932, there was already a mechanised corps
which was followed in May 1933 by another corps and 6 independent
51. 50 Let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSR, Voenizdat, Moscow 1968, p.202.
52. The early attempts to produce tanks in the Soviet Union had
not borne fruits.
53. Altogether the tanks were to support cavalry and infantry in
reconnaissance and in attack. Light tanks were suited for
co-ordination with cavalry whereas medium and heavy tanks were
to support infantry in breakthrough (TPP - Infantry support
tanks) and to operate in the rear of the enemy defence after a
successful attack (TDD - Long range tanks). See: PU-29
pp.57,70, 86-90.
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brigades.By that time Soviet industry could produce several
hundred tanks annually (740 during 1930-31), T-27 tankette, T-26
and BT light tanks were produced in 1931; T-28 medium tanks were
produced in 1932. The T-37 amphibious tank was also produced in
1932 and the T-35 heavy tank with five turrets was produced a year
later. The mechanised corps as an independent operational unit
consisted of two mechanised brigades, one rifle-machine-gun brigade
and independent AA battery. Altogether it had according to
regulations 500 tanks and 200 automobiles. In order to train the
necessary professional cadres, the F.E. Dzherzhinsky Military-
technical Academy opened in 1930 a mechanisation and motorisation
faculty. In May, 1932 the M.V. Lomonosov Academy in Moscow followed
suit and opened a military academy for mechanised-motorised cadres.
The 11th Mechanised Corps was posted to Leningrad and the
45th to Kiev Military District. During 1933-34, another two were
formed. In 1938 these four mechanised corps were, re-organised and
provided with tanks. Thus the 10th Tank Corps was stationed in
Leningrad, the 15th in Belo-Russia, the 25th in Kiev and the 20th in
Trans-Baikal. Each corps consisted of two tank brigades and one
rifle-machine-gun brigade. There were 560 tanks to each corps.
In July 1939, the Supreme Military Council, in the process of
improving the organisational structure of the armed forces, appointed
a commission to investigate the mechanised units' organisation. The
commission was headed by G.I. Kulik and among its members were
54. IVOV, 1960, Vol.1, p.96. See also: 50 Let vooruzhennykh sil
SSR, p.202, also, V.D. Mostvenko, Tanki (ocherk iz istorii
zarozhdeniya i razvitiya bronetankovoi tekhniki), pp.85-95.
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S.M. Eudenny, h.M. Shaposhnikov, S.K. Timoshenko, K.A. Heretskov,
L.Z. Kekblis, D.G. Pavlov, E.A. Shchudenko. E.G. Pavlov who was at
the time the Chief of the Ariaoured Forces Directorate in the Red Army,
based his negative opinion about the structure of the mechanised
corps on his experience in Spain. G.I. Kulik supported him, but the
commission decided not to abandon the formation as such. However,
it was impressed on the winds of the participants that a general of
some attainment who had taken an active part in the Civil Jar in
Spain did not approve of the tanks' performance there. It remained
for an experience nearer home to decide the issue. On 21 Kovember
1939, the Supreme Military Council was called upon to evaluate the
performance of the mechanised corps during the recent campaign in
Eelo-Russia and Meat Ukraine where the 15th and the 25th tank corps
had taken part;
As there is no engineering and material experience
in maintaining large mobile units, the efficiency
of the commanding personnel iu leading these unit3
and in moving the corps in action was proved on
several occasions to be defective.-'-'
The new generation of commanders who were hastily promoted
into the vacated ranks of the purged were learnin; to conduct war
the hard way.
The cumulative evidence based on this campaign and on past
experience moved the Supreme Military Council to order the dissolution
of the mechanised corps. They were replaced by motorised divisions
of 275 tanks each. By May 1940, four such divisions were formed
55. V.A. Anfilov, op.cit. p.107.
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(the 1st, 15th, 31st and 109th). The experience of armoured warfare
in Khalkhin Gol was shelved for the time being.55 For a whole year
the old mechanised formations were in the process of dissolution
while the new divisions were taking shape. The decision to dissolve
the old mechanised corps had been taken only nine days before the
break-out of the Finnish War. The frustration and demoralisation
resulting from this war shook the Soviet leadership and precipitated
a thorough re-organisation of the Red Army. Military thinking too,
was invigorated after the lethargy caused by the purges.
As the Soviet military concept of the offensive developed to
embrace the whole depth of the battle-field, making use of better
co-ordination between the services, two other problems needed careful
attention: surprise and timing. The interest in the possibilities
of surprise was enhanced by improvement in technology .in the means of
transport and in signalling. These developments highlighted by the
introduction of aircraft into military operation and by the ever-
increasing use of radio in war operations, made high speed concentra¬
tion and rapid blows at unexpected targets not only possible, but
necessary. Fast tanks and heavy barrages of long-range, high speed
and even self-propelled artillery, fascinated many military thinkers.
Yet the idea of a strategic surprise attack did not seem likely to
Soviet thinkers because they did not believe in the military of one
country conducting war against the military of another;
56• Voprosy strategii p.22. Marshal Zakharov obviously attributes
the failure in assessing the theoretical achievement of the
encounters in Khalkhin-Gol to the theoretical lethargy which has
followed the purges.
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By and large it is not the General Staff who
prepare, conduct and take responsibility for
the success and failures of war, but the
government of the country.57
Consequently it was not a simple technical problem but a very
complicated political one.
In view of contemporary intelligence methods it
is impossible to talk about any kind of political
surprise
It is true that in our time the speed of con¬
centration of forces has increased and it seems
as though there is more advantage to be gained from
surprise advancing of forces. But in return the
intelligence methods of gauging enemy intentions
long before the outbreak of war, have also improved.59
The large-scale surprise concept was losing ground to more
modest aspirations of local tactical surprise. The loss of interest
in the surprise attack as a decisive factor led Soviet thinkers to
the other extreme. while emphasising the improvement in
mobility of aviation, motorised and mechanised units demanded that
Red Army units should be trained to counter any surprise attack with
lightning strokes (molnieiiosnie udari)59. Thus, while the Soviet
military doctrine was permeated with offeusive spirit, its approach
to strategic surprise attack was rather defensive although even the
so-called defensive posture in the Soviet doctrine was a strange mix
of defensive-offensive attituues. For instance:
57. Shaposhnikov. Moz.^Arraii, Moscow, Voennvi vastnik, 1927, Vol.1,
p.244.
58. Ibid., Vol.Ill, pp.202-203.
59. M.N. Tukhachevskii, '0 novora Polevorn Ustave RKKA', Vonrosy
taktiki p.80.
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The infantry order of battle for defence.
1) To make the disposition of the attacker's
reconnaissance as difficult as possible and to
take advantage of his unexpected attack; at
the same time to use the opportunity to ascer¬
tain the deployment of the attacker and the
direction of the main blow in order to prepare
for counter-activity.
2) To deploy the defence units in the chosen
battle-zone in such a way that the attacking
enemy will break under fire and under the
counter-attack of the units of this zone.
3) To maintain reserves for counter-attack.60
The concept of surprise was closely connected with the
problem of the timing of the first period of the war and its general
duration. The Russians did not believe in one decisive surprise
blow which might crush the enemy, and consequently they did not accept
the idea of a short war.
A short war is advantageous for the bourgeoisie ....
as it allows the bourgeoisie to have a war-tine
array better equipped than in a long war.61
The Russians could draw on their own experience of 1812. Did not
they see the Grand Arose melting away on the vast plains, under
severe weather conditions in face of tenacious, even though scattered
opposition? These arguments, based on the vastness of Russia and on
the mass-army versus the professional army, dispensed with the idea
of a short war. The end of the war was postponed indefinitely
pending an intricate series of political, diplomatic, economic and
60. K.A. Morozov, 'Oboronital'nie deistviya pekhoty', Voprosy
taktiki, p.156.
61. V.A. Anfilov, op.cit., p.157.
military skirmishes, but the problem of the first period of the war
remained unresolved.
After 13 39 the Russians had to face many surprises in Poland,
Finland and ultimately, France. A weakened Red Army, as it emerged
after the purges, was facing a present ally but a possible enemy
which was using exactly the strategy of surprise which had been re¬
pudiated by the Soviet High Command. The Germans employed in
Western Europe the sane methods of mass mechanised formations which
had just been discarded as impractical by the Supreme Military Council
on 21 November 1939. With the important lessons of Khalkhin-Gol,52
where the Russians themselves used a mass of air and armoured forces,
fading quickly out of memory, the German Blitzkrieg in Poland and the
questionable Russian performance in Finland brought the precarious
state of the Red Army into sharp relief. A.fter 1937 not only the
continuity of thought was affected, but many ingenious solutions to
problems of large mechanised units and of inter-service co-ordination
were falling out of favour. The German success with modern methods
of warfare and the Russian failure to apply these methods in Finland
made way for the vast re-organisation following the Finnish War. The
tank as a major component of mechanised warfare was again the centre
of attention. However not all were of one mind concerning the role
of the tank and its independence on the battlefield.
62. For a retrospective explanation of the failure to assess the
Far East operations see S. Daskov, Review of I.I. kuznetsov,
'Podvigi geroev Khalkhin-Gola', Ulan-Ude, 3uryalskoye
knizhnoye izdatel'stva, 1§69, VIZ, 8, 1970 p.81.
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An unsupported tank attack on a still solid defence,
no matter how many tank echelons there might be, does
not promise success. In Finland, for instance, in
the Karelian Isthmus, in order to get better co-ordination
between attacking infantry and tanks, to each tank was
attached a platoon of infantry; the tanks commander and
the infantry commander knew each other personally. The
tanks had numbers marked on them which were known to the
infantry platoon attacking with them.63
The intimate links between man and machine were well-established in
the mind of Soviet military writers. However, the offensive concept
was still infantry orientated. On the one hand we find that:
In this movement the forward artillery salvos depended
on the attacking pace of the infantry.61*
and on the other we learn that:
It is impossible now to talk about close co-ordination
with infantry alone. That is not enough anymore, the
tank has outgrown this stage and is now aspiring to
greater heights ... At the present stage we justify
demand from tank units both co-ordination with infantry
and independent activity.65
Theoretical thinking was apparently reviving but the gap be¬
tween tactical concepts and industrial technological application was
still very wide.
The plan for 1940 was to produce 600 T-34 tanks but
only 115 were produced.66
Nor was the situation better in small arms, artillery, or aircraft
63. P.A. Rotmistrov, 'Proryv sil'no ukreplennykh polos i ukreplennykh
rayonov strelkovym korpusom' Voprosy taktiki p.296.
64. Ibid., p.298.
65. I.P. Sukhov,'Tanki v sovremennoi voine', Voprosy strategii p.613.
66. V.A. Anfilov, op.cit., p.94.
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industry, all of which were lacing grave modernisation problems
regarding the shift from manual to serial production.57 Military
writers, who supported the idea of independent tank formations were
well aware of tue lack of means to accomplish full infantry mechanised
co-ordination.
The operative independence of tank-units is gaining
ground but it is not yet finally resolved
It will be finally resolved when the infantry, sup¬
ported by tanks, or even only a unit which is to work
in close co-ordination with tank units, will be
carried by all-terrain transport (better by cater¬
pillar), and when everything needed to supply the
tank units will also be on tracks suitable for fast
movement in places where tanks move.58
The lessons of Finland were learned at a speed measured by
the German success in the War. The training of the Red Array, its
morale and discipline all called for immediate and rigorous attention.
The Supreme Military Council which met in April 1940, to discuss the
Finnish War took several measures to redress the pitiable shape of
the Armed Forces. In less than a month, Voroshilov was relieved
of his post and was replaced by Timoshenko, who became Defence
»
Commissar on 8th May. Just over a week later, on 16th Hay, order
ho.120 saw the light of day. It listed the shortcomings that uad
been revealed during the Finnish War and would have to be corrected.
However, the soldiers who had taken part in the campaign, rank and
file, were showered with medals and promotions.59
67. N.E. Nosovsky, 'Nadezhni arsenal vooruzheniva' Voprosy istorii.
Ho. 11, 1970, "p.121.
68. I.P. Sukiiov, 'Tanki v sovremennoi voine' Voprosy strategii
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69. Meretskov, ojucit., p.190.
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On the 7th May 1940, the Praesidium of the
Supreme Soviet introduced the following
high ranks: the commanders of all arms -
Major-General, Lieutenant-General, Colonel-
General, General of the Army, and ratified
the previously established rank of Marshal.70
Order No.160 of 16th May summed up the principles of the new
training programme for the Red Army. Combat training was to attain
the maximum approximation to combat conditions and requirements.7*
During that period, a commission headed by V.N. Kordiuinov was
appointed in the Commissariat of Defence to work out the new draft
of Field Service Regulations 1939 which would include the latest
achievements in military equipment in the Red Army and the experience
of the Soviet-Finnish War and that of the German-Polish campaign.
Bodenny who was released from his command of Moscow MD was appointed
to supervise the work of this commission.72 This draft was
circulating in the Army, the military academies, technical schools and
administration of regions and central institutions.73 Though it was
not ratified officially, it served for all intents and purposes as the
official Field Service Regulations until after the beginning of the
war. Being exposed to the diversity of opinions at the time and to
influence of current events, it was indeed difficult to agree upon the
right direction in training and discipline of the Soviet Armed Forces.
On 12 October, a new Disciplinary Code replaced the old code of 1925.
Its provisions were remarkable in a socialist state: the commander's
70. Major-General N. Bobkov, 'K istorii voenskikh zvanii v
sovetskikh vooruzhennykh silakh', VIZ No.9, 1970, p.88.
71. J. Erickson, op.cit., p.554.
72. Voprosy taktiki p.21.
73. Ibid., p.21.
68.
orders had to be carried out unquestioningly, there were severe
punishments for insubordination, and an obligatory salute symbolised
the new, harsh discipline.7l* 'Commanders were authorised to use
force and firearms to ensure compliance with an order, even in
peace-time'.75 A further move towards bolstering the authority of
the commanding personnel was taken on 12th August 1940, when tne
office of political Commissar was abolished and a unified command
restored. Following this, and the decree concerning ranks of high
commanders, it was necessary to enhance the status of lower rank
commanders too:
In order to promote the junior personnel's re¬
sponsibility, to create conditions of military
preparedness in the units, to educate and train
the soldiers and also to raise their authority,
the following ranks were established in November
1940: Junior Sergeant, Sergeant, Senior Sergeant,
Starshina. (Chief Petty Officer, First
Sergeant). The same Prikaz introduced ranks for
orderlies too - Red - Soldier and Efretor -
Private First Class.76
Salaries of commanders were substantially raised, though part of the
increase was cancelled out by inflation.77 Thus the army was re¬
covering from the consequences of the purges, but with the growing
danger of war which had become acute after the shattering collapse of
74. Roman Kolkowicz, op.cit., p.63.
75. M. Mackintosh, op.cit., p.127.
76. Major-General N. Bobkov, 'K istorii voinskikh zvanii v
sovetskikh vooruzhenykh silakh' VIZ No.9, 1970, p.88.
77. M. Fainsod, How Jlussia is Ruled, Harvard Univ. Press, 1963,
Revised Ed. p.479.
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France the all-important problem of preparing the Armed Forces for
the beginning of hostilities acquired gigantic dimensions. Through¬
out 1940, the armed forcer were trained according to the new training
prograrme using real ammunition, which was not in abundance, for
small arms, as well as for artillery.
Timoshenko and Meretskov (who replaced Shaposhnikov as Chief
of General Staff in August 1940) were personally supervising the
training and manoeuvres. Yet in the designing of new rifles, guns,
airplanes, tanks and ships, and in their applications many problems
remained unresolved. In 1933, E.A. Snilovskii wrote an article,
'Nachalnyi period voiny', published in Voina i Revolutsia, October
1933, in which he drew attention to the elusive first period of the
war:
It is desirable to carry the battle on to enemy
territory, but it should be remembered that the
cavalry, the mechanised units and aviation will
be necessary in the decisive combat. There¬
fore, they should not be exhausted during the
first period.78
Shilovskii indicated that he did not consider the first period
of the war as a decisive one; furthermore he conveyed the idea of war
in stages in which there would be time for concentration on both
sides. This idea was later challenged on all accounts;
Forestalling the Enemy's concentration always
gives the High Command the possibility to take
the operative-strategic initiative at the very
beginning of the war.78
78, Voprosy strategii, p.500.
79. Ibid., p.488.
Although it would be still difficult to prepare for future
wars, it would be easier to define their first period:
The din of dropping bombs and the noise of tanks
will be the declaration of war in the future.8®
The same argument was used by G.S. Isserson:
The proposition that such an attack (stunning
neutralising attack - oglushitelnogo
podavlyausnchego udar. AS), was launched at the
first hours of the war, does not apply any more;
on the contrary, the first hours of the war
occurred because such an attack was launched.8*
This argument seemed to have settled the problem concerning
the actual commencement of hostilities, but it did not do away with
the other, not less important one, of how to identify the threat of
an enemy and of how to prepare against such an eventuality.82
But from the threat of war to the real breakout
of war, there is always one more pace
Concentration acquired subtle character. It is
generally impossible to define its beginning.
Its sequel is always in doubt - is it really a
preparation for armed onslaught?83
Thus, by the end of 1940, the Red Army had regained some of
the ground lost because of the purges but the speed of events, and the
80. S.N. Krasil'nikov, 'Nachalnyi period budushchi voini' Pravda,
20 May, 1936.
81. G.S. Isserson, 'Novie formy bor'by', Voprosy strategii p.427.
82. VIZ No.3, 1965, p.50.
83. G.S. Isserson, 'Novie formy bor'by', Voprosy strategii
pp.427-428.
complexity of the political-military situation facing the Soviet Union
by the end of 1940 left many problems unsolved.
In the middle of November 1940, the Russo-German diplomatic
dialogue came to a standstill. Having spent several heated but
futile hours with Hitler and Ribbentrop, Molotov returned to Moscow
empty-handed. There was no visible change in Soviet policy towards
Germany or any other country after November 1940. The army was
carrying on its routine, as it had been established after the Finnish
War, that is, training under conditions simulating a real battlefield.
No major transfer of significant military formations was noted, even
along the Western borders. If there was any Soviet apprehension in
November and the first half of December 1940, it was well subdued.
By the end of November 1940, the long and complex Russo-German
contest over the Balkans came to an end. On 20th November, Hungary
signed the Tripartite Pact and Rumania followed suit on the 23rd.
Hitler had his hands free to secure the oil of Ploesti and to dislodge
the British from their last foothold on the Continent. On 9th
December 1940, the British Army had started its offensive in Northern
Africa, and by the end of December it was noted by Russians as well as
by other diplomats and intelligence people that there were more than
half-a-million German troops concentrated along the Danube, at the
principle crossings.811
Apart from the diplomatic haggling which was known to only a
few and the daily training of the Army, there was the usual struggle
along the borders. Hundreds of agents were captured along the
84. Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign, London, Frederick
Muller Limited, 1945, p.132.
Western borders during 1940.85 Not less irritating were enemy air¬
craft flying over Soviet territory. There was no call for alarm but
the Commissar for Defence and the Chief of the General Staff were
worried enough to call a military meeting, in December 1940, under
the auspices of the Supreme Military Council (GVS).
The autumn exercises of 1940 were not altogether encouraging.
High military authorities went so far as to indicate crisis in the
training programme of the Red Array. Looking at the problem from a
soldier's point of view, it was a confused picture. Since 1935
there were endless changes in regulations, in instructions, in command
in equipment and in discipline. The recent exercises along the
Western border which were commanded by Lieutenant-General Vatutin
were conducted according to the experience of the Finnish War. The
soldiers were trained to break through heavily fortified lines, to
overcome technical and engineering obstacles and to engage an enemy
in bunkers and pillboxes. On the face of it, it was an exercise in
interaction of arms using tanks, artillery and air force. It was the
intention of the High Command to simulate the environment of a real
battlefield for which puroose live ammunition was used by all arms.
Infantry soldiers too, were firing their weapons, some of which were
the new sub-machine-guns and half automatic rifles. But Timoshenko
and Meretskov who were touring the training grounds were not satisfied
nor were many other commanders, notably those of the armoured forces.
Sometimes the task seemed impossible, with the new ideas about
85. Lt. General V. Fedorchuk, 'Armieskie Chekisti v Doyakh za rodinu'
VIZ No.12, 1967, p.lll. The figure 5000 captured agents seems
rather exaggerated. It may refer to all trespassers.
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concentration of mechanised corps clashing with the reality of the
same units being dispersed or re-organised.86 The co-ordination
between tanks and infantry remained unaccomplished after the exercises,
for prestige as well as for mechanical, logistical and tactical
reasons. The air force too, was very slow in catching up. The
trickle of new machines into the force made the old ones seem even
more obsolete and unattractive for the young pilots, yet there were
too few of these new models coveted and dreaded at the same time.87
Co ordination in the air which had been such a problem during the
'incident' in Khalkhin Gol88 was not helped by the intrusion of the
modern types of aircraft, let alone air-force land-force co¬
ordination. Further-more, tne proportion of air-ground support
aircraft to bombers made such co-ordination almost an impossible task.
At the same time, Germany was proving that it could be done.
Precise co-ordination between arms, mass concentration of armoured
forces, air supremacy and surprise were the pillars of the German
doctrine in action. It was of commanding importance for the Soviet
leadership to assess the German might after the fall of Western and
Northern Europe. It was verging on recklessness to proceed with the
training and the armament programmes without a theoretical summing up
of the ground that had been covered so far. The only way to evaluate
the achievement of the Red Army since the Finnish War was to hear
86. See Chapter IV under Armoured Forces.
87. See Chapter IV under Air Force.
88. VIZ No.9, 1969, pp.74-76.
reports of the people who were in a position to know what the army
was doing. Six commanders were assigned to prepare an exhaustive
report in their particular fields. The reports were ordered on
1st September and they were given a month to prepare them. Meretskov,
the CGS had Vatutin and Vasilievsky to help him in compiling the
gigantic amount of data; Zhukov was lucky to have Bagramyan around,
with his erudition in Staff and theoretical work. The reports were
diverse so as to cover every possible aspect of military activity, but
the terms of reference were strict and clear-cut. The idea was to
match the theoretical thinking with the current technical and tactical
possibilities of the Soviet Union.
The military representatives on the whole were in their
forties or younger. If they were not direct products of Soviet
military education, they at least had had some period in a Soviet
military academy. However, quite a few were veterans of the Civil
War, and some were associated or even acquainted with the victims of
the purges as well as with their ideas. On the other hand, there
was a long list of younger commanders who assumed high ranks as a
result of the purges but were lacking in experience, or (to use a
contemporary expression) 'military culture'.83 As they were all,
at least to some extent, products of Soviet military education, they
were of necessity imbued with the spirit of the offensive, and
therefore likely to be impressed with ideas about initiative and
carrying the battle on to enemy territory. Many of the participants
were old-time acquaintances whose comradeship was forged in battle
89. M.I. Kazakov, Nad kartoi bylikh srazheniya, Moscow, Voenizdat
1965, p.57.
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and in exercises, as well as in nllitary academies which they had
attended as pupils or teachers. The political undertones were
contributed implicitly by fresh memories of the purges and explicitly
by the presence of Party representatives and military political
workers who were notorious for their part in the elimination of the
older High Command.
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Tinoshenko who opened the December 1940 meeting in his
capacity as both People's Commissar of Defence and Chairman of the
conference, set the tone:
How do ue conceive of organising and conducting
offensive and defensive operations, of using
mechanised force and air force, and of organising
all the work concerning the development of
military theory and operative preparedness of the
commanding personnel."
After Titaoshenko's rather general opening, the conference spent the
following two days, 23-25 December, listening to and discussing CGS
Meretskov's report. The title of his report was: Results and
Aims of the Infantry and Air Force Military Preparations, and the
Operative Preparations of the Commanding Personnel. The very
title indicated a critical look back at the results of the training
programme since the Finnish War and an analytical look ahead. Re¬
garding his first intention, Meretskov was in an awkward situation.
He became CGS on 18 August 1940, and could not be blamed for mistakes
before this period, i.e. the brunt of his criticism was carried by
Timoshenko and Shaposhnikov. Moreover, Meretskov and Tirooshenko
did not see eye to eye regarding the role of tanks in a future war.91
On the other hand, Meretskov was vulnerable on account of the Finnish
War where his general command of operations92 had not brought victory
and his command of the 7th Army had left much to be desired. His
Finnish War experience left its mark on his report. Meretskov
90. V.A. Anfilov, op.cit., p.137.
91. Meretskov, op.cit., p.195.
92. VIZ No.3, 1965, p.57.
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criticised bitterly the Field Service Regulations which were circu¬
lating at the time for comment and corrections. For lack of any
other regulations, these provisional and officially unratified
versions were in use. To Meretslcov's mind they were old and not in
line with the demands of modern war. He aimed his criticism mainly
at two grave mistakes: the proportion between combat and non-combat
troops in first-line units and the lop-sided balance between attack
and defence. In his opinion only a third of the troops were actually
committed to battle while two-thirds were kept behind as holding
troops. The same mistake he observed in defence, where not enough
forces and means were directed into the sector of the main enemy blow.
But this mistake, according to Meretskov was only a detail in an
entirely erroneous approach to the problem of defence:
There was a time when in general people were
afraid to say that defence was possible.93
Meretskov made it very clear what he thought had been the
source of evil:
The war experience has proved that the present
system of education and military preparation of
the forces did not provide the necessary train¬
ing for them. It is generally known that our
army ... is educated according to the combat
experience in the period of the Civil War ....
which led to wrong ideas about the rigorous
demands which are made in the course of war.91*
Drawing on his observations during the recently held
93. Meretskov, op.cit., p.198.
94. Anfilov, op.cit., p.127.
exercises, he commented that it looked:
.... as if we reared not defenders of the
Motherland, who are ready to shed their
blood, but hot-house plants.95
He went on to say that:
The troops, overcoming the advanced lines of
defence not always had a clear notion what
should be done in order to struggle quickly
through the defensive obstacles and reach the
first line of defence. During training as
soon as the soldiers came up against real
obstacles, it was evident that they had
neither practice nor skill to overcome them.
.... It was revealed that they did not know
how to adapt to local conditions and how to
use correctly the ground features in order to
take cover.96
There were other occasions when the staffs were not accurate in co¬
ordinating the branches of the army.
Commenting directly on what he himself experienced in the
Finnish War, Meretskov said:
For some reason we have not yet defined what
will be the case with mines on the battle¬
field. 97
Yet above all, the Chief of the General Staff wanted to impress upon
his colleagues the danger of an imminent war. As if anticipating
many complaints, wild suggestions and criticism, he said:
95. Meretskov, op.cit., p.198.
96. Anfilov, op.cit., p.130.
97. Ibid., p.131.
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At the present, the government and the Party
supply us with all that is necessary and de¬
mand that we will be in constant military
preparedness against aggression. Not for
one minute are we allowed to forget that we
live and work at a time of war, we cannot
lose even one hour, and making use of every
minute we must improve our war readiness.98
It was a shattering document. During the intervals in the
following debate, Meretskov could hear many angry comments. Obviously
Timoshenko was not pleased. Meretskov knew very well that this state
of affairs was not of the Commissar's making. Timoshenko himself
inherited a dispirited army, in a demoralised and chaotic organisational
situation when he was appointed People's Commissar of Defence seven
months before the December Meeting. Many commentators who agreed
with Meretskov's general argument remarked nevertheless that there had
been many successes in training and organisation during 1940. While
some disapproved of the tone of Meretskov's report, none could dispute
its conclusions, namely the need for new Field Service Regulations
that would take into consideration the experience of the war in
Finland and in Western Europe. Nobody argued against Meretskov's
statement that there were shortcomings in the training programme.
The second report on the agenda was read by General of the
Army, Zhukov, who came to Moscow from his Military District's H.Q. in
Kiev. He spoke about The nature of modern offensive operations.
His main subject was the massive mechanised corps. He elaborated on
the new scope of warfare as a result of motorisation and mechanisation
of modern armies. Modern battle, according to Zhukov, was faster,
more dynamic and achieved more decisive results. Fast development
98. Anfilov, op.cit., p.138.
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was due to mass concentration of air force, tanks, motorised and
airborne units. Successful development of a breakthrough, turning
operative success into a strategic one was made possible by the use
of modern equipment en masse. Analysing the war in Western Europe
during 1939-40, he concluded that most instructive was the close co¬
ordination of masses of tanks and mechanised units with air force and
airborne troops in operation in depth. Modern operations would
succeed only if they were carried in many directions, in all the
depth of the operative theatre, with strong mobile groups hitting at
the flanks and rear of the enemy concentrations. In conclusion,
Zhukov emphasised that the Red Army would have to face a strong and
heavily equipped enemy. Of all those present at the conference,
Zhukov was the only one who both approved of modern warfare and applied
it in practice. The heavy losses which the victory in Khalkhin-Gol
entailed left him disenchanted, but convinced.
Among those who took part in the debate after Zhukov's report,
only one was conspicuous in his criticism, P.L. Romanenko, commander
of 1st Mechanised Corps. Among other things, he said the following:
In my opinion this treatment (Zhukov's report)
could have been right during the period 1932-34,
as it reflects the standard of military thinking
of that time, based on troops considerably less
saturated with equipment.
The report has rightly established that the
German army accomplished its attacking operations
on the whole by mechanised and air force units,
but it has not shown how it was accomplished
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the Germans who have less tanks than we, understand
that attacking force in our time is made of
mechanised, tank and air force units and they
assembled all their tanks and motorised troops in a
strategical formation; they massed them and
assigned to them the accomplishment of independent
decisive operations."
On the positive side of his comments, Romanenko went on to
suggest a Shock Army consisting of 4-5 mechanised corps, 3-4 air corps,
1-2 paratrooper divisions, 9-12 artillery regiments. Nobody accepted
this suggestion which stood in staggering contradiction to the
technical and organisational capabilities of the Red Army in 1940-41.
First-hand view of the conference material proves
that there were no serious disputes between the
participants concerning the problem of application
of mass mobile troops (motor-mechanised). In
discussing the reports of G.K. Zhukov and D.G.
Pavlov, there were many exchanges of opinion, but
not about the principle of applying massed mobile
troops. They regarded groups assigned to develop
a breakthrough and their deployment and order of
battle (echelons); the width of front and timing
of committing the mobile group to the breakthrough;
the organisation of co-ordination of mobile troops
and air force, their conduct and fuel supply for
tanks to enable independent activity of mechanised
units in the operative depth of the enemy.120
Lt. General P.S. Klenov, Chief of Staff of the Baltic Military District
commented that Znukov's report aired the basic problems of preparing
and conducting offensive operations, but it did not mention the
particular operations during the first period of the War.101
99. Yeremenko, op.cit., p.36, see also: VIZ No.6, 1965, p.74 for
comment on Romanenko's remar.es.
100. Ibid.
101. Zhukov, Vospominaniya i Razmishleniya, APN Publisning House
1969, p.272.
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General F.E. Golikov who basically accepted Zhukov's conception about
massive mechanised units, did not agree with Romanenko's criticism
that Zhukov had in mind the capabilities of the Red Army in 1932-34.
The third report, The character of modern Defensive Operations
was read by General of the Army I.V. Tulenyev, who was the Commander
of Moscow Military District:
General of the Army I.V. Tulenyev prepared a
comprehensive report on the Nature of Modern
defence, but in keeping with the instructions,
he did not go beyond the limits of defence on
an Array scale, and therefore, he did not
discuss the nature of modern strategical
defence.
Tulenyev's task was difficult as he had to overcome the
convention and the political-theoretical aversion against defensive
operations. He plotted his argument very carefully giving constant
tribute to the merits of offensive operations. However he made his
point that, whereas the attack was very advanced in Soviet
theoretical writings, defence left much to be desired. The defence
operation, he argued, whether it was dependent upon the general plan
of the war, operative considerations or even some political or
economical reasons might be based on strong fortifications using
modern military means. An Army in defence should occupy a front of
100 km, and have a depth of 100-120 km. Every division would have
to defend a line 8-12 km. in length. The defence should be organised
in depth consisting of several fortified defensive lines, and the
operative organisation of an army's troops should be constructed in
two echelons. The defence should cater for anti-tank, anti-artillery
102. Zhukov, ibid., p.197, see also, Anfilov, op.cit., p.141.
and anti-air-raid purposes. In the depth of tie fortified area,
there should be forces and means to cope with tanks and air-borne
units. More-over, the army must be able to commit strong forces for
counter~attack3, the old defensive-offensive mix.
During the debate which had followed Tulenyev's report,
Lt. General M.A. Purkayev, Chief of Staff of Kiev Military District
spoke about the need for strong anti-tank defence. His solution,
in part, was to use mechanised means to lay mines. Major-General
V.I. Klimovskii, Chief of Staff of Western Military District aired
his view about the surprise factor in defence. Lt. General Kirporias,
commander of Leningrad Military District spoke about the importance
of camouflage in defence. The Chief of Frunze Military Academy,
M.S. Khosin maintained that the Defence with its fortifications
depended upon the operative conception and could not be separated from
it. Furthermore, it was impossible to make the operative conception
dependent upon the environment of the fortification. He based his
observation on the experience of the Russian Army in the First World
War. Major-General L.A. Govorov, Deputy General Inspector of
Artillery, said that defence consisted of strong tactical fire-power,
of the possibilities provided by fortifications to exercise such fire
and of the manoeuvres of mobile operative reserves. The most
controversial point of view was expressed by Lt. General V.D.
Sokolovsky, Chief of Staff of Moscow Military District. He challenged
the view that the defence was centred round a geographical point.
Fierce battle did not mean that not one piece of land should be given
up. The defence he said, should be tactically elastic. Arranged in
depth it should aim at oiusing as many casualties as possible, to
bleed the enemy white both materially and from a morale point of view.
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Lt. General P.S. Klenov praised Tulenyev for emphasising the
importance of defence, in which, according to him, the Red Army was
rather amateurish. No one disputed the fact that both theory and
practice of defence should be furthered and that their contemporary
state was not satisfactory.
Tulenyev's report was followed by Col. General D.G. Pavlov,
commander or Western Military District who spoke about The Use of
Mechanised Corps in Attack. Obviously Pavlov had changed his mind
since November103 1939. He now said that the main task of tank
forces was to develop the success of a breakthrough into the bperative
depth'104 of the enemy. Mechanised troops en masse using their
modern equipment and operating independently were a decisive factor
in large operative activities. Mechanised troops would turn an
operative success into a strategic one.
In the debate following Pavlov's paper, Lieutenant-General
F.E. Golikov spoke about the factor of timing in committing armoured
forces. In his opinion armoured forces should he involved in the
breakthrough from the very first day, as otnerwise they were likely
to engage stronger and better prepared enemy forces. Lieutenant-
General A.I. Yeremenko who agreed in principle with Zhukov's ideas
about mass concentration of mechanised units105 went on to discuss
the co-ordination between infantry and tanks with a strong accent on
the latter.
103. gee p.60.
104. 'Operative depth' in Soviet militarcy terminology means the
length and width of a given battlefield usually of a front
or an Army including their rear at a given time.
105. Anfilov, op.cit., p.143.
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.... tanks with the support of artillery and
aviation engage the enemy, and the infantry
destroys it, occupies its territory and
consolidates the success. In thi3 function
tne tank3 give close support to the infantry.
Hera too, they are tne decisive factor in
I OSsuccess.iUO
Artillery had featured prominently in all the debates. The
Red Army was saturated with guns at all levels.137 During 1940,
the training programme accentuated artillery co-ordination with
infantry, concentration of fire under one centralised command and
artillery fire by topographic caps and at night. But as in other
sectors, here too, the training progransme was based on the Finnish
War experience and the Finns had neither tanks nor planes in
sufficient numbers to merit special attention. However, in December
there was on the conference table data collected during the war in
Western and Northern Europe. The participants had a fairly accurate
notion of tneir likely enemy and his performance. Furtnermore even
within tne framework, of the conference a discrepancy was revealed
between a training programme aimed at blowing up strong fortified
lines, and far-advanced ideas about masses of mechanised forces in
co-ordination witn huge air forces. A war of manoeuvre in attack
and in defence as it had been outlined in the conference, demanded
new thinking about artillery too. Lieutenant-General M.A. Parsegov,
Inspector General of Artillery complained that tne independent anti¬
aircraft units could not cope with their task of nighly concentrated
106. Yereraenko, op.cit., p.39.
107. IVOV 1960, Vol.1, pp.452-453, see also: 50^Let Vooruzhennykh
Sil SSSR, p.201, also: Zhukov, op.cit., pp.213-214.
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fire. Marshal Kulik suggested the establishment of courses during
1941 for young AA gunners. The aim of these courses would be to
achieve high speed fire.*09
The fifth report in the conference, The Air Force in Attack
Operations and in the Struggle for Air Supremacy, was read by
Lieutenant-General A.F. Rychagov. lie said that the air force, like
the armoured force was expecting new machines during 1941. The main
task would be to roaster these planes, and to fit them into the
training programme in combination with the older types which were
still to form the bulk of the force. On the theoretical side, he
made six main points. The task of the air force, he said, was the
conquest of air supremacy; co-ordination between air force and land
forces in the battlefield; protection of troops and regions from
enemy air raids; activity of the air force as operative and strategic
reserve over the troops and operative rear of the enemy; provisions
for dropping paratroops; supplying troops cut off from their
logistics, or who were in need for other reasons.
The debate following Rychagov's report also extended beyond
the given terms of reference. Thus, Major-General D.T. Kozlov, Chief
of Air Defence said that conquest of air supremacy was the duty of a
Front and not of an Army's air force. Lieutenant-General M.M. Popov,
Commander of the 1st Red Banner Army followed the same argument:
The struggle for strategic supremacy is included
in the competence of the Supreme Command and the
Front command and goes beyond the framework of
the Army's command activity.*®9
108. Marshal P. Batitskii, 'Razvitiye voisk PVO strany v gody
Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny', VIZ No.9, 1972, p.15.
109. Yeremenko, op.cit., p.42.
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lie baaed his conclusion partially on recent German success in the
We3t. Popov was impressed by German air raids on British and French
air-fields. In his opinion attacks on air-fields helped towards
air-supremacy. The German success depended, according to Popov, on
whether they achieved surprise in their air-raids. Despite the
previous terms of reference, the ideas about centralising large air-
force formations under a Front or as a reserve of the Supreme Command
carried the day. In that respect, as in all others, the tendency
was towards enlarging the formations, and saturating them with
mechanised equipment, i.e. getting high speed and high efficiency
witnout giving up the concept of a mass army.
The sixth and last report of the conference lit fan try divisions
in Attack and Defence was read by Inspector of Infantry Lt. General
A.K. Smirnov.
Smirnov obviously had in mind motorised infantry. In defence
the infantry division reflected the same structure which had been
mentioned in an Ariay context. Division was to Army as battalion was
to division.
ing infantry division faced the most difficult task. Only saturating
such divisions with tanks and artillery could help them to overcome
What is the problem, of commanding soldiers?
Knowledge of the equipment by our commanding
personnel ... mast *" ' meat is the
road to mastering
The basis of defence was the battalion sector.111 An attack
110. Anfilov, op.cit., p.125.
111. Yeremenko, op.cit., p.43.
 
and penetrate enemy defence lines. With two artillery regiments,
said Smirnov, the division coul 1 successfully break through a
fortified front, four kilometers wide. Snirnov's report highlighted
the growing rote of platoon and company commanders. Since the
beginning of the thirties, not only did every service have its
military academy, but also every branch of the land forces. In 1937
there were 13 academies and 75 military colleges and schools and at
the beginning of 1941, that is at the tiire of the conference, there
were 19 academies and 255 colleges and schools. At the beginning
of 1937, 79.6 per cent of the high ranking commanders had secondary
or high military education. Amongst armoured and mechanised force
commanders the figure was 96.8 per cent, in the air force, 98.9 and
in the navy, 98.2112 The standard of military and general education
of commanding personnel had grown and was growing,*DUt simultane¬
ously there were destructive and demoralising processes in operation,
not all of which were intentional. In Autumn 1940, a considerable
number of older recruits fulfilled their term of service and were
transferred to the reserve and new recruits came to replace them.
Many of these were junior and some were senior officers. Many of
the participants at the conference complained both about the standard
of the new commanders and indirectly about the system of promotion.
Thus Lieutenant-General I.S, Konev, Commander of Trans-baikal
Military District said:
112. Anfilov, op.cit., p.124, the reference is to military
education.
113. D. Fedotoff White, The Growth of_ the Red Army, Princeton
University Press, 1944, p.378.
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however great the cadres' needs, I consider
it intolerable that commanders who lave never
com nude J -t regiment should be appointed
division coroaandero.11
Lieutenant-General V.N. Rordiumov, Chief of military training
in the Red Army, who was also head of a co; mission appointed to
investigate the project PU-1939 said;
Talking about young commanders who were promoted
tc commanding posts (Kordiumov) - proved that
they were all boundlessly devoted to the dome-
land, but not all of them had enough operative -
tactical training and not all had successfully
coped with the demands of their duties.1*5
This particular shortcoming was a direct result of the purge.
.... at the end of 1940, the majority of our
commanding cadres were very young. Some
commanders during the last two-three years
went through several service degrees and
commanded districts, and large formations;
they conducted the work of Headquarters in
just a few months. They replaced the military
leadership that was knocked out in the years
1937-38.116
Apart from the six papers read and the general discussion
following each, the large assembly was divided into study groups to
discuss and analyse tactical and strategic problems. Altogether
there were five such sessions (letuchek) in which problems of Army
and Front in attack and defence were raised. To crown this aspect
114. Anfilov, Ibid., p.125. The remark is an indirect criticism of
the purge of the military, and so are the following two remarks.
115. Ibid., p.125.
116. Meretskov, op.cit.t p.199.
of the conference, a war game on naps was conducted. Although not
under fire, the commanders felt the pressure of demanding logistical,
organisational and signalling tasks which cropped up during the game.
The game proved that many of the young commanders, recently promoted,
did not have the necessary experience in coEmtanding large military
units.
This part of the conference ended on 29 December 1940. There
followed a two-day exhibition of new armaments. The commanders were
invited to the firing range to observe the new tanks in action and
then the conference reconvened on 31 December, 1940, for the summing-
up read by Marshal Timoshenko. His paper was a survey of the Red
Army during 1940, that is since he had been appointed People's
Commissar of Defence (8th May). This part of his speech was in
part a reply to the criticism of Meretskov and other observations
which had been addressed to him during the conference. He went on
to emphasise the German achievements in the West, underlining the
factors of motorisation, mass concentration of mechanised and air
forces and their inter-co-ordination. In the high speed of modern
war, he said there was the danger of surprise. He praised the Soviet
theory as opposed to the German total reliance on surprise and
blitzkrieg (molnenosnaya_ voina). There was rarely a case when the
strategic aim of the war was achieved in one decisive blow. In
order to achieve this ultimate aim it was necessary to get through a
series of stages each of which might hold in substance the strategic
aim of a particular stage. In other words, Soviet theory maintained
at the end of 1940 that the war would be long and fierce, consisting
however of several stages. Timoshenko also summed up the theme of
offensive-defensive. Me outlined the aims and the scope of a defensive
operation, which could engulf a whole front with several lines of
defence in depth. Yet, the philosophy of military action, in his
opinion, was based on the offensive. Defensive operation, no matter
how elaborate it might be, was only auxiliary to the offensive. The
Red Army should be in defence only when it was absolutely impossible
to attack, in order to gain time for an attack, and for halting
actions on secondary sections to enable the main one to launch an
attack. But even while on the defensive, opportunities should be
sought to counter-attack. All the defensive means should be always
prepared because wherever this had not been the case during the war in
the West, there had been casualties. Timoshenko did not mention that
Germany started the war before completing her mobilisation, grouping
and deployment.
Although military conferences were held regularly in the Red
Army, the December meeting, according to those who participated and
wrote about it, was different. It was basically military-professional
both in agenda and in approach. Many of those invited represented
the young generation of commanders who were promoted after the purges,
a fact that the veterans, the survivors were very much aware of.
Some comments which had been sounded in the debates concealed a
bitter criticism of those who lowered the standard of military art
in the Soviet Union. Stalin was well-informed on all the proceed¬
ings, but he did not make an appearance, nor was his direct influence
felt throughout the conference. Within technical, professional
limitations the military were left alone to consolidate the rich
combat experience of the recent, dramatic two years during which the
Red Army underwent three major, though not total, compaigns in
Khalkhin Gol, Finland and Western Ukraine. Although
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their papers and comments tvere based on past history eating back to
the First World War and to the Civil War in Spain, the main
interest of senior Soviet commanders was German performance in the
west. These two approaches created a gap between the papers and
the comments. The papers were based on earlier experience within
terms of reference dictated by the Supreme Military Council and the
General Staff. They had to approximate to the Red Army's actual
capability until the end of 1940, and its potential during 1941.
The authors of these papers were first approached during September
1940, when the full significance of recent German victories had not
yet been realised, let alone analysed. Since the beginning of
November, the date on which the papers had to be submitted, not only
had Molotov returned empty-handed from Berlin but also the full
impact of German might had been impressed on the mind of the Soviet
Government. The commanders who were assembled by the end of
December were in a somewhat different frame of mind. They were
much wiser about the military difficulties the Red Army might have
to face if ever the Soviet Union was involved in war. The difference
in state of mind between September and December combined with
differences in combat experience, age, education and knowledge of the
real possibilities of Soviet industry and the armament programme,
accounted for many disputes. On the whole, there was a surprising
unanimity of outlook and assessment of the situation which could not,
however, bridge over the gap between the school of people who wanted
to apply First World war and Spanish Civil War experience to a
future war and the other school who wanted to apply the potential
of the Red Army as it would be by 1942.
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In other words, neither school spoke in terms of war in 1941.117
The lessons of large mechanised and air forces and the need for their
co-ordination with infantry and artillery were studied and digested.
The significance of speed and its offshot - surprise - were impressed
upon the commanders with endless illustrations. No one failed to
acknowledge the importance and complications of defence, though the
offensive spirit carried the day. The speakers admitted frankly the
shortcomings in command education, in the poor shape of fortified
lines and areas and in the use of radio for communications. All the
Soviet theoretical erudition was aired during the conference and the
participants benefitted from the use of unified terminology. Last,
but not least, the Field Service Regulations 1939 project was given a
boost.118 A foundation was laid for a clearer view of the training
programme, the armament programme and 'combat readiness* of the Red
Army in 1941.
The War Games 2-15 January, 1941.
On 1st January 1941, Stalin invited to the Kremlin the
commanders who had stayed on in Moscow after the conference, for the
war games which were due to start on that day. He was not pleased
with the fact that Timoshenko read his closing paper without hearing
his comment about it before, to which Timoshenko answered that he had
sent the draft to Stalin and was consequently sure that Stalin had
read it and had no comment to make. Stalin wa3 not familiar with all
117. bagramyan, 'Zapisici nachainiica operativnogo otdela', VIZ No.l,
1967, p.58.
118. IVOV, 1960, Vol.1, p.443.
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the details of the coining War Gaues. lie as.,ed about the date and
the commanders who were due to command the Blue (Western) side and
the Red (Eastern) side. Finally he instructed Timoshenko not to
dismiss the commanders after the games. The games basse on cap
exercise which started on 2nd January, were under the general super¬
vision of Ticoshenko and were divided into two part3. The first
game analysed a break through a fortified district and the conrnitinent
of mechanised corps to develop the breakthrough. The second was a
two-sided game in which the air of the Red - East side - was to offer
stiff defence north of the Pripet and create possibilities for a
decisive offensive. The results of tne first Game were applied in
the second. The Blue - Western side - in the second game was
commanded by General Zhukov (his Chief of Staff was Lt. General M.A.
Purkaev, Zhukov's actual Chief of Staff in Kiev Military District).
The Red - Eastern side - was commanded by Colonel General D.G. Pavlov
(his Chief of Staff was Major General V.I. Klimovskii, his actual
Chief of Staff in the Western Military District). The front of the
Western strategic axis ran from East Prussia to Polesie. The Red
side had more than 50 divisions and the Blue more than 70. The data
collected for the games was based on recent German operations in the
West, and on estimates of their force around the borders of the USSR.
During the game there were several surprises. The Western
side inflicted three strong blows on the defenders, penetrated the
fortified district, routed the Grodno and Bialistok troop concentration
and went on to the Lida district. This result was both against the
119. Heretskov o^.jcit., p.2J0, see also, Ehuxov, op.cit., pp.223-225;
also Roy Mcdvedev, Let History Judge, Macmillan, 1972, p.447.
Field Regulations according to which the attacking side needed a much
larger advantage and against the General Staff expectations when they
had planned the game. The two very complicated games lasted from
the second until the eighth January. They were then analysed by the
Blue and Red commanders between the 8-11 January. On this day when
the participants who were away from their commands for three weeks
were preparing to go home, Stalin phoned and invited all the partic¬
ipants to the Kremlin on 13 January.120 In the short time remaining
to him, Meretskov was instructed to prepare his analysis of the War
Games. The participants in the War Games convened in the Kremlin at
1200 hours and faced the whole government and Central Committee of
the Communist Party. It was not like the previous military meeting.
Meretskov's report, which had been prepared in such a haste, was not
clear on its account of the two-sided game. Meretskov claimed on
the basis of the Field Regulations and the intelligence data available
about the Germans, that a Soviet division had more man-power and fire
pownr than an equivalent German one. On this basis, he calculated
tnat in a meeting engagement (vstrechnii boi) a Soviet division
would no doubt defeat a German one, that in defence, one Soviet
division would withstand the attack of two-three German divisions
and that in attack half a Soviet division would overcome a whole
German one.121 Stalin raised a crucial problem. If that was so,
he argued, how had it happened that tne Blue side had crushed the
defence of the Red one since the difference in number of divisions
was lower than that stated in Meretskov's report. Meretskov tried
120. Kazakov, op.cit., p.61.
121. Ibid., p.63.
101.
to argue that the 31ue aide had the advantage in mechanised and air
forces to which Staliu had a reply, devastating in its simplicity,
ivhat would count at the end, he said, was not.what ve had written
down in the book, but what would be the real circumstances. Yet on
the other hand, Stalin challenged the data about the German strength,
as it was presented by Meretskov, on the grounds that not only
arithmetical majority counted, but also the skill of commanders and
troops. Vatutin who helped Meretskov to compile the material tried
to come in on that point, but he was cut short, while Tinoshenko who
read all the intelligence information did not support his Chief of
Staff. At that point, the debate was thrown open to the floor where
it immediately turned round to the major issue - mechanised-iiotorised
mass army, ready for war of manoeuvre, in co-ordination with massive
air force, or massive infantry formations saturated with thousands of
horse-drawn artillery pieces.
Pavlov and Zhukov summed up their roles as the blue and Red
commanders. Zhukov pointed out the weakness of the fortified lines
along the T'estern borders. These were the very lines whose vulner¬
ability he had just demonstrated. To his mind, they were located
too close to the borders and did not have the right configuration.
Some indignant objections were raised against Zhukov's observations.
Tavlov argued from a local-patriotism point of view since the forti¬
fications were within his area of command while Voroshilov snapped
that the decision regarding the fortified lines had been taken by
the Supreme Military Council and their construction was under the
control of Deputy Defence Commissar Marshal B.M. Shaposhinkov.122
122. VIZ, No.3, 1965, p.52.
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At that, the argument was cut short.
The chief of the Armoured Forces Directorate, Lt. General
Ya. N. Fedorenko, retailed the problems of moving tank units about,
sometimes distances of 100-200 km. with ail the waste of time and
machine-hours involved. It was not a matter of high policy, but a
sad reality that the armoured forces in a constant process of re¬
organisation were moved around, some units 3-4 times. Many units
were redeployed when the new borders were established and as it
usually took about two months to service, repair and put the machines
in order and as, moreover, half of the personnel were busy doing
these mechanical and maintenance jobs, there was very little time
left for training. On top of that, there were no training grounds
ready for the armoured forces in their new locations and throughout
1940 they had to practice static gunnery. Another source of
grievance was the relationship between araoured and infantry units.
The infantry not only accepted literally their own major role on the
battlefield, "but to add humiliation to injury took advantage of tank
mobility and the armoured forces' precarious status and demanded that
the tanks should come to their training fields for co-ordinated
manoeuvres - a further waste of machine-hours. The result was, said
Fedorenko, that there was no training at all to achieve co-ordination
between tanks, artillery and infantry. This basic demand of modern
warfare was postponed to 1941. But although it was fitted into
the programme, it was unlikely to be accomplished because the new
models T-34 and KV, on which the programme was partially based, were
slow in reaching the units.
Fedorenko was heckled by Marshal G.I. Kulik, Chief of
Artillery who questioned the wisdom of having tanks in the first
place. According to his calculations, artillery was much more
important as it proved more effective than tanks. Fedorenko
answered in a caln voice to this rather heated interruption. He
went on to prove that tanks had the advantage over artillery as they
had a gua and were also mobile. It was a reverberation of the old
dispute when Pavlov and Kulik were instrumental in making the
decision to dissolve the niechanised corps. Like the dispute be¬
tween infantry and mechanised units, the dispute between tanks and
artillery had many prestige undertones and the symptons of the
services'123 one-track mind. However the latter dispute was ominous
in its implications because processes of procurement and adaptation
of industry to new specifications were rather slow even in most
advanced decision-making institutions and ultra-modern industries.
Whether the decisions favoured artillery or tanks, both would
probably feel the repercussions for a long time. The participants
at the conference were aware of this. Marshal Kulik, following the
logic of his emphasis on artillery, that is, on a static positional
war, but in line with the ideas about mass armies, went on to
suggest a sixteen-eighteen thousand infantry division. As for
artillery logistics, he thought of horses as traction power. Kulik
did not make this suggestion as an expedient due to the slow rate of
tank production. He represented a school of thought which was not
fully aware of the military industrial revolution which had been
123. Listening to Kulik someone in the audience cracked: 'Every
woodcock praises its own swamp', (Kazhdi kulik svoe boloto
khvalit) quoted by Yeremenko, op.cit., p.4tf. Humour not¬
withstanding, this discussion cut deen into the bone of
Soviet military thinking: For another account of the same
discussion, see: Kazakov, op.cit. pn.63-66.
taking place in the Soviet Union during the late thirties and the
beginning of the forties. This school failed to see the possible
applications of this revolution on the battlefields. They still
visualised the war as a swarm of men and horses pulling at heavy
guns and trying to blow each other out of well-fortified positions.
These views were not adopted at the conference, at least not on
theoretical grounds. The theoretical hurdle overcome, it was a
problem of how much to procure of each item. The results in practice
were sometimes nearer to what Kulik saw as an ideal than to what
Pavlov, Fedorenko and Zhukov demanded, but the intention to achieve
more mechanisation was established.
In his speech at the end of the analysis, Stalin emphasised
that the coming war would be motorised, and that it would be a combat
between mass armies in which the Pved Army must be 2-3 times stronger
than the enemy. The army, he said, must have automatic weapons and
the rear both of the army and of the country must be prepared to
supply the combat units with all the ammunition and food stuffs
necessary to conduct a war. Without actually committing himself to
either opinion, he compared Kulik's views to the views of the
opponents of the Collectivisation. To his mind it was the choice
between the tractor and the wooden plough.*21* Significantly he did
not make the comparison between agriculture and industrialisation.
At the end of the War Games, the Soviet Government had an accurate
picture of the procurement demands of the military, whereas the
commanders had a fairly accurate notion of the blue-print for
production up to the middle of 1942.
124. Kazakov, oo.cit., pp.65-66.
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During the War Games, the Soviet high Command, the Government
and the Party caught a glimpse of the enemy on maps, charts and
figure columns. Some of them were over-optimistic, others were
incredulous, not one expected a war within a month, and most of them
doubted if it would break out during 1941. however, all out e very
few realised the difficulties which were facing the Soviet Union in
organising war industry, in training the Reu Army and in fortification.
They were aware of the Japanese danger and the implications of a war
on two fronts. Yet with all this, tue Soviet Union was at peace,
formally and in practice. The Soviet High Command had some rough
idea of the time it would take to order an alert in several sectors
of the Western borders in case of emergency.125 The Air Force re¬
ported that it would take several hours to put its units into battle
order. But all these were speculative calculations. A full
mobilisation had neither been experimented with, nor exercised.
Fedorenko's report concerning the combat readiness of the armoured
forces, Rychagov's report about the air force, and Z'nukov's observations
concerning the state of the border fortifications, were alarming.
Furthermore, the machinery of mobilisation, that is the chain of
command from top to bottom, as well as communications and the signals
network, had not been put to any full-scale test since the end of the
Civil War.
125. Zhukov, op.cit., no.190-193.
CHAPTER III
PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT
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In November when Molotov went on his diplomatic mission to
Berlin he already knew about German military movement eastwards and
since information about reconnaissance flights over the Rumanian-
Soviet border was passed on by Frontier Troops as early as September,
1940, Molotov might have been in possession of this information too.1
He could not have known at the time about Hitler's intention to
attack the Soviet Union, nor of his instructions to start planning
such an attack. Furthermore the shift of the German army eastwards
although it was compatible with the strategic intentions of Hitler2
answered the immediate demands arising from his Balkan policy. Hitler's
strategic intentions were kept top secret and there were few, if any,
breaches of security as long as these intentions were limited to
planning by high ranking staff officers. However as early as August,
1940, General Kostring, Military Attache in Moscow was told by Haider
at a conference in Fontainbleau that Hitler had decided on an operation
against the USSR.3 On 6th September, 1940, Jodl sent a top secret
1. Collective editorship headed by P.E. Ziriyanov, Pogranichnie
Voiska SSR 1939-1941. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow,
Institut istorii SSSR, Akademiya Hauk, SSSR, 1970, pp.459-460
(Document No.482); see also, W. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's
Headquarters, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, p.136.
2. H.A. Jacobsen (Editor), Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der
Wehrmacht 1940-1945. Frankfurt am main, Bernard und Graefe,
Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1965, Band I: 1 Sugust, 1940 - 31 December
1941, pp.5 (1 August, 1940), p.13 (7 August, 1940), p.971
(Document No.26, 27 August, 1940, 2. Gruppe XXI; Keitel instruct
ion for reinforcement of the German troops in Rumania and their
preparation for action within a short time); see also, R. Briul
'Voennaya podgotovka napadeniya germanskogo imperializma na
sovetskii soyuz', Voprosy istorii, No.12, 1971, p.62; also
A. Toynbee and V.M. Toynbee (Editors), The Initial Triumph of the
Axis, Survey of international affairs 1939-1946, London, Oxford
University Press, 1958, pp.378-379.
3. Toynbee and V.M. Toynbee, op.cit., p.379.
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directive to the German Counter Espionage Service announcing that
German formations in the eastern territory were being strengthened.
'These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that we
are preparing an offensive in the east. )n the other hand, Russia
... should draw the conclusion that we can at any time protect our
interests - especially in the Balkans - with strong forces against a
Russian push.'1* Thus, already in September, 1940, the 'top secret'
was shared by the planners, by certain elements of the diplomatic
corps and by the shady people of counter espionage - a group of people
for whom there had never been any real distinction between reality
and fiction. The more momentum it gathered the more people were let
into the secret of the plans for attacking the Soviet Union. Event¬
ually it reached down to the people who were to execute the idea, to
translate the plan into numbers of tanks and planes and their
operation on the battlefield. Guderian wrote that 'shortly after
Molotov's visit ray new Chief of Staff ... and my first general staff
officer ... were summoned to a conference ... there they heard for the
first time about ... Operation Barbarossa'.5
During November and the first part of December the Gerroan
High Command held war games and on 5th December, 1940, Haider (CGS)
reported to Hitler on the plans for the coming operation against the
USSR, and expressed the German High Command's assessment of the Red
4. H.A. Jacobsen (Editor), op.cit., n.973 (Document No.29,
6 September, 1940).
5. H. Guderian, Panzer Leader, London, Michael Joseph, 1970, p.142.
Using the words 'Shortly after Molotov visit', Guderian means
November, or at the latest December 1940.
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Array material and performance.6 At that time the German army was
suffering from a shortage of tanks and transport vehicles which had
to be made good out of captured French vehicles or current French
industrial production.7 Despite industrial and procurement problems
and despite many gaps in German intelligence information concerning
the Soviet Union, the plan was developing apace.3 On 18th December
Hitler signed nine copies of Directive No.21 'Case Barbarrosa*.
Directive No.21 was not an order to attack, it wa3 a plan for a large
scale operation and an instruction to continue preparations which had
already started and to start deployment. Long term preparations were
to be concluded by 15th May, 1941. Unlike tactical battle orders it
explicitly left several points open, for instance:
In certain circumstances I shall issue orders for
the deployment against Soviet Russia eirdit weeks
before the operation is timed to begin.9
In section II 'Probable Allies and their Tasks' the text reads as
follows:
6. Generaloberst balder, kriegstagebucn 1939-42, Stuttgart, W.
Konlanmnier Verlag, 1963 (henceforth cited as KTB) Band II (1.7
1940-21.6 1941) pp.213-214.
7. H.A. Jacobsen (editor) op.cit., p.973. (Document no.29
6 September, 1940, Paragraph 4); see also, General Heinz
Guderian, op.cit., pp.138-139; also, J.R.K. Butler, op.cit.,
Vol.11, p.537. September order to raise the German Field Army
to a total of 190 divisions by May, 1941, twenty of which were
to be armoured and ten motorised; also M. Van Creveld, 'The
German Attack on the USSR: The Destruction of a Legend',
European Studies Review, Vol.2, No.l, January, 1972, p.83.
8. W. Warlimont, op.cit., pp.136-143.
9. hitler's War Directives 1939-1945 (edited by Trevor Roper),
p.94.
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The High Command of the Armed Forces will decide
and lay down in due time the manner in which the
forces of these two countries will be brought
under German Command.10
The problem of transit via Sweden had not yet been solved and section
five of Directive Mo.21 ended with the words:
I await submission of the plans of Commanders-
in-Chief on the basis of this directive.1*
It is obvious that by 18th December the German High Command had no
more than an instruction of a strategic nature to prepare for an attack
on the Soviet Union. Although by January, 1941, several western
agents "had seen through the veil of Germany's secret preparations, they
could not reveal more than the facts, namely the shift of the German
army to the east.
On 7th January, 1941, the Reich Foreign Minister informed his
Ambassadors, Schulenburg in Moscow, von Papen in Ankara, Heeren in
Belgrade and Erbach-Schonburg in Athens, that strong German troop
formations were going via Hungary to Rumania.12 The information was
to be kept secret. These German troops were to be stationed for the
time being in southern Rumania, with Rumanian consent of course,
prepared to deny the British Army a foothold in Greece or to eject it
from the European continent altogether. As Ribbentrop emphatically
10. Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945 (edited by Trevor Roper), p.95.
11. Ibid.
12. R.J. Sontag and J.S. Beddie (Editors), Nazij^Soviet Relations
1939-1941, Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign
Office, Washington, Department of State Publication, 1948
(Henceforth cited as MSR) pp.264-265.
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stated, the move was not aimed at any of the Balkan states, including
Turkey. The fate of the Balkans and the Dardanelles, as well as the
vulnerability of Turkey, despite the Nontreux convention and the
alteration in the Lausanne treaty, bore directly upon Soviet security.
Despite its concern the Soviet Government could do nothing to
influence German policy in the Balkans. Molotov had already failed
to do so in his November visit to Berlin. The December meeting and
the January War Games did not convince Stalin that he could try to
extend his diplomacy by military means. Besides he had no reason to
complain against the elimination of British influence from southern
Europe. Therefore the only positive thing the Soviet Union could do
to keep at least 3ome political options open was to sign a new Rusbo-
German agreement on 10th January, 1941. A German source referring
to it, said that the agreement amounted to.
increase to two and a half million tons a
year in Soviet Grain and fodder deliveries to
Germany.13
A few days later Schnurre discussed the agreement with Steinhardt,
the American Ambassador in Berlin;
He referred particularly to the deliveries of
Turkistan cotton to be made to Germany, under
the new agreement and remarked that he assumed
the Soviets would import American cotton to
make good any shortage resulting in the Soviet.
Union ***
13. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic papers, 1941,
General, The Soviet Union, United States Government Frinting
Office, Washington, 1958, Vol.1, p.121.
14. Ibid., p.125.
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On 17th January Dekanosov, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, presented
a memorandum regarding German troop movements in the Balkans and asked
what were Germany's intentions.
At the beginning of 1941 hitler believed 'that the situation
in Europe can no longer develop unfavourably for Germany'.However
all the might of Germany's military machine could not guarantee Hitler
complete control over all the variables. It was beyond Germany's
power, for instance to improve Italian fighting competence either at
sea or on landlc without heavily committing German forces. At a
conference at Berghof (Obersalzberg) on 8-9 January, 1941, Hitler
thought that the offensive against Egypt had no chance of success for
the time being, but he was determined to help his ally both in North
Africa and in Albania committing nevertheless as little of his forces
as possible. Hitler's speculations regarding Great Britain's
despairs or hopes17 notwithstanding, the British Army was still an
enemy to reckon with.
To deal with this problem Hitler had first to solve the
problem of the Balkans in order to use it both as a spring board
against the British presence in southern Europe and against the Soviet
Union. The immediate problem at the beginning of 1941 was southern
15. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs [Henceforth cited as FCSAj
p.12 (8-9 January, 1941).
16. British attack on Taranto where bombers sunk the battleship,
Cavour and damaged the battleships Littorio and Duilio on 11-12
November, 1940 and General Wavell's offensive in the desert
which had started on 7 December and lasted until 7 February 1941;
see Shirer op,cit., pp.980-982.
17. FCNA p.13 - 'Britain is sustained in her struggle by hopes placed
in the U.S.A. and Russia. ... Eden is very pro-Russian'. Note:
Eden replaced Lord Halifax on 22 December, 1940; see also
W. Warlimont, op.clt., p.178.
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Europe. The ract that it was used as a cover for the concentration
of troops according to 'Plan Barbarossa' wa3 an additional bonus.
At the same conference at Berghof Hitler reviewed his plans
in all theatres of the war. It was obvious that to carry out
'Operation r^arita'18 Ger- any would have to deploy troops in Bulgaria.
The Soviet Government could not retrain indifferent towards Germany's
designs in Bulgaria regardless of the plausible explanation that
Germany had no territorial claims in the Balkans and that any troop
movements were aimed at Creat Britain. On 12th January, 1941, a
Tass communique announced that.
The foreign Press, relying on statements made in
certain Bulgarian quarters, is spreading the
rumour that units of German troops have penetrated
into Bulgaria, that the transportation of these
troops continued and is intensified, with the
knowledge of the Government of the USSR, and that,
at the request of the Bulgarian Government, the
Government of the USSR has agreed to this penetration
into Bulgaria by German troops. Tass agency is
authorised to state that:
1. If it is true that German troops have entered
Bulgaria, and if the transportation is continuing,
it took place and does take place without the knowledge
and agreement of the USSR, it being understood that
this question has never been raised by Germany with
the USSR.
2. The Bulgarian Government, in particular, has
never addressed to the Government of the USSR any
request relating tc the admission or transportation
of German troops into Bulgaria and has, in consequence,
18. For the sequence of events leading to the forming of 'Operation
Marita', Tne Attack on Greece see KTb, p.164 (4 November, 1940),
p.186 (18 November), p.193 (25 November), p.210 (5 December -
first mention of 'Marita'); see also, H.A. Jacobsen (Editor),
op.cit., p.255 (9 January, 1941).
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not been in a position to receive any reply
on the matter. 9
Hitler was winning the diplomatic war for control over the Balkans,
and thereby was also winning more room for deployment. The danger
emanating from the presence of strong German forces along the borders
of the Soviet Union was perceptible it was far more difficult to de¬
fine the threat.
It is true that the Soviet Government had been the recipient
of many a warning against the imminent danrer of a German attack, but
so far all these learnings were of a general nature, pointing at the
obvious, namely the disturbing presence of Cern-any's troops around
the Soviet Union. The State Department of the USA was in possession
of important information which it had not failed to divulge to the
Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Umansky.
the German General Staff definitely called
for a German attack upon Russia the following
summer, as the Department of State was already
well aware and as I advised the Soviet Ambassador
in Washington in January of that year.20
However, in the highly undefined transformation from a state of danger
to a state of threat it was extremely difficult to decide when a
19. Gafencu, op.cit., p.129; see also, Werth, op_.cit., p.126; also,
V. Issraeiyan, L. Kutakov, Diplomatiya Agressorov, Moscow, Hauka,
1967, pp.92-142. This source does not mention the Tass communique
but mentions the Soviet Government representation of 17 January,
1941 and deals with Russian-Bulgarian relations in general.
20. Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, Haroish Hamilton, London,
1944, p.251; see also: Cordell Hull, Memoirs, Hodder and Stoughton,
London 1948, Vol.11, p.967. Hull mentions the American commercial
attache in Berlin Sam E. Woods who was informed of Hitler's
intention to attack the USSR as early as August 1940; also Whaley,
op.cit., pp.40-51; also Nekrich, op_.cit., pp.115-117, 119,120-125.
perceptible danger turned into on iuimineut threat. Comparing Soviet
forces and deployment in the Military Districts to those of Germany
aloa0 tne borders of the soviet Union during January, 1941, those who
made decisions in the dovict Union were worried but saw no call for
emergency. In January, 1-41, the German army was not deployed for an
attack on the boviet Union, nor were there amy indications where might
be the ioain direction of such an attack, if indeed it wa3 to come
during the summer. Even if the warnings had been of a clearer
nature, the lied Army in January, 1541, was not ready for an active
defencea let alone for offensive operations. Mth ao such backing
Soviet policy was denuded of any active role and thu government could
rely only on increasing the pace of preparation. ho great sense of
urgency had yet penetrated the Soviet system, but then the indefinable
nature of the threat - indeed, 'threat' was scarcely apparent ~ could
not stimulate alarm. Many problems were yet unsolved in the
modernized armament industry at the beginning of 1941; other problems
were created by the very process of modernization. The problem of
spare parts had arisen out of the new assignments given to industry
/
to produce the new models of tanks and aircraft, whereupon many
factories stopped production of old models abruptly and altogether.
For instance, during the first half of 1941 the tank industry had
produced 1684 tanks of which about 1500 were T-34 and KV.21 Related
to this was the problem of the servicing and repair of tanks and other
mechanised units. Repair technology as well as technicians were of
poor quality; the crews did not pay enough attention to maintainance
21. V.A. Anfilov, op.cit., p.95.
before operations and servicing during and after it.°° The problem
of fuel depots caused the array, the air force and cue navy grave
problems. Until 1340 it had been the rule Suae the army itself
arranged its own depots out of Cue allowances made for it by tne
—.oaousovct and Sovnarxom. The amount was defined for Cue districts
and the fleets. April, 1941, was fined as Cue time to finalise tne
accumulation of fuel and lubrication oil for military use and the
reserves allocated • /ere almost sufficient. but men the distribution
map was examined it was discovered that the western frontier districts
got less than was allocated in the plan. As the Commissariat of
Defence suffered from a shortage of drums and containers, the right
quotas of fuel were overlooked particularly as far as aviation fuel
was concerned. However, even the existing depots were not suitably
located and were for civil rather than for military use.23
Jar industry though advancing in leaps and bounds had not yet
been put on a war footing, because such a shift could have shaken the
•hole economy and hampered its civil side, for reasons that in January,
1941, were not yet absolutely justifiable and could not be properly
explained internally or externally. Such a decision could have pre¬
cipitated the same German reaction as a Soviet military thrust deep
into Rumania. The decisions which were taken on the basis of the
results of the December Meeting and the January War Gaines excluded
the former as well as the latter. But even without a major change in
economic policy, industry was struggling in the teeth of former
22. A. Karpenko, * Soversheastvovanie tekhnicheskogo obespecheniya
bronetankovykn voisk v operatsiyakh', Via No.4, 1907, pp.15-16.
2b. M.I. Kormilitsin, 'Armii nuzhno goriuchee', Voprosy istorii
p.969, p.121.
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decisions. Moreover the new push entailed further Party control in
the shops and more rigid demands by military supervisors who were
sent to the factories to put across the army's demands and specifi¬
cations. On top of all that there were some intrinsic difficulties,
peculiar to industry in its transitional period, such as uneven annual
crops and distribution of vocational school graduates, assembly line
serial production and managerial problems concerning the translation
of blue prints,21* as well as technical problems concerning special
alloys, density and elasticity of steel and general lack of engineering
knowledge and technical experience. Such problems delayed the
production of automatic rifles and sub-machineguns which yielded
eventually not the best possible choice, but the fairest possible
compromise.25 In some fields Soviet industry solved the problems
of serial production as late as 1940. before this year neither the
threat, nor the size of the Red Army merited the production of
millions of automatic rifles or sub-machineguns. Furthermore not
until the Finnish War did Soviet military philosophy fully grasp the
modern implications of infantry fire power. When the dispute whether
to produce the Tokarey or the Simonov automatic rifle was finally
settled, haste ana expediency made it ever so difficult to decide
whether to shift wholly to this new type or to maintain the old 7.62
Dragoon Rifle Mosin, M 1891/30. 1'he decision which was taken in
1940 by the Central Committee, after a dispute between a special
committee headed by Molotov and the Commissariat for armament, was
24. B.L. Vannikov, 'Oboronnaya promyshlennost SSSR nakanune voiny'
Voprosy istorii, ho.10, l9ob, p.ilo.
2b. Ibid., pp.121-123.
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another compromise.* •• As in many other po 1 ifcical-ecouowic problems
tue question of automatic small anas was complicated by its
implications. before a procurement of a new weapon coula be made a
whole range of problems had to je examined; the size of the army in
the near future, the design and calibre of the bullet, the design and
size of the magazine, the design and snape of infantry outfit and of
course traiuing according to the new tactics resulting from the use
of automatic rifles. It was estimated in 1940 that it would take
industry 18 months to prepare for the production of a new type of
automatic or self loading rifle (samozaryadnaya vintovka). The more
sophisticated the weapon system the more difficult it was to make
decisions and the more devastating the consequence of every mistake.
During the 18th All Union Party Conference - 15-20 February, 1941, -
the Party tightened its grip on industry. The number of Party members
at the time of the conference was increasing, reaching 3.876.885
members.27 The conference aired Party complaints that too much
attention was paid to agriculture instead of industry and that local
Party organisations left industry too much to the care of industrial
Commissariats. The representatives of industry were complaining at
the same time that their work had been interfered with by outside
supervisors and inspectors.28 The conference instructed every Party
organisation to appoint several secretaries whose job it would be to
deal with industrial and transport problems and to exercise control.
26. B.L. Varmikov, 'Oboronnaya promyshlennost SSSR nakanune voiny'
Voprosy istorii, No.l, 1969, p.122-125.
27. L. Schapiro, op.cit., p.552.
28. N.E. Nosovski, 'Nadezhnyi arsenal vooruzheniya' Voprosy istorii,
So.11, 1970, p.
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On 3rd February, Hitler conferred with his array chiefs.
Haider compared German with Soviet strength, and Hitler approved of the
operation plan, the aim of which "as to occupy :he Baltic states and
Leningrad. The objective was to annihilate great . .rts of the enemy
forces, not to force him to flee.''0 The Cernans had wrong ideas not
only about the sources and resourcefulness of the Red Army but also
on the nature of Blitzkrieg in which they had become such masters in
their battle against "estern Eurcp .
On 4tli February, 1941, Ger.ia:g decided activate small units
of her navy in the Baltic:
All mine layers and motor boats together with a
small part of the anti-submarine and mine sweeping
units are to operate in the Baltic Sea. Finnish
harbours are to be used.3"
By the ena of February there were about a million German soldiers in
Rumania but the Balkan issue had not yet been settled to Hitler's
satisfaction. The Soviet Union was using all its influence over
Bulgaria to keep it out of the German orbit, Greece was still a
British ally, and Turkey had become a pivot of diplomatic activities
and pressures.31 The Soviet Government was in constant touch with
the 'Iurkisn one, bringing pressure to bear on the 'Sublime forte' to
keep it out of the war. Regardless of Russian suspicion of Great
Britain tae neutrality of iurkey was certainly a common Soviet-
29. H.A. Jacobsen, op.cit., p.237~29t>; see also, RIB, p.270
i 3 February 1940 ].
30. FCNA p.19.
31. DGFF 20th February, 1941, Document 67, r>.120; 24th February,
1941, Document 60, p. 133; 26tli February, iy41, Document 101,
p.161; 27th February, 1941, Document 102, p.187.
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British interest. The Soviet Union ./as aliio prepared to help Turkey
materially. In short 'even if Russia were standing asleep like a
piece of statuary, she would still be a powerful influence in the
war. She was keeping Hitler guessing, notwithstanding the agreement
they had for closer relations'.32
On 27 February the Reich Foreign Minister instructed the
German Ambassador in Moscow to notify the Soviet Government that
Bulgaria was about to accede to the Three Power Pact.33 The
following day Molotov expressed concern regarding this move.3'* He
mentioned his memorandum of 25 November, 1940, following his visit to
Berlin to which the German Government had not yet replied.35 On 1st
March Bulgaria signed the pact and the following day it was occupied
by German troops, which crossed the Danube from Rumania after
exhausting all food reserves there.36 After the occupation of
Bulgaria European Russia was effectively surrounded by Germany and
her allied troops. There was no change of policy but Japanese
intelligence in the Far East observed transfer of Soviet troops west¬
ward. Berlin was rife with rumours. In diplomatic circles people
discussed whether the next German move would be against Turkey, or,
as the official line would have it, against Great Britain.37
32. Cordell Hull, op.cit., Vol.11, p.906.
33. NSR p.276.
34. Ibid., pp.277,278; See also: Gafencu, op.cit., p.137 - Tass
4th March.
35. NSR 28th February, 1941, pp.277-278.
36. Gafencu, op.cit., p.136.
37. The Von Hassell Diaries, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1948, p.158.
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However despite the marked deterioration of Soviet-German
relationships there were still many fields of co-operation. Some
were significant, as for example the grain and raw material deliveries
to Germany,3® others were symbolic, like the work of various Soviet
commissions on German territory. These were refugee commissions
which dealt with a small but constant traffic of people. Continu¬
ation of their work meant routine border activity, termination meant -
trouble. Yet along the borders there were more and more German troops
and the Soviet Commissions with their free passage across the border
became a nuisance to the German High Command which had issued an order
to stop their activity.39
During March there was no perceptible change of policy.1*0
If anything, March saw the beginning of a real dichotomy in Soviet
policy. Moscow made its displeasure with Bulgaria apparent, and
there was a marked rise in apprehension among military commanders,
culminating in Timoshenko and Zhukov's appeal to Stalin to call up the
reservists. During March there were reports that Party officials
had made speeches in Moscow factories alluding to the possibility of
a conflict between the Soviet Union and Germany.^ On the other
hand, the country maintained a peaceful appearance. The press carried
no overtly anti-German articles, deliveries of food-stuff and raw
material to Germany were prompt and to the letter of the commercial
agreements. However foreigners who lived in Moscow during this period
38• NSR 5th April, 1941, pp.318-319.
39. Ibid., 13th March, 1941, p.279.
40. Alexander Wertn, op.cit., pp.122-129.
41. Ibid., p.126.
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were aware of slight changes of mood and some stirri 13s of public
opinion. 'The phrase mobllizational preparedness kept recurring
over and over again in propaganda and the press', 2 referring to the
need to brace economy and industry for their heavy tasks. 'Russian
public opinion, stirred and shaken by the invasion of Bulgaria, began
to have doubts as to the wisdom of its leaders and the advantage of
the Moscow "act. ... there was an opposition, both in the country
and in the Party' ... .'*3 If need be public opinion could easily be
aroused against Germany. In March, 1941, the Soviet leadership could
rest assured that Russian public opinion did not harbour any defeatist
inclinations, although according to American sources it could be less
sure regarding public opinion in the Ukraine.1*1*
Throughout "'arch 'Case Barbarossa' was taking shape both in
planning and in orders to ever smaller units to move and redeploy in
the east. But there was not any definite timetable for the beginning
of operations.1*5 Rumania was denied for the time being any active
role at the initial period of the onslaught. It was not even informed
42. 0. Gafencu, op.cit., pp.138-139.
43. foreign Relations of the U.S.A. 1941, Vol.!, p.132.
44. IhicI-, pp.620-621 (American Ambassador Steinhardt to the Secretary
of State, 7 June, 1941); see also: State Department - Foreign
Office, Document ""ield Team, office of German Foreign Ministry:
German Embassy, Moscow, collection entitled: GPU official
Shigunow, negative frame No.175739. Under German interrogation
Shigunow stated: 'The Soviet Red Army soldiers did not like to
sacrifice their lives for the Bolsheviks'. (Ne zhelaniye
sovietskikh krasnoarmyeitsev skladyvat golovy za uol'snevitvov)
45. DGFP, Document 195, p.33o. See also: J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy.
Vol.Ill, Part 1, pp.67-68. Also: M. Van Creveld, op.cit., p.74.
of the very existence of such a plan. Elaborate and detailed plans
for attack combined with impressive German build-up not far from the
borders of the Soviet Union could not be carried out undetected. On
20th March, Under Secretary of State Uelles again warned the Soviet
Ambassador Unansky that Germany intended to attack the Soviet Union.
According to Welles, 'Mr. Umansky turned very white'.**6
During March the Yugoslav Government was gradually cracking
under German pressure which had been brought to ' ear in order to make
it accede to the Tripartite Pact including its third clause.1,7 The
only political card the Soviet Union could play during the turmoil in
Yugoslavia was to render the Yugoslavs some moral support. Therefore
the Soviet Government supported the Serbian War '"'action as it emerged
after Prince Paul signed the Tripartite Pact (24 March, 1941) and the
ensuing coup d'etat on 27 March, 1941. On 4th April Molotov notified
Schulenburg of the prospective non-aggrcssion pact with Yugoslavia1*®
which was actually signed on the night 5/6 April only several hours
before the already imminent- German attabk on Yugoslavia and Greece. The
attack was duly announced by Schulenburg when he met Uolotov on 6 April.**9
Soviet-British relations remained as cool as they had been
since 1939, despite the complete change in the balance of power in
46. Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1939-1941, United
States Government Printing Office, Washington 1943, p.110, also
p.638 Document 202. Sumner Welles, op.cit., p.136. Also
Cordell kull, op.cit., Vol.11, p.968. Also: Max Beloff, The
Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941, London, Royal Institute
of International Affairs, 1947-49, p.358.
47. This clause made it obligatory on the signatories to help the
other parties with military force. Bee also: DOFP Document 144,
145, p.2_>5.
48. hRR 4th April, 1941, p.318.
49. Ibid., bth April, 1941, pp.319-320.
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Europe. Throughout January, 1941, 'there was no discussion on general
political questions between the two countries'.50 A meeting took
place on 1st February between Molotov and the British Ambassador to
the Soviet Union, Sir Stafford Cripps, but it did not help to improve
relations between the two countries. The dramatic events in
Yugoslavia during March indicated the common interest of Great Britain
and the Soviet Union. Indeed on 21st March, Mr. Eden suggested to
Cripps that he raise the question of Yugoslavia with the Soviet
Government. The Ambassador discussed the problem with M. Vyshinsky
on 22 March but to no avail, the differences between the two countries
being too wide. Great Britain refused to recognise the annexation of
the Baltic States,51 and it brought pressure to bear on the U.S.A.
'to restrict to normal figures the export to Russia of wheat, cotton,
copper, petroleum and oil-field equipment'.52 To the old suspicions
against Great Britain there was added another factor of Real-politik -
the obvious British interest in a Russo-German war. The precarious
British situation in the Balkans and the Red Array state of prepared¬
ness were not conducive to a Soviet-British alliance. Cripps was
kept at arm's length, and was given audience neither with Stalin nor
yet with Kolotov.
On the night of 31st March-lst April the British Foreign
Office received a report from Belgrade that Hitler had told Prince
Paul of Yugoslavia of his intention to attack the Soviet Union on
50. L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy Vol.1, p.597.
[Henceforth cited as BFP. "1
51. Ibid., pp.489-490.
52. Ibid., p.602. See also: Cordell Hull, op.cit., Vol.11, pp.
970-973; also: Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol.1
1941, pp.600-601, 602-604.
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30th June. Cn the night 2-3 April, Lord Halifax, the British
Ambassador in Washington telegraphed that Under Secretary of State
Sumner Welles had given him a report on Hitler's announcement to
Prince Paul. On 3rd April, Churchill sent Cripps the following
cable:
I have sure information from a trusted agent that
when the Germans thought they had got Yugoslavia
in the net - that is to say, after March 20 - they
began to move three out of the five Panzer
divisions from Rouraania to Southern Poland. The
moment they heard of the Serbian revolution this
movement was countermanded. Your Excellency will
readily appreciate the significance of the facts.53
The time elapsing from the receipt of the information at the British
end in London and its transmission to the British Ambassador in
Moscow indicates a smooth communication net. Not only was tne in¬
formation aoout the German Panzer divisions' movements from Bucnarest
to Cracow obtained, processed and transmitted, a process which called
for a decision of tne prime minister, but it was also analysed
against the background of tne other pieces of information received
from Prince Paul.51* But at that point the decisions of the person
on the spot - Cripps - and the cumbersome diplomatic relations between
Great Britain and tne Soviet Union put a spanner in the wheels. The
British Ambassador delayed Cnurchill's message to Stalin until 19th
.flpi'ii- one day before the 'Grecno-British Thermopylae'.55 No
great danage was done since the warning in the first place had been
53. Cnurchill, op.cit., Vol.3, p.320.
54. BFP, p.604 N.l.
55. On 16th April, one day before Yugoslavia was completely occupied
Eden related to Maisky the message of Prince Paul.
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given only as an indication of German intentions and British good
will. Furthermore the factual message was transmitted to Stalin and
Molotov by the Yugoslav Minister who had been asked by Cripps to do
so. However, such a delay could only exacerbate Russian suspicions,
probably not of the facts but of the motivation. On 23 April Cripps
telegraphed that he had received a letter from Vyshinsky, the
recipient of Churchill's message, to the effect that Stalin had seen
the message.56 Whatever the Russians made of this note it is
worthwhile mentioning that the Axis Planning Section, a body which
had been 3et up in March, 1941, by the British Joint Intelligence
Committee 'to present reports on probable action by the enemy'57 did
not reach a final and definite conclusion at this stage that Germany
would attack the Soviet Union.
Although the German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece did not
bring any respite in the tense Anglo-Russian relations it did have an
effect on Germany's preparations for 'Case Barbarossa'. On 8th
March the OKI' timetable for transportation to the east was ready.58
Hitler might have had this timetable in mind during the hasty
conference of 27 March, when on 13.00 hours he notified his generals
of his intention 'to smash Yugoslavia militarily and as a state'
(Weisung Nr.25)59 and said the following:
56. L. Woodward, BFP pp.604-607.
57. J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol.11, p.541.
58. M. Van Creveld, op.cit., p.74.
59. GDFP p.373.
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In this connection, the beginning of Operation
Barbarossa will have to postponed up to four
weeks.50
Immediately after the beginning of the attack on Yugoslavia
the Soviet General Staff ordered some corrections in the defence plan
of the borders, and Military Districts Commands were ordered to rein¬
force. After the attack on Greece and Yugoslavia, which could not
but end unfavourably for the USSR, there was no hope of any military
opposition to the Axis designs for a 'new order' in Europe. The Red
Army was left to its own devices facing the increasing might of
Germany's war machine. The Soviet Government not only was aware of
the danger, but was also taking steps to avert it. Reservists had
been called to the colours since the end of March while military
formations were being moved from the Far East westward.51
Indeed the Neutrality Pact with Japan was the only Soviet
diplomatic achievement during the gloomy days of the German occupation
of Yugoslavia and Greece. The Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union
which was signed on 13th April was a good bargain for both parties.52
Japan maintained her concessions in Northern Sakhalin and the Soviet
Union received a form of guarantee against a possible war on two
fronts. The emotional scene in the railway station53 was but an
indication that Stalin wanted to avoid a war even on one front.
60. GDFP p.374; see also, H.A. Jacob3en, op.cit., p.1199. See
also J.R.M. Butler, op.cit., Vol. pp.71-72.
61. See Chapter IV, p.160, N56, see also, p.131.
62. See the text in J. Degras, op.cit., pp.486-687.
63. NSR 13 April, 1941, p.323.
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However, Stalin had not received any such guarantees from his
German ally. In the direct relations with Germany the trend of
deterioration had not changed. An outwardly insignificant but
symbolically meaningful concession was made by the Russians in their
unconditional acceptance of the German demand concerning the border
line from the river Igorka to the Baltic Sea.6** A major Soviet
concession was made regarding German aerial espionage. German planes
were crossing the border with annoying regularity and in increasing
numbers, especially during the first half of 1941. They ventured
on sorties of 200 km. over Soviet territory at heights varying
from 150 to 50,000 m. using light scouting planes and bombers. There
was no clear policy towards the intruders and for several months
Army units were shooting at theiy but without success. On 17 March,
1940, the NKVD recommended that the army should not shoot at the
German planes, as evidently, according to this recommendation, they
did not cross intentionally, but instead units should note the
particulars of each incident so that protests could be sent to the
German Government along diplomatic channels. This was a very con¬
venient arrangement for the Germans, though it did not seem to satisfy
the Red Army rank and file.65 However, the Navy did not consider
itself bound by the instructions issued on 29 March, 1940, and went
on shooting at German planes which infringed Soviet airspace. On
22 April the Soviet Union officially complained to the German Foreign
Office about 80 cases of aerial trespass from 27 March to 18 April,
1941. The German High Command countered the Foreign Office demarche
64. NSR 15th April, 1941, p.325.
65. Bor'ba za Sovetskuyu Pribaltiku, Vol.1, p.36.
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by pointing to several Soviet flights over German territory and a con¬
centration of Soviet forces on the German Eastern border. Whilst the
Navy was leading its own policy regarding German planes the army
showed great restraint, but Finnish or Rumanian planes were shot at
whenever they were spotted:
Unfortunately our attempts to shoot down the
trespassing planes were not successful.66
The reason was that even in regard to Rumanian and Hungarian planes
Soviet fighter planes were not allowed to cross the border even in
hot pursuit. As for passive air defence there were not enough AA
guns to cover the whole length of the border and the Rumanians and
the Hungarians carefully avoided those areas which were defended.
Perhaps more important, at that time there were not yet 'radio¬
location devices' - namely, radar - along the borders and the early
warning system was too slow for the Soviet fighter planes to take
off and engage the enemy.
The January war games followed by the reshuffling of the
high command had some immediate effects on the preparation of the
Soviet Union to face ever greater difficulties. Before the end of
February, 1941, a plan for mobilization of the armed forces was
approved. It concerned organisation and material aspects of
mobilisation and was designated 'MP-41',67 After approval the plan
was handed down to the districts with instructions to make corrections
in the preceding mobilisation plans by 1 Hay, 1941. The operation
66• Pogranichnie Voiska SSSR 1939-1941 pp.396,486.
67. Zhukov, op.cit., p.228.
plan was also revised between February end April 1941.®® These
latter plans were in turn revisions of the former plans that were
valid until the end of 1940, whereupon they were revised by the
Operation Division - Generals O.K. Tfalandin, A.M. Vasilevsky, A.F.
Anisov - under the supervision of Marshal Shaposhnikov, General of
the Army K.A. Meretskov and later on by Zhnk.ov. the three consecutive
OCS. Each revision tool; into consideration the lessons of the war
in the West, the state of the Red Amy and current political
situation. The operation plan, judging it on its own terms of
reference65 envisaged an enemy blow from the south-east, aiming at
the Ukraine. However, the plan doer not testify to any urgency, nor
does it indicate the possibility of a war before 1 May, 1941. Any
Soviet deployment from that date on should have followed this plan's
configuration. Yet the fate of the February plan was not better
than that of its predecessors for two complementary reasons it
could not be applied with the armed forces at hand and it was getting
out of date under the impact of outside events while still under
scrutiny in the Military Districts. As a remedy to the first malaise
Timoshenko and Zhukov asked Stalin's permission to call up reservists,
as from mid March. Permission was given within a fortnight and
five hundred thousand reservists were called up and sent to
Western Military Districts. Although being reservists and no
strangers to army life their accommodation, incorporation in existing
68. Bagramyan, op.ext., p.88, K0V0-41 was the operational plan where¬
as I IP-41 was the mobilization plan; see also, Anfiiov, op.cit.,
pp.170,197. Anfiiov refers to a 'plan for the defence of the
country's border.; see also, .eretskov, op.cit., p.20b.
63. Ziiukov, op.cit., p.219.
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units, lot alone equipping and clothing put soma extra -.eight on the
already heavily burdeiad staff of the districts. Tae "arch call-up
raised the at andin strength of the lad Army by over 10". Even
though the country was it peace and the armed forces were not put on
the alert such an influx must have had soma disruptive effect on
peace time routine.
Simultaneously with such a considerable call-up tha General
Staff started to shift the weight of the Red Amy from the Far hast
and the. internal districts towards tha west. It wa3 not a redeploy¬
ment as there had not been any mobilisation of transport or logistics.
The trains were running usual services and their load of troops,
incomplete in manpower and equipment were ordered off over a hundred
kilometers away from the western borders. Even so, this transfer did
not remain unnoticed by the Japanese in the Far East. They had their
own estimate70 to what extent the Soviet forces facing them were
thinned. They had reasons71 for not pouncing on the opportunity,
which fact the Soviet Government correctly gauged.
While these two trends were taking shape, namely the call-up
of reservists and the transfer of regular units westward, both the
mobilisation plan and the operation plan proved outdated by events in
Yugoslavia and Greece. Even before Yugoslavia was wholly occupied
70. Study of strategical and tactical peculiarities of Far Eastern
Russia and Soviet Far Eastern forces, Japanese special studies on
Manchuria, Vol.XIII, p.47.
71. During two 'incidents', in Lake Khasan (August 1938) and in
Khalkhin Gol (August 1939) the Japanese encountered a determined
Soviet army under able command of Blyukher in the first incident
and Zhukov in the second. The Japanese were defeated on both
occasions.
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the General Staff ordered some corrections in the plans.72 ..either
strategic assessi:«eut nor date or possible war ./ere put in douot, only
tiie capacity of the soviet arced forces at t at particular period to
resist the kind of attack that tue existing plans foresaw, was
questioned.73 As the movement of troops westward was gathering
momentum during April the western Military Districts were put under
growing pressures. Recent German moves turned a remote probability
of war into a likelihood.
Directive No.21 presented Germany with enormous strategic
problems. At the beginning of 1941 only a few divisions were actually
engaged in operations: several others were garrisoned in the occupied
territories facing little if any armed opposition. The bulk of the
German array was being shifted gradually Eastward. The movement towards
the East for which no definitive tine table had yet been established
was veiled in great secrecy. As far as tlie Soviet Union v?as concerned
the Germans would have the Prussians believe that it was all part of
Germany's war against Great Britain. This was the official diplomatic
explanation given in reply to all Russian representations. Since the
Royal Navy was active in the North Sea and as long as the British Army
had a foothold on the continent it seemed a plausible explanation.
The Germans made the utmost use of this situation when taey launched
their 'disinformation campaign' in February, 1941.74 By that time
there already were close on a million German soldiers along the
southern borders of the Soviet Union.
72. Zhukov, op.cit., p.228. See also: Bagramyan, op.cit., p.55.
73. Zhukov, op.jcit., p.228.
74. See above pp.120,123.
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uicler nan no cnoice out to help his Italian ally who suffered
defeat ana Humiliation in Greece. in November it was necided that
Germany would carry out operation 'Marita' - the conquest of Greece -
independently. Work on the plan had actually startea on 14 November
and finished on 7 December.The assembly-order issued in December
allocated ID divisions for the operation, of which several were
to stay as occupation forces and some others which had already been
earmarKed for ' karbarossa' would then return to tneir asseoioly places
for the attack on the Soviet Union. According to the plan (Marita)
the German Army was to launch its attacks from bases in kurania
and Bulgaria. The latter had not yet agreed to become such
75. hTB, p.179 (14 November, 1940), p.218 (7 December, 1940), see
also c..h. Cookridge, Gehlen Spy Of The Century, Corgi edition,
London, 1972, p.70.
a springboard, while the Soviet Union, 'ell aware of the pressure
that had been brought to bear on the Bulgarian government, did not
mince vords in expressing its concern. "bile these processes were
in notion Hitler felt that the oil fields in blocsti were not well
secured against British air raids or Russian expansion attempts, nor
was he satisfied concerning the safety of the Petsamo nickel mines
in Finland: securing these places was in line v;ith geueral prepara¬
tion for 'Barbarossa'. Nevertheless, by March, 1341, the Geruian
time-table for deployment in the hast had already becone strained
and logistics problems had begun to isount.
The coup detat of 27 March in Yugoslavia anJ the hasty
preparation for 'Operation 25' - the conquest of that country - finally
unhinged the German time-table for the attack on the Soviet Union.
Although the number of divisions assigned for both 'Marlta' and
'Operation 25' was not large, only six divisions and two corps head¬
quarters were withdrawn from the second and third echelons of the
'Barbarossa' assembly. The staff-work and the logistics involved
resulted in a postponement of six weeks in the preparations for 'Plan
Barbarossa'.
When military operations in Yugoslavia and Greece terminated
Germany resumed the concentration of forces and the piling up of
material along the borders of the Soviet Union. Ho matter what
explanations were given and what rumours distributed by German
diplomats and agents they could not do avay with the facts. From
the Soviet side of the border Russian soldiers and Frontier Troops
could see trains unloading, roads being built and strong-points
erected. On the South-Western sector Chief of Intelligence of Kiev
MD Colonel G.I. Bondarev reported that since April nearly 200 wagon3
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of ammunition had reached the border of the Ukraine every day.
Thence they were transferred to field-depots.76 By the number of
German reconnaissance flights the Soviet commanders could infer that
the Germans had not yet had a full picture of the Red Army deployment77
and that the Germans were as suspicious of the Red Army movements as
indeed they were of the movements of the German Army.
Four military agencies were entrusted with the defence of the
Western borders of the Soviet Union - the Frontier Troops, the
troupes de couverture ('covering armies'), the army air-force and the
Navy each subordinated respectively to three separate Commissariats -
the NKVD, Commissariat of Defence and Commissariat of the Navy.
Beria not only represented the dreaded NKVD which had carried out the
purges of the military but he was also actively countermanding steps
taken by the army in anticipation of a possible German attack. On
Beria's orders the Frontier Troops and the army were forbidden to open
fire on German reconnaissance planes. Timoshenko and Zhukov were not
invited to attend Kuznetsov's audiences with Stalin, whereas Kuznetsov
had not approved of Zhukov'a conduct of the General Staff. All these
created tensions between the Commissariats, an aggravating factor since
there was no C-in-C of the armed forces.
Starting with the Frontier Troops, these were deployed along
the border in a complex of observation posts, strong points and
76. I. Bagramyan, 'Zapiski nachalnika operativnogo otdela' VIZ No.3,
1967, p.52.
77. Bee German Military Documents (GMD): for one set of aerial
reconnaissance photos, Koluft, Stabsbildmeldung Nr.7. AOK 17,
under file No.K0K17, 16593/1, for total German air reconnaissance
coverage, see map Durch Luftbild gedecktes Gelande Koluft file;
see also under Abschnittsstab Gotzmann Stabsbildabteilung, for
aerial photos and interpretation.
136.
customs check points. In case of emergency they were to be sub¬
ordinated to the nearest army command. Although well equipped and
well trained they did not have organically attached armoured or
artillery forces. Their available equipment served their peace-time
function i.e. protecting the border against subversive elements and
contraband. Next carae the 'covering armies' amounting to almost one
third of all first-line formations, were intended to gain time for
the main body of the array to organise and to move towards the border,
as well as for mobilisation. Together with the Frontier Troops (but
under their own separate command) they occupied the fortified areas,
into which no other formations were allowed without a written order
by the Commissar of Defence. In that capacity they formed garrisons
which by January 1941 were not in full force and were poorly equipped
with artillery pieces and ammunition. Armoured formation formed part
of the second echelon and were meant to counter-attack enemy forces
which broke through the border defences.
The headquarters of the five military districts - Leningrad,
Riga, Minsk, Kiev and Odessa - corresponded more to administrative
convenience than forming centres of immediate military significance.
But even staffs of combat units which were actually near the border
were lodged in Khatakh ihuts , or in farmers' houses, sometimes many
kilometres away from their units, because the permanent command posts
were still under construction both regarding their actual premises and
their signalling networks. These temporary centres could hardly be
considered adequate for command and control of formations under fire.
If as early as January there had been a plan for command posts in
case of emergency the commanders in the field were not aware of it, nor
were they ordered to move into them: not until mid-June is there any
evidence of urgency in providing commanders with reliable means for
command and control of their troops. Since a general emergency had
not been practised the commanders could not have been familiar with
the arrangements in existing command post.
At the beginning of 1941 the Soviet Armies were deployed in a
peace-time fashion. Whereas the Frontier Troops were actually on
the border, army barracks and installations were dispersed over a
large area, approximately 50-60 km. from the border. The location
of these installations had very little to do with any possible theatre
of war of the units which were stationed in them. In the European
part of the Soviet Union there were in Leningrad 1® the 14th, 7th and
23rd Armies.78 Their task was to defend a front of 1200 km. from
the Rybachi peninsula to the Finnish Gulf. The defence in the far
north was effected by independent units which were deployed only in
vital sectors. In Ilango there was the Sth Independent Rifle Brigade,
in accordance with the Soviet-Finnish agreement signed at the end of
the war between the two countries. The Baltic 13) was defended by the
Sth and the 11th armies and three territorial corps, one for each of
the Baltic states. The coast from Tallin to Libau was defended by
two rifle divisions, and on the islands Saretna and Khiuiae the 3rd
Independent Rifle Brigade was stationed. Their front of 300 km.
reached from Palangi in the north of the Baltic to the southern border
of Latvia. The 3rd, 19th and 4th Armies were to defend the Western
MD, a front of 450 km. from the southern border of Latvia to the
northern border of the Ukraine. In Kiev MD there were four Armies
78. Die Kriegswehrmacht der UdSSR OKH/Gen Stbh - 0 Qu IV Abt. FliO(II)
Nr. 100/41 Gehi_eimJ. Dated 15.1.41. Tell I: Text.
the 5th, 6th, 26th and 12th. Their front of 800 km stretched from
Bomachev, through Sokal and Przemysl to Liphani. In the south,
Odessa MB, along a front of 450 km there were several units which at
the beginning of 1941 had not yet been formed as an Army. The
Crimea was defended by the 9th Independent Rifle Corps.72
However, at the beginning of 1941 all these formations were
undermanned; a number of armoured formations existed in names only
for lack of modern fighting vehicles and transport. Many divisions
were down to 6000 men instead of the 14,500 stipulated in the tables
of strength. The signals network was almost non-existent as far as
radio was concerned and poor in every other respect. Apart from
some particular sectors (mainly along the old borders of the Soviet
Union) fortification and fieldwork were either blueprints or under
construction, but even the existing fortifications were dilapidated
and stripped of artillery. Military and naval airfields too were
only beginning to materialise, being for the time being more hindrance
than help. In all, from Palangi to the estuary of the Dunai 9
'covering armies' were deployed, the first echelon of which consisted
of 40 rifle divisions and two cavalry divisions.80 Evidently the
theoretical conclusions of the December meeting, lofty as they were,
had no immediate impact 'on the ground*. The translation of
military philosophy into military combat readiness proved to be a
long process.
On 15 January, 19A1^ the new appointments in the high command
79• IV0V» 1960» Vol.1, p.471.
80. Ibid., p.473.
of tuu Rail Army were aace public.21 There was no mention of a
*i*prcu*. Command uor of a Supreme commander of the armed forces. The
problem .;ud aot presented itself so far because there was no immediate
threat, the army was not isobilised, nor yet put on alert. On 21st
January, the .wople's Coiasissar for Defence published Order Ho.30
concerning military and political tasks for 1941. The necessary
measures which had aeon saltan to strengthen and expand the Red Army
were .10 longer sufficient when the influx of new recruits enlarged
the army to 4,207,000.82 -Tierces every individual soldier was
better fed, better clad and better trained, (the training tine for
privates was six months and for an officer three years , over all their
period of reserve service) there was nothing to suggest that the
general improvement had any effect on political decisions. The
modest improvement in the performance of many units raised the
confidence of the military but it did not help to convey the growing
apprehension of commanders along the borders to the political leader¬
ship. For the Government as for the high command of the Red Army
the dead-line "as still the end of 1942 by which time - if all went
well - the armament programme would turn the armed forces into a
potent force to be reckoned with.83 Until such tine the army would
yet what it requested, subject to industry's capacity to supply it,
but with no prejudice to the third five year plan. Military pre¬
rogatives by no means included direct interference in political
decision makin" nor were there any signs that they intended to do so.
81. 1. oagraryan, 'Zapiski nachalnika onerativnogo otdela' VIZ, No.l.
1967, p.58.
82. IVOV Vol.1, 1963, p.460.
83. MeretsVov on.cit. no.201-20?.; see also* Zhukov op.cit. , p.231.
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There was some degree of discontent - it had found some expression
during the December Meeting * and some voluntary local attempts to
anticipate emergencies on a lilitary District or an Army level. With
no Supreme Commander, with no definite plans for emergency, without
proven communication lines and with no confirmed plans for full
mobilisation, the armed forces in January and at the beginning of
February, 1941, were operating in a vacuum. They were no real factor
in decision-making and they had no concrete orders for any emergency.
Zhukov's nomination as the ne./ CGS was announced on 15 January,
1941. He was given a fortnight to wind up his affairs in Kiev. In
this time he wanted to leave his corviand is " '11 prepared as he could,
he assembled all the corn landing personnel of the Military District
and held a conference on the same lines as the recent Military
Meeting. Under the additional authority of his new mantle it was
the best way to translate the abstract philosophy of the December
Meeting into practical military measures in the "Meld. Being among
the military he could express his concern regarding Germany's move3
around the borders of the Soviet Union, when this attitude had not
yet been shared by the Party. In January-February, 1941, Germany
was considered officially an ally of the Soviet Union. Zhukov
survnarised in lis speech the theoretical conclusions of the December
Meeting. He managed to amaze his listeners when he said that not
only in the direction of the main blow must the attacker have an
advantage of two or three to one but in all the width of the
attacking front.84 In the ensuing debate. General M.I. Potanov
(until this conference commander of the 4th Mechanised corns) spoke
84. Bagraiayan, op.cit., p.45. It was an abstract notion in February,
ly41, but it could fit into the envisaged plan for 1942.
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about the need for air-ground co-ordination between the air force
and the armoured forces. Yet his n>ain contribution was the comment
tnat the logistics transport for tanks and motorised infantry should
be separated.85 The meeting which took place in the District Pom
K.A. lasted five days. At the end Zhukov announced that General
I.G. Sovetnikov, till then commander of the 5th Army, was appointed
assistant district commander for the fortified area, and that General
Potapov replaced him as commander of the 5th army.86 Zhukov arrived
back in Moscow, on 31 January, 1941, and assumed his new post on
1 February, 1941.
The same could scarcely be said for other MDs in the Soviet
Union. Elsewhere, it was a sorry tale of confusion or downright
complacency. Admittedly, the command of the Baltic MD could
scarcely be blamed, for even in the early spring of 1941 Stalin was
intent on carrying through yet another aspect of his military purge
by removing the senior command. In the Western MD Pavlov slumbered
on and there is no evidence that anything other than the most routine
activity was being pursued.
85. Highly theoretical since there was not enough transport for
either.
86. Bagramyan, op.cit., pp.44-47. Bagramyan is wrong about the
date of Zhukov's visit, and Zhukov's own version is correct,
see Zhukov, op.cit., p.201.
CHAPTER IV
APPEASEMENT OR CHANGE OF POLICY
By the beginning of May the German army faced no more military
opposition on the whole continent of Europe, up to the borders of the
Soviet Union. British forces had evacuated mainland Greece by 30
April, 1941, and though they still held on to Crete they formed no
real threat to the rear of the German army in Southern Europe. With
the meagre air force they had on Crete they could hardly interfere
with the Rumanian oil-fields in Ploesti. At the beginning of May,
1941, the Soviet Government had even less options for positive, let
alone aggressive foreign policy than it had had theoretically up to
December, 1940. Considerations which had called for caution then,
namely the need to prepare and re-organise the Red Army, bolster and
hasten the pace of production and build fortifications along the
borders, were still in operation in May, but Soviet diplomacy kept a
calm face.
The First of May saw the usual parade in Moscow. Observers
were impressed with the motorisation of the army, and keen eyes dis¬
cerned the heavy KV and the medium T-34 tanks among hundreds of
parading armoured vehicles. A perceptive and knowledgeable observer
noted that for the first time in the history of the Soviet Union
officers carried swords on the parade.* Rumours circulating in
Moscow had it that these parading units were in transit, on their way
to the western borders. The parade was a further step in the.
ambiguous Soviet policy which had been noted two months earlier.2
The very fact that the parade was held had been calculated to impress
the German observers with the readiness of the Soviet Government for
1. A. Werth, op.cit., p.132; see also: Gafencu, op.cit., p.185.
2. See above n.121 (Chapter III).
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compromise, a readiness which had nevertheless been based on the
might of the Red Army. However, under the cover of this policy, on
which Stalin pinned great hopes, the Soviet Union was relentlessly
preparing for war. The very conduct of such contradictory moves - a
policy towards Germany which had correctly been described as
'appeasement', while feverishly carrying out plans for mobilisation,
fortification and defence - presented Stalin with extraordinary
difficulties.
After the December Military meeting and the following January
war games Stalin doubted whether he would be able to count on the
professional capability of his army at least until the middle of
1942. Further reports since January could not have changed his mind,
particularly in view of the unbroken successes of the German army and
the political fiasco in the Ealkans. Under these circumstances
Stalin invited the graduates of Military Academies to a reception in
the Kremlin on 5th May, 1941. Ue delivered a forty minute speech
which was not fully published in 'Frsvda' on the following day. The
article in Fravda was entitled: 'We must be prepared to deal with
any surprise'. The article read:
In his speech, Comrade Stalin noted the profound
changes that had taken place in the Red Army in
the last few years and emphasised that, on the
strength of the experience cf modern war, its
organisation had undergone important changes, and
it had been substantially re-equipped. Comrade
Stalin welcomed the officers who had graduated
from the military academies and wished them all
success in their work. He spoke for forty minutes
and was listened to with exceptionally great
attention.a
3. Pravda 6 May, 1941, as quoted by Werth, op.cit.., p.132.
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Reliable and unreliable sources reported that in his 5th May speech
to the graduates of military academies Stalin had said that the danger
to 'Russia's essential existence'** emanated from the fact that the
'Germans were evidently aiming at complete domination of Europe'.5
Stalin went on to say that the Soviet Government maintained the
closest contacts with the Turkish Government encouraging her to resist
any extreme demands on the part of Germany.6 Sir S. Cripps's report
from Moscow corroborated essentially the other reports.7 Stalin's
assumption of power made him officially responsible for Soviet policy
making. He left no room for speculation about Molotov's feelings
towards Germany.8 Furthermore he made it absolutely clear that from
then on Party-Government-State were one entity, ruled by one person
and represented by one sovereign. This move had far greater
significance than the outside observer realised at the time. It
opened the way for a unified supreme command of the armed forces, a
problem which had not previously been resolved.9
The events during the first week of May, the military parade,
the speech in the Kremlin and to crown them all, the nominal assumption
4. Public Record Office (Henceforth cited as PRO) FO 371/29481 No.78
File No. N.2393, 24 May, 1941.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., FO 371/29481 No.78, File No. N.2130, 11 May, 1941.
8. Churchill, op.cit., Vol.11, pp.517-518.
9. On the whole there had been surprisingly scanty Russian comment
regarding Stalin's assumption of nominal power, but see Bagramyan,
op.cit., pp.61-62. 'It must be said that we have all received
this report (about Stalin's nomination AS) with satisfaction; see
also, Nekrich, op.cit., p.131.
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of power by Stalin, as announced on 6th May had external and internal
effects. Put together they impressed the German Ambassador in Moscow
and the Counsellor of the Embassy, Gustav Hilger, as a significant
turn in Soviet Foreign Policy.10 They imagined they saw in them a
sign that the Soviet Union would be even more obliging towards Germany
than it had been hitherto. Moreover they found support for their view
in the closure of the Norwegian, Belgian and Yugoslav Embassies in
Moscow and in the hasty recognition of the Rashid Ali pro-Nazi regime
in Iraq. The Japanese were of the opinion that when Stalin replaced
Molotov as head of the Sovnark (Soviet of people's Commissars) he
merely confirmed an existing situation. By May anti-German feeling
in the army was not an uncommon phenomenon.
Stalin's ambiguous policy had a superficial success. It
convinced German and other diplomats that the Soviet Union would be
prepared to pay a very high price for peace. When Count Schulenburg
returned to Moscow after his conversation with Hitler he was convinced
that Hitler had made up his mind to attack the Soviet Union:
The die has been cast. War against Russia had
been decided.11
Since both Schulenburg and his Counsellor Gustav Hilger were convinced
that good relations between Germany and the USSR were in the best
interests of their country, and since they further believed that a
war would not augur well for Germany, they were ready to go beyond
the point of treason to warn the Soviet Government of the approaching
10. DGFP, p.964 (Document 593).
11. Hilger, op.cit., p.328.
war.12 The same impression that the USSR was ready to compromise
was carried by the British Ambassador, and certainly by the banished
legations of the occupied countries of Europe. The other aspect of
the Soviet policy received less attention. It was meant to be con¬
cealed as it involved not only troop movements on a large scale but
also the rudiments of a possible change in Soviet policy. On the
face of it Stalin did not take any risk by expelling the legations
but he still took some measures to countermand if not the significance
of the deed at least the bitter personal feelings of the people
involved.13
Far more devious was Soviet policy towards Great Britain.
Stalin's 5th May speech and the assumption of nominal power indicated
that the Soviet Government was convinced that war with Germany was
inevitable, and that it wa3 only a matter of time before it broke out.
If this was the case it was essential from Moscow's point of view that
Great Britain should not be defeated, nor subjected to any peace offer
that xrould leave Germany free to unleash all its might against the
Soviet Union. The same considerations were operating on the British
side.11* The deliberately ambiguous policy yielded strange results
in Anglo-Russian relations. The British Government was doing its
12. See DGFP, pp.751,789, Poc.4P6,504 for Schulenburg state of mind,
reinforced by Gafencu, op.cit., p.206, see also Hilger op.cit.,
pp.331-332. See also: Ainu Bullock, Hitler, r ^tudy in tyranny,
p.647 for Schulenburg attempt to influence German policy. Also:
Shirer, The Rise and Fall pp.1227, 1275, for hie part in the
Conspiracy against Hitler.
13. Gafencu, op.cit., pp.193-194, Znukov talks to Colonel Popovici,
the Yugoslav military attache.
14. EFP Vol.1, p.614.
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utmost and scheming to do even more15 to encourage the Soviet Union
in its unyielding position towards Germany. To that effect in¬
telligence information about German troop movements towards the east
was passed on to the Russians. The British had to move with extreme
caution in order not to aggravate Soviet suspicions that the sole
interest of the British Government was to embroil the Soviet Union
in a war against Germany.16 The basic difference in the attitudes
of the Soviet Union and Great Britain emanated from the fact tnat in
May, 1941, Great Britain had already been in the war for almost two
years. While Great Britain was at great pains to find allies, the
Soviet Union was doing its best to preserve the peace. The mutual
suspicion was not alleviated by Hess's flight to Scotland on 10th
May.17
On 9th May Madam Kollontai, Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, told
her Belgian colleague that 'Russia might be the next item on Germany's
list', 'But,' she said, 'the Soviet Army was quite prepared and the
Air Force very powerful'.18 There were rumours at the time amongst
Western diplomats of a new mighty Soviet fighter. On the same date
a circular from Moscow to Soviet missions in the West instructed them
to explore cautiously what would be the attitude of other countries
15. PRO. Document No. CAB.65/22, W.M.(41) 58th Conclusions, Minute 2.
9 June 1941.
16. Churchill, op.cit., Vol.Ill, pp.319-323.
17. BFP Vol.1 p.614., for the conflicting opinions in British circles
concerning possible effects of the Hess affair and the use that
could be maae of it.
16. PRO. Document No. FO.371/29501 File MO.N2131, 11 May 1941; also:
FO.371/29501 File No.N2471/122/30, 27 May 1941.
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towards a Russo-German war.1*3 Also on the same date Pravda
published a lengthy denial of 'supposed movements of troops', of the
Red Armys20 exactly at the time when such movements were gathering
momentum. At the time this denial was interpreted by diplomats as
another sign of Stalin's 'appeasement'; only a few paid attention to
the threat between the lines.
After the Soviet-Yugoslav treaty of 5th April and particularly
after Schulenburg's return from Berlin, Soviet-Nazi relations came to
a standstill.21 Not only did Count Schulenburg exhaust all his
diplomatic arsenal in futile attempts to influence the policy of his
country, but he was also suspected of going beyond his diplomatic
discretion.22 He was kept where Ire was precisely because his
opposition to war was widely known and his opinions served the great
'disinformation' game which had started in February, 1941.
Schulenburg and Hilger's indiscretion as well as British
warnings that Germany was preparing a war against the Soviet Union
were interpreted by the Soviet leadership in the light of what they
had heard from their own sources and their own reading of the situation.
Despite detailed data ori German concentration of troops and several
possible dates for the attack no responsible source could claim that
it knew that the Germans were going to attack. The date 22 June which
had been blurted out on 15th May in Berlin at a reception at the
19. A. Toynbee arid V.M. Toynbee, op.cit., p.402.
20. Gafencu, op.cit., p.191.
21. Ibid., p.206. See also: Hilger, op^cit., p.330.
22. See above Note on p.147.
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Bulgarian Legation by a spokesman of the German Foreign Office, Karl
Boemer23 was neither more nor less ominous than any other date that
had been mentioned in the endless rumours which were reaching Moscow
at the time.
Apart from mobilising, intensifying the pace of training of
recruits in the army and deploying large formations which had been
brought from interior and far east MDs, the Soviet Government was
also following the cautious circular which had been sent on 9th May.2**
Soviet ministers were instructed to sound out Great Britain concerning
its position on all war theatres; they were also asked to be warmer
towards their British colleagues and to assure them that the Soviet
Union was not on the verge of giving in to German pressure, and had
the power to defend its interest. These impressions were gathered
on 22nd May by a British diplomat who paid a 'periodical visit' to
Madame Kollontay the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm:
If the Germans do attack us we are quite ready
for them. We are exceedingly strong.25
On 27th May Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London told Anthony Eden
that:
On no account would we give up any of our
territory to anybody.25
Maisky also mentioned the Soviet air force in an indirect way.
23. A. Toynbee and V.M. Toynbee, op.cit., p.402.
24. See above pj.49.
25. PRO. F0.371/29501 File No.N.2608, 5 June 1941.
26. Ibid., F0.371/29501 File No.N.2471/122/38.
During May it became obvious to the Soviet High Command that
the available forces in the Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussia, Kiev and
Odessa Military Districts would not be able to withstand a German
attack on their own. General F.I. Golikov, head of General Staff
Intelligence Service reported that by 5th May, 1941, there were 108-
113 German divisions along the Soviet borders: six at Danzig and
Poznan; five in Finland; 23-24 in East Prussia; 29 in Poland
against the Western Military District and 31-34 in Poland against the
Kiev Military District; 14-15 in the Carpathians, Moldavia and North
Dobruja.27 On 13 May it was decided to move 4 Armies and one rifle
corps from interior Military District westward under the guise of
mobile training camps. The 22nd Army was transferred from the Urals
to Velikije Luki; the 21st from the Volga district to Gomel; the
19th from the North Caucasus to Belaya Tserkov; the 16th from Trans-
Baikal to Shepetovka; and the 26th Rifle corps from Kharkov to the
Western Dvina.
The Western Military Districts were ordered at short notice
to prepare accommodation for the incoming formations. As the packed
troop trains kept coming they completely disrupted the training
programmes of soldiers and staff. Meanwhile the call-up of reservists
was moving apace with recruitment. The former had to readjust to a
military regime, the latter had to go through refresher courses which
started at the beginning of May. Towards the end of May the General
Staff instructed the commanders of the western districts to establish
front commands not later than 20th June. They were to be at
Panevezys for Baltic Military District, Obuz-Lesna for Western
27. Zhukov, op.cit., p.250 ; see also Nekrich, op.cit., pp.124-125.
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Military District, Ternopol for Kiev Military District and Tiraspol
for Odessa Military District. In immediate proximity to the border
there were 47 infantry and six naval regiments. On the border there
were several rifle divisions of the Covering Army which were not de¬
ployed for combat and 11 regiments of the Frontier Troops still under
the command of the HKVD.28 Timoshenko's instruction at the beginning
of May detailing tasks for the troops in case of a German surprise
attack, though an indicator of the alarm in the Commissariat of
Defence and the General Staff, had only slightly changed the deploy¬
ment of the troops along the border. However, Timoshenko's instruction
helped to define roughly the tasks of the first and the second
echelons.29 The Plan for Defence of the Country's Border had not yet
been ratified in Moscow by the beginning of May. Troops were slowly
moving westward, without seeing the light of day, slightly exposing
the Far East,30 but extremely cautious not to arouse the wrath of
Germany, nor give it the slightest excuse for an immediate war.
Studying Timoshenko's instructions Colonel Bagramyan, Chief of
operations Kiev Military District, who went through the operational
papers (operativnaya dokumentatsiya) had some doubts concerning the
rear of the new deployment. On relating his doubts to his Chief of
Staff General Purkaev he got the reply:
28. Zhukov, op.cit., p.236. At a time of war they came under the
command of the nearest army H.Q.; see Pogranichniye Voiska SSSR
1939-1941 p.402 Document 398, 20 June, 1941.
29. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.62.
30. The Russo-Japanese neutrality pact of 13 April, 1941, gave the
Soviet Government reason to believe that the Japanese did not
plan any immediate aggression.
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In Moscow they know what to do (V Moskve znayut
shto delayut). There would be somebody in the
rear to meet an enemy which had broken through.31
In May, as in December, the ideal date for war, if indeed war was in¬
evitable, was the middle of 1942. No substantial German demands were
put to the Soviet Government and it was not asked to do anything to
conciliate Germany but was prepared to go a long way, though by no
means all the way, in order to postpone war.
Throughout May the units arrived not fully mobilised, not
fully equipped and without sufficient transport. Trains still worked
on peace time schedule. War \?as becoming a probability not yet a
likelihood. Although the nature of the coming war had already been
discussed in December and some good articles were circulating in
military journals it had not yet become a reality. Not even the
glimpse they had caught of modern warfare in Western, Northern and
recently Southern Europe changed the minds of those whose military
experience had been forged during the First World War.32 The deploy¬
ment of the Soviet Troops in May and June was proof that the Soviet
military leadership believed in a war that would develop in stages.
They did not think much of a strategic surprise attack and were
convinced that they would have time to mobilise, establish logistics
and deploy after the beginning of hostilities.33
31. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.63.
32. M.V. Zakharov, 'Stranitsy istorii sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil
nakanunye Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1939-1941', Voprosy
istorii No.5, 1970, p.40. All the MDs* commanders on the eve
of the war were veterans of the First World War.
33. IVOV, 1963, VolJ, p.472.
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The huge call-up, transfer and reorganisation created an
acute shortage of command staff. The Kiev Military District alone
was short of 30,000 men for command and technical staff. The 3rd
and 12th mechanized corps [8th and 11th Armies] in the Baltic MD were
short of men, sergeants and particularly officers.31* On 14 May the
Commissar of Defence ordered an end to the study periods for cadets
and their immediate transport to the field. By the end of May the
number of reservists had soared to 793,000.35 The American Embassy
cabled home on 22 May that:
There has recently been a substantial troop
movement from Vladivostok west bound. Many
trainloads of Soviet Army units including
artillery and tanks departed for the west.36
On 20th May the 34th Rifle Corps was transferred from North Caucasus
to the west. The first to arrive was an operative group under the
command of Lieutenant-General M.A. Reiter, First Deputy Commander
North Caucasus Military District. Following this group came four
rifle divisions and one mountain rifle division. By the beginning
of June this force became part of the newly organised 19th Army.37
At about that time half the divisions of the western districts were
completed up to 12,000 men. Some more weapons and equipment were
issued to these divisions. It is not difficult to estimate the
amount of organisational work and administrative skill demanded of the
34. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.72; also: Bor'ba za sovietskuyu
pribaltiku, p.41.
35. Anfilov, op.cit., p.180.
36. Foreign relations of the U.S., Vol.1, p.146.
37. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.63.
155.
people in charge of such an effort. On top of the manJbth transfer
westward there was a trickle of transport eastward, for instance the
Infantry College which was transferred from Lvov to the Urals on 25
May.3® By May, along the 2000 km. border from Palangi to Dunai
there were 9 Armies, according to the Plan of Defence, but the first
echelon consisted of only 40 rifle divisions and 2 cavalry divisions.39
The last week of May and the first week of June saw a gradual
and significant change in deployment. While all the former
activities were running concurrently, namely call-up of reservists,
training of recruits, organisation of new formations and transfer of
large units from the Far East and internal districts, some new moves
were observed within the western districts. Whereas on paper
Timoshenko's instructions merely earmarked the units which were
allocated as first and second echelons, in the field they meant a
considerable transformation. The units were not only to move to
their newly designated camps, which were still far away from their
theatres of operation in case of war, according to the Plan of
Operation, but also to incorporate the new rank and file reservists.
Moreover, in their new accommodations they had to accustom themselves
to the new environment while getting down immediately to their train¬
ing programme, which was going on despite all the commotion.lt0
In the Baltic MD, 50th and 125th Rifle Divisions held
38. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.59.
39. IVOV I960, Vol.1, p.473.
40. K.S. Moskalenko, op.cit., p.18. The first anti-tank brigade
had a training programme of 8-10 hours a day and 2-3 hours,
night training per week. See also: Bor'ba za Sovietskuyu
Pribaltiku, pp.44-45.
exercises in which co-ordination between them and their warning system
were found to be unsatisfactory. As some of the intelligence informa¬
tion sent from the border to Moscow was sifted, the district commanders
could not help being deeply worried by the concentration of enemy
forces facing their sectors of responsibility. Under the relentless,
though somewhat diffuse pressure from Moscow, the torrents of
instruction, the comforting burden of reinforcement and the alarming
reports from the borders, it was only sensible that district commanders
would use their commonsense and secure the advanced posts of their
fronts. The manning of Fortified Areas: URs - (Ukreplenie rayony)
was strictly forbidden, but there were many other field fortifications
which could be occupied. Thus, while moving forward his second
echelon Kirponos ordered his commanders to occupy with small forces
forward positions along the border according to the Plan of Defence
(K0V0-41) .**1 On 10 June, Kirponos ordered 62nd Rifle Divisions, 5th
Army to move from Lutsk closer to the border. The 193rd Rifle
Division was ordered to move from Korosten to the Pavurskii camp;
31st Rifle Corps from Stry; 3rd Cavalry Division from Nesterov to
Isyaslavl to be accommodated there in the barracks of the 32nd Cavalry
Division and the 190th Rifle Division from Cherkassy to Nesterov to
replace the 3rd Cavalry Division. The authority ratifying this
movement of the second echelon came on 12 June in an order signed by
Timoshenko, but on the same date there was another order cancelling
the occupation of the advanced line of defence and ordering hack the
41. Keretskov, op.cit., p.205; also Bagramyan, op.cit., p.68.
See Chapter 1, N.17.
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troops sent there.1*2 The to and fro movements must have puzzled the
local commanders as to the intentions of their government. For
several of the second echelon units the march distance to the border,
only at night but in peaceful conditions, was eight to ten nights.
The Tass communique published on 14 June could not really
alleviate the worries of commanders in the field. In the spirit of
this announcement the political workers in the 11th Army Baltic MD
told the soldiers on the evening of 21 June that there would be no
war.1*3 On 14 June the Military Council of Odessa Military District
was ordered to allot an operative group in order to establish an Army
command and lodge it in Tiraspol.**** The Military Council of the
Baltic Military District was busy too. On 15 June rifle divisions
of the district were ordered to prepare their defence sectors, but
they did not do so, and did not work out a fire system using existing
fire points.1*5 Both soldiers and commanders were apprehensive of
the situation, whereupon political workers were sent to the units to
explain government motives.1*6 The sappers were ordered to lay mines
ready for activation within three hours.
On 17 June Moscow ordered Kiev Military District to move
another five rifle corps closer to the border. The 31st Rifle Corps
from Korosten was ordered to arrive at Kovel by 28 June; its Staff
42. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.68. Note, 31st Rifle Corps and 3rd
43. K.S. Moskalenko op.cit., p.20; see also: Bor'ba za sovetskuyu
pribaltiku, p.46.
44. Anfilov, op.cit., p.181.
45. Anfilov, Nachalo velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, p.44.
46. Borba za sovetskuyu pribaltiku, p.44.
was due to arrive on 22 June. Usually it took the corps 2-3 days to
cover the distance from its camp to the deployment areas on foot, but
under the veil of secrecy it was obliged to move only at night, as
during day time there were German reconnaissance planes flying un¬
molested overhead.1*7 Under such conditions the corps could not have
been expected to arrive before 10-12 days, as indeed it was ordered to
do. 36 Rifle Corps should have occupied the line Dubno-Kozin-Krements
by the morning of 27 June; and 49th Rifle Corps by 30 June.1*8 What¬
ever the original urgency in ordering the transfer of these corps they
were certainly given ample time en route. Whereas the 31st, 36th and
37th Rifle Corps were assigned a successive line of defence, though
still quite a distance from the border, the destinations of the 55th
and 49th Rifle Corps were not clearly defined. On 18 June at 20.00
hours several rifle divisions of the Kiev Military District without
their equipment and supplies (which according to plan were to be released
only after the order for mobilisation) but complete in manpower, were
ordered to move closer to the border.1*9 The Military Council in the
Baltic Military District was ordered on the same day to put the anti¬
aircraft defence on the alert as from 19 June. The chief of signals
was ordered to put on the alert all the signals systems in Baltic
Military District. Chief of Military transport was ordered to put the
47. Colonel N. Svetlishin, 'Nekotorie voprosy primeneniya Voisk PV0
strany' VIZ 12, 1969, p.17 N. The Red Army was well equipped to
record German flights and the Germans did not make great effort
to conceal them. But see preceding page for the movement of
31st Rifle Corps. Either the Corps was divided into section or
else its deployment orders were changed between the 10th and the
17th June.
48. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.77.
49. Anfilov, op.cit., p.181.
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railway system service on a war footing as from 22 June. The
commanders of the 8th and 11th Armies were ordered to point out to
the sappers their mines depots in order to lay mines according to the
Plan of Defence. They were also ordered to reconnoitre the bridges,
prepare explosives and earmark units that would be in charge of
destroying the bridges if the need arose.5® Mechanised corps were
ordered to move to the regions and sectors allocated to them in the
Plan of Defence.51
Despite the order of May the Baltic, West and Kiev districts
had not yet had command posts on 18 June whereupon they were
instructed again to establish such posts and reorganise as the North¬
west, West and South West fronts, by 22-23 June.52 On 19 June
Zhukov cabled Kiev HQ ordering the establishment of a Front Command
in Ternopol by 22 June. The cable ordered complete secrecy.53
These orders were issued under the pressure of perceptible danger but
with no definite date in mind. For instance Timoshenko's order of
19 June to camouflage airfields, tanks, armoured cars, command cars
and other special cars (radio cars) was to be carried out by 15 July!
Even so it was an enormous task. In the Baltic MD, for instance,
there were 70 airfields, 49 of which were operative. However it was
noticeable that Kirponos received it on the 20 June and carried it out
by 21 June. By that date the beautiful colours, the delight of every
military commander were camouflaged and the heavy equipment of the
50. Anfilov, op_«cit., p.181.
51. Ibid., p.183.
52. Ibid., p.187.
53. Bagramyan, op.cit., t>.83.
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5th Army wa3 hastily driven into groves and forests.5'1 The order
to establish tae South Front was carried out on 20-21 June. Its
operative command was established in Vinitsa.55
Whatever Stalin's ideas about Germany's intention tne rumours
and information were percolating from abroad and from the borders
indicating an approaching war, the time, tiie place and the size of
which were yet unclear on 21 June, 1941. Soldiers were training
8-10 hours daily and 2-3 hours every night, there were professional-
technical courses for special units, the air force carried out night
manoeuvres and military trains kept moving from the east westward.
An American diplomat reported on 21 June:
While travelling from Krasnoyarsk to Chita
his train met between 200-220 westbound trains
averaging 25 cars each of which seven were
loaded with troops and the remaining 18 with
artillery, tanks.
He noted no unusual movement west of Krasnoyarsk
nor east of Chita.56
Feverish activity was taking place in the High Command too. On 21
June Zhulcov was appointed as an overall commander of the South and
South-West Fronts, Meretskov as an overall commander of the Northern
Front,57 and Marshall Budenny as commander of the Armies of the High
Command reserves, which were moved forward to the Dnieper.58 On
54. Moskalenko, op.cit., p.24.
55. Anfilov, op.cit., p.182.
56. The Foreign Relations of the. U.S. Vol.1, p. 150.
57. Anfilov, op.cit., p.182.
58. Ibid.
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21 June, 1941, all the personnel of the General Staff and the
Commissariat of Defence were ordered to stay in their offices over¬
night.55
British and American observers were perturbed by Stalin's
ambivalent policy. Every move on the side of such an important
power had repercussions all over Europe and beyond. Although Great
Britain - and to some extent the USA - could not ignore the Soviet
Union's policy toward Germany they could still enjoy a considerable
freedom of their own policies. The Germans too, were puzzled by the
contradictions in Soviet policy. Stalin was eager to please the
Germans, but he had also secured his rear against a Japanese attack;55
he professed peaceful intentions and exhibited nighty new airplanes.61
A Soviet delegation was innocently incredulous when shown the latest
models of German tanks, suggesting that the Russians might have
59. Zhukov, op.cit., p.212.
60. R.D. Warth, Soviet Russia In World Politics, London, Vision Press,
1963, pp.254-257. Warth suggests that Japan'3 commitment in
South Asia dictated its attitude towards the Soviet Union; see
also, V. Issraelyan, L. Kutakov, o£_*cit., pp.170-171. This
source, throws interesting light on Japanese foreign policy as it
was formulated on 3rd February, 1941, by Matsuoka's initiative,
and on Japanese-German and Japanese-American relations; see,
DGFP, p.570, Document 361 (16th April, 1941) p.642, Document 408
(26th April, 1941) for German views of the Soviet-Japanese
Neutrality Pact; see Documents on American Foreign Relations
1940-41 pp.291-292 fortext of the Pact
61. W.G. 'MIG-3, Undistinguished forbear of a distinguished line'.
Air Enthusiast Vol.1, No.5, October, 1971, pp.252-254, Oberst
Heinrich Ashenbrenner delegation visit3 the USSR in April, 1941.
This visit combined with some diplomatic activities (see Chapter
III p.148) to impress the world with the might of the Soviet Air
Force; see also KTB, pp.396-397, 5 May, 1941. Krebs report on
USSR readiness to come a long way towards Germany. He also re¬
ports a new fighter and deployment of long range bombers near
the border.
162.
exceeded these models.62 However, Germany maintained the military
and the diplomatic initiative and dictated most of the moves in
Europe after the end of 1940.
Whereas Stalin and the Soviet Government had little or no
control over German decisions they had a firm grip over their own
country. Since 1939 the whole economy and particularly the war
industry had been called upon to produce more and faster, while the
armed forces had undergone severe jolts as a result of a new train¬
ing programme, new ranking system and several reorganisations. There
had been an impressive improvement in industry. The standard of
education of directors in the war industry was raised, 'particularly
since 1940, the shop foreman has been raised to a figure of major
importance'.63 However, during the February conference in his report
Malenkov said (16 February)
A situation should not be tolerated where a director,
wishing to excuse himself for the poor work of his
firm, continually refers to the fact that his orders
were not fulfilled although they were correct and
were given in time.6*1
No official attempt was made at correlating the harsh demands put on
the industry and the armed forces with the political aim of these
moves. Indeed, there were many private consultations between
62. Guderian, op.cit., p.143; according to Guderian during the visit
of the Soviet delegations the Germans suspected for the first
time that the Russians might possess 'better and heavier tanks
than we do'; see also KTB, pp.335-336, 30 March, 1941. Inform¬
ation about a good heavy tank with a 47 mm. gun and a small
number of a giant tank of 42-45 t. with a 100 mm. gun.
63. D. Granick, Management of the Industrial Firm, pp.32-33,43.
64. Ibid., p.29.
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commanders in the field55 and some exchange of ideas between the
military High Command and Stalin.55 These seemed neither to change
the political line, nor yet the propaganda line in the armed forces.
'Our government was hesitant' wrote Meretskov.57 The main link,
that should have turned political propaganda, military training and
industrial productivity into some kind of operational readiness, was
missing - there was no mention of any 'enemy'.5®
Without a definite 'enemy' it was well nigh impossible to
convey to managers of industry and to soldiers alike any sense of
urgency. On the contrary, since Germany was the object of 'appease¬
ment', concentrations of German troops and reconnaissance flight of
German planes had to be explained not as hostile acts - a fact that
was quite clear to every sensible soldier along the border - but as
65. K.K. Rokossovskii, Soldatskii Dolg, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1972, pp.
8-9. A conversation between Rokossovskii, I.I. Fedyunin3kii,
S.M. Kondrusev and F.V. Komarov. All participants felt that
war was approaching. Rokossovskii and Fedyuninskii planned some
co-ordination of activities between their respective units in a
case of war; see also Meretskov, op.cit., pp.203-205. Convers¬
ations with Major-General Zakharov, Major-General Halinovskii,
Colonel-General Pavlov, Chief of Air Force, I.I. Kopets and Air
Force officers in an air-field in the Baltic MD; also Bagramyan,
op.cit., p.63, conversation between Bagramyan and Purkaev, also
Fedyuninskii, op.cit., p.12, a conversation with Rokossovskii.
66. A.A. Lobachev, Trudnymi dorogami, Moscow, 1960, p.127. Kirponos
letter to Stalin; see also R. Malinovskii, 'Dvatsatiletie nachala
Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny', VIZ, No.6, 1961, pp.6-7; also, I.V.
Tyulenev, Cherez tri voiny, Moscow, 1960, p.140; also, Meretskov,
op.cit., p.204. Conversation with Stalin and Timoshenko; also,
Zhukov, op.cit., pp.249-251. Telephone conversation between
Timoshenko, and Stalin on 13th June, 1941; conversation between
Timoshenko, Zhukov and Stalin on 14th June, 1941; conversation
between Timoshenko, Zhukov, Vatutin and Stalin on 21st June, 1941.
67. Meretskov, op.cit., p.206.
68. Nekrich, op.cit., p.131, see also, Yu.P. Petrov, Partinoe
Stroitel'stvo v Sovetskoi armii i flote (1919-1961), Voenizdat,
1964, p.335, particularly Zhdanov's view of the Soviet propaganda
line taken in the first half of 1941.
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German war activities against Great Britain. This explanation
which was carried by Party workers even on 21 June, 194169 was not
only utterly confusing but also served the German policy of
'disinformation'. Thus the armoured forces were called upon to
intensify their training, to master their new machines because there
was a war situation in Europe, while unspecified 'Capitalists' and
'Imperialists' were threatening the Soviet Union, but they were not
allowed to deploy near the border, nor to conduct in these regions
any exercises.
After the debate during the December meeting the plan for
reorganisation and training of the armoured forces and the artillery
seemed clear and straightforward. Some of the theoretical problems
concerning the tasks of tanks and the aims of armoured forces in a
modern war, were resolved. Despite Kulik's protests it was agreed
that the tank is a mobile weapon with a high rate of fire-power, and
that the armoured forces could come to their own only in mass
formations. In theory modernisation had carried the day; in practice
the pitiable state of obsolescent machines jeopardized the future of
the new training and rearmament programmes. The potential manifested
by the qualities of the new T-34 medium tank and the new KV heavy tank
was nullified by the small quantities of these tanks. Whereas the
new operational ideas which had been aired in December were partially
based on the capability of the T-34 and the KV, commander and soldiers
on the exercise grounds were not given the opportunity to master the
new machines.
69. Bor'ba za Sovetskuyu Pribaltiku, p.46.
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The Red Army: Armour and Artillery
At the beginning of 1941, the situation of the armoured
forces was deplorable as a result of arbitrary changes in military
policy in the years 1938-40. These and the disorientation in military
thought as a consequence of the purges left the armoured forces in
disarray. The incorporation of new tanks into older formations was a
long process, but time was running short - as the December meeting
persistently emphasised. Timoshenko's idea after he became commissar
was to reverse the 21st November, 1939 decision concerning the mechan¬
ised corps. When he assumed office the transition from corps formation
to that of division was in full swing. However on 9th June, 1940,
the November decision of the Main Military Soviet was finally revoked
and Timoshenko authorised the formation of nine mechanised corps and
twenty armoured brigades for infantry close support. The role of the
armoured forces was extensively discussed during the December meeting
and as soon as Zhukov became CGS with the backing of Timoshenko they
set out together to enhance the pace of reorganisation of the armoured
forces. In addition to the nine mechanised corps which were in
process of formation they pushed through a plan [in March 1941] to
form another twenty mechanised corps.70 The plan was put out for
70. Kommunist, No.12, 1968, p.65; see also Meretskov, op.cit., p.
201; also Anfilov, op.cit., p.107, also P.A. Rotmistrov, Vremya
i Tanki, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1972, pp.85-87. An account of the
reasons for the radical changes and frequent re-organisating of
the armoured forces by one of the Soviet outstanding tank
commanders of the Second World War and a leading theoretician in
the field of armoured warfare. Marshal Rotmistrov is the author
of several important articles and an Editor of Istroiya Voennogo
Iskusstva, Moscow, 1963.
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discussion on 3rd February, 1941, merely three days after Zhukov had
assumed his new post as CGS. Such an undertaking was obviously
beyond the capacity of Soviet industry at the time. Meretskov who
was then in charge of combat training did not believe in the
Timoshenko-Zhukov plan, preferring to see the old formations rein¬
forced by whatever new machines industry was capable of producing.
According to Meretskov's calculation a full complement of mechanised
corps as envisaged by Timoshenko-Zhukov could not be achieved before
1943, but even optimistic forecasting in February, 1941, could not
maintain that the Soviet Union would stay out of the war after 1942.
The result of the dispute between Meretskov on the one hand and
Timoshenko and Zhukov on the other was a compromise. A great effort
was made to complete the formation of nine mechanised corps whereas
formations equipped with old models were only slightly reinforced
with new machines.
Although the old models of the BT series - BT-5, BT-7, BT-7M
- paved the way for the development of better machines, they bore the
marks of earlier stages of development. Some of the BT~5s were
armed with 76.2 mm. guns and were meant to support attacking tanks.
The size of their turret did not allow for both radio equipment and
heavy load of shells and the designers had to compromise between 115
shells for tanks with no radio equipment and 72 shells for tanks
with radio equipment. Later models of the BT-5 were equipped with
the M-17T and the M-5 engines which were both modifications of air¬
craft powerplants.71 Later models of BT-7 had an armour of 20 mm.
71. V.D. Mostovenko, lanki, (Ocherk iz istorii zarozhdeniya i
razvitiya bronetankovoi tekhniki), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1958, pp.
88-89. This is the standard work on the development of Soviet
AFVs (armoured fighting vehicles). T. Milsom, Russian Tanks
1900-1970, London, Arms and Armour Press, Lionel Leventhal Ltd.,
1970, pp.56-58.
on the front and 15 tun. on the turret which also became conical.
BT-7M was equipped with a diesel engine. Far too light were the
tanks of the T series; T-26 was armed with a 37 mm. gun and a
machinegun, its body armour was 15 mm., roof - 10 mm. and bottom - 6 mm.
T--28 medium tank was armed with a 76.2 mm. gun, three or four 7.62 mm.
machineguns in three turrets. It developed a speed of only 37 kmh, and
its radius of operation was only 220 km.72 By June 1940, the T-34
designed by a group headed by M.I. Koshkin and the KV tanks designed
by a group headed by Zh. Ya. Kotin went into mass production after they
had been put to a rigorous test both on the Khalkhin Gol and in the
Finnish War. Even in its first configuration - officially the A-l -
the T--34 was a formidable machine: following a decision taken in
August 1939 the T-34 was designed as an only track tank; its front
turret armour - 75 mm. turret sides 45 mm.. It was armed with the
long barrelled 76.2 gun of 41.5 length calibre and three 7.62 mm. DT
machineguns. Its cross-country speed was 55 kmh and its range 250
miles. It was electro-x^elded and was fitted with periscopes.
However its serial production started in June 1940 which fact explains
why at the beginning of 1941 there were very few T-34s tanks actually
ready for action. The KV was a heavy tank of 47.5t., armed with a
76.2 mm. gun and four machineguns. Despite its heavy weight it
could reach a speed of 35 kmh. Although the first KV tanks were
delivered to the armed forces during December 1939, they started to
72. V.D. Mostovenko, op.cit., pp.95-97 for further technical
specification.
160.
arrive in some quantity only during the second half of 1940.73
On May day the Red Array paraded its might in Red Square.
Kiev MD had its own military parade. The artillery was very
impressive and there were many tanks, endless columns of them, but:
Only an experienced eye could see the multitude
of obsolete tanks — The new, later renowned
1 thirty fours' and KV appeared in the parade in
very small numbers. Not because there were
only few of them in the district. There were
enough to take part in the parade, but unfort¬
unately these machines had only recently been
supplied to the troops and the tank crews had
not yet mastered enough experience in driving
them.7>*
The new tanks were incorporated into the existing or reorganised units
but their crews as well as the armoured force commanders, had no
experience in command and control of even medium sized formations, let
alone combat experience with large formations.75 Shortcomings were
revealed during exercises in the Kiev MD. Tank drivers proved them¬
selves extremely incompetent even at the end of May (the 27th) , many
of them having had only three hours on their new machines. The
73. The T-34 opposite number Panzerkampfwagen III/Avsfuhrung F (Type
5/ZW) in comparison had front turrent armour - 30 mm., side
turret - 30 mm., armament - 37 mm. I./45 nun and two 7.92 mm.,
MG-34 machineguns; maximum road speed - 40 kmh, range - cross
country - 95 km. It had a uetrol engine. See P.A. Rotmistrov,
op.cit., pp.62-64 and Mostovenko, op.cit., pp.l0b-110 for
technical snecifications of the T-34 and the KV.
74. Bagramyan. op.cit., pp.60-61.
75. KTJB. p.382, 26th April, 19A1. According to Krebs report there
was an acute shortage of commanders. Regiments are commanded by
young Majors and Divisions by Colonels, p.397 6tb May, 1941.
Krebs reports that Russian commanders are really poor.
.... aus«esr?rochert scblerbt ; see e1«o. General der
Eisenbahntrupper. Die russiche Panzerwaffe, Verteiler fur
GenStdP 0 ou TV Abt. Fremde Heere bet file) 28fh April, 1941.
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crews were far better in firing their guns than in driving the tanks.
During the May exercises many tanks were put out of action for lack
of spare parts and poor repair facilities. Maintenance technology
was primitive and did not provide efficient service.76 Shortage of
spare parts for old models and poor maintenance remained with the
armoured forces throughout June. The first was the result of the
shifting of industry to the new models, the second was due to lack of
expert technicians for the new machines and shortage of mobile
servicing facilities on a range compatible with the size of the
armoured forces. By June the armoured force comprised about 20,000
machines of all types of which 508 were KV and 967 T-3477 in the five
western districts. Of the older tanks which were still the backbone
of the force 29% needed a complete overhaul, 44% needed partial repair
and only 27% were in reasonable condition. However, mechanised corps
were kept at some distance from the border for political and tactical
76. VIZ, ho.4, 1967, pp.15-16.
77. M.V. Zakharov, 'Gtrauitsy istorii sovetskikh vooruzheunykli sil
nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1939-41' Voprosy istorii,
ho.5, 1970, p.35. This source quotes the figure IC6l for both
T-34 and kV at the beginning of the war; see also, Bor'ba za
Sovetskuyu Pribaltiku, p.43. According to this source, on the
eve of the war there were in Baltic MD altogether 1150 tanks of
which only IGo were new models, also nuiiiov, op.cit., p.95,
which quotes the figure of 1664 tanks along the Western border,
of which 1500 were T-34 anu kV; see also kTD, p.411, 14ta May,
1941. It is interesting to note that Haider mentions a bottle¬
neck in Germany's armoureu machines production programme.
LPanzerkampfwagen-programm.J; also P.A. Rotmistrov, op.cit.,
pp.62-63, for Rotmistrov's opinion about the high ratio of light
tanks in the armoured forces; also p.83 for figures of T-34 and
RV in the forces.
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reasons.78 Whereas infantry could be brought close to the border in
silence at the dead of night, it was impossible for mechanised units
as long as the policy of 'no provocation' was in force. The
mechanised corps were moved from interior districts westward and from
their location in the western district forward but they often arrived
without their tanks and artillery,79 because the Soviet military at
the time was of the opinion that after the beginning of hostilities
there would be enough time to mobilise. Until such time there were
no heavy transporters to carry the tanks, which were scarce anyway,
and no lorries to carry fuel and lubricants as those were tied to the
Five Year Plan.
Even the original nine corps were not equipped with the new
models by June, 1941; the other 20 about which a decision had been
taken in March, 1941, were only beginning to take shape.80
Although still far from perfect, Goviet artillery equipment and
organisation by contrast made a somewhat better shewing.
78. Bor'ba za Sovetslcuyu Pribaltiku, p.93; see also, Bagramyan,
op.cit., p.64. Commanders who complained that they were short
of men and equipment received the standard replj* that it would all
be arranged after mobilisation was started; see also KTB, p.345,
4th April, 1941. German intelligence believed that a newly
formed armoured corps of three divisions was stationed near
Leningrad; also, p.382, 26th April, 1941. According to Krebs
report there were gaping holes in Soviet units as far as material
was concerned. Krebs also reported four armoured groups of
various strength in Bessarabia, in and west of Zhitomir, Vilna and
Pskov.
79. K.K. Rokossovskii, op.cit., p.9.
80. P.A. Rotmistrov, op.cit., p.88. According to Rotmistrov more
than 15,000 T-34 and KV tanks were needed to form the new 20
merchanized corps which had been planned, whereas industry could
produce during 1941 only about 5,500. In addition to tanks there




Based on a long tradition dating back to Peter the Great,
Soviet artillery was mechanically up to the demands of war, as far as
was known up to 1940. Indeed, the experience of the Spanish Civil
War, the incidents in the Far East and the Finnish War had not
demonstrated any major flaw in Soviet artillery doctrine. However,
the limitations of these encounters owing to their duration, the
standard of technology and the peculiarity of terrain had not taxed
the artillery too heavily. Although significant lessons were learned
from air-battles over Spain and considerable numbers of aircraft took
part in air-battles over Khalkhin Gol in both cases the air-force was
not a dominant factor. Consequently AA artillery had not benefited
from these experiences. As for the Finnish war, since the Finns had
an insignificant air-force and armoured force, conclusions concerning
the artillery were drawn mainly based on heavy fortified static
defence. The broken terrain of the Finnish battle-field, criss¬
crossed with ravines, swamps and covered with groves brought to the
fore the need for high trajectory weapons.81 Whereas in 1936
B.I. Shavyrin's design bureau was closed because mortars were dis¬
counted, in late 1940 their production was given high priority.82
81. K.P. Kazakov, Vsegda s pekhotoi vsegda s tankami, Moscow,
voenizdat, 1969, p.9.
82. IVOV, 1960, Vol.1, p.453. Three heavy mortals were developed
and produced during 1938-1939: 82 mm. as a standard weapon of
a battalion; 107 urn. and 120 mm. as a standard weapon of a
regiment; see also Zhulcov, op. cit., pp.213-214. According to
Zhukov in the period 1st January 1939-22nd June 1941 the Army
received 52.407 mortars and 29.637 guns, [tank guns not included].
By June 1941 the Red Army had more mortars than the German army;
also, Anfilov, op.cit., p.96, for the changing approach to the
production of mortars. According to this source by 1st June
1941 the Red Army had 14.200 82 mm. and 3.800 120 mm. mortars.
Having solved some of the production problems which had faced the
mortar industry when it was resumed late in 1940, the Red Army was
provided by the end of the first half of 1941 with 13.000 82 una. and
3000 120 mm. mortars. Altogether, despite his interest in all aspects
of military industry, Stalin definitely had a great predilection for
artillery.83
At the time of the December meeting Marshal G.I. Kulik was the
head of Main artillery direction of the Red Army - GAU (Glavnoe
artilleriskoy upravleniye Krasnoi Armii). His deputy was Colonel-
General N.N. Voronov, and the Chief of Staff from 14 June 1941 was
Colonel-General N.D. Yakovlev. GAU could boast a very impressive
arsenal. Still in service were the improved old models 1910/30, but
the bulk of the armoury was the new models 152 mm. Howitzer - model
1937, 122 mm. Howitzer - model 1938, 76 mm., and 210 mm. guns, 280 mm.
mortar, 305 mm. Howitzer, 37 mm. automatic and 85 mm. AA guns - all
1939 models. Not only were these new models but some of them were
either dual purpose like the 85 mm. AA gun which could be used as an
A.T. gun as well, or dual purpose like the 76 mm. gun designed by
V.G. Grabin which with few modifications was used as a standard tank-
gun. Unfortunately the production of the 76 mm. gun was stopped in
May 1941 in favour of guns and heavy machineguns which were deamed
necessary for F.A., the armoured fordes and A.T. guns.81* Of the
83. B.L. Vannikov, 'Oboronnaya Promyshlennost SSSR Nalcanune voiny',
Voprosy istorii, No.10, 1968, p.117'... V otnoshenii Stalin k
artillerii i artilleriskoi promyshlennosti chuvstvovalas osobaya
simpatiya.' Zhukov, op.cit., p.214 also made the same remark.
Before and during the war B.L. Vannikov was Commissar for
Armament.
84. M.V. Zakharov, 'Stranitsy istorii sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil
Nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1939-1941' Voprosy istorii
No.5, 1970, p.33. Note: F.A. - Fortified Area.
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smaller calibres there were the 45 mm. anti-tank gun, modernized in
1940, and the 45 ram., 37 ram., 25 mm. AA automatic guns. The 37 ram.
was produced in two versions - one mounting 4 barrels with a fire
power of 400 shells per minute and a one barrel naval version.85
As far as number of barrels are concerned the Red Army was
moderately well-equipped although demands were growing with the
growth of the army and with the widening 3cope of artillery theory.
These in turn put heavy pressure to bear on both gun and ammunition
production which were lagging behind. Soviet artillery theory in
1940 reached new heights of sophistication, designating for the
artillery ever more complicated tasks, which included,
The tasks of regimental artillery in various stages
of the attack.
a. During the approach/march.
b. During the artillery barrage preparing the
attack.
c. During the attack of infantry and tanks.
d. During the struggle in the depth of the
defence.88
Following (c) and (d) it is clear that in each of these stages the
artillery is allocated accurate targets which have to be engaged
exactly on time as otherwise friendly forces might be struck. The
plan for Army artillery was so elaborate and complicated that it
could not be conceived without high mobility and reliable communi¬
cation. The difficulties of the artillerymen were emphasized by the
85. N.E. Nosovskii, 'Nadezhniy arsenal vooruzheniya', Voprosy
istorii, No.11, 1970, p.117.
86. V.D. Grendal, 'Artilleriya v osnovnykh vidakh boya*, Voprosy
taktiki, pp.209-210; see also Anfilov, op.cit., p.116 for
Artillery doctrine of the Red Army.
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fact that signalling was effected by either visual means or by
telephone, both means being easily disrupted in a battle environment.
From a tactical point of view lack of sophisticated signalling reduced
the "depth* of artillery batteries and compelled them to fight as a
one line echelon in order not to hit each other, or any other friendly
forces. Such primitive tactics made detection of the batteries
easier.
No less demanding were the tasks of the artillery in defence:
As the defence is relatively less saturated with
artillery the control of this artillery must
allow possibilities for concentrated effort
(manevragnen) towards these means or forces of the
enemy which might at some stage of the battle
present the most dangerous threat to the defence . ..87
Both in the offensive and in defence the artillery had to be flexible
in engaging several targets simultaneously, keeping in touch with
rapidly changing situations and agile in using various types of
skills. Not the least of the worries being the artillery inexper¬
ience in the use of live ammunition and the acute lack of transport
which made flexible use of artillery an impossible task.88 Since
the Finnish War simulation of real battle conditions in training had
carried the day, yet constant mention of live ammunition indicates
that though this practice was no longer exceptional it had not yet
been well-established.
The beceiaber meeting was an attempt to sum up Soviet military
experience and to accass the validity of the doctrine based on this
experience. The criticism directed against the artillery was aimed
87. A.K. Sivkov, "Taktika artilleriya", Voprosy Taktiki, p.222.
88. IVOV 1960, Vol.1, p.453.
at the inedaquacy of the anti air-craft artillery. It was slow,
unco-ordinated and scattered, the reasons being high priority for the
production of other types of artillery and inefficient locating and
signalling devices. Failing to locate approaching enemy planes the
AA guns proved too slow and too few to cope. Marshal Kulik who was
aware of this failing and very keen to improve the performance of AA
artillery completely failed to appreciate the significance of the
tank. Semper fidelis, he stuck to the offensive by the infantry arm
but emphasized defence in air and in armoured xirarfare. Indeed anti¬
tank x^arfare both in theory and in practice was very late in appearing.
In Timoshenko's instructions for artillery training during the summer
of 1940 there was no specific mention of anti-tank artillery since
they were based on the experience of the Spanish and the Finnish wars
where combat was against fortified areas, more a si age than a war of
manoeuvre.85 But this trend had started to change after the reversal
of the decision to do away with mechanized corps. Marshal Kulik was
fighting a last ditch battle against the tank during the December
meeting. By that time the evidence of German success in armoured
warfare was overwhelming. In only one important point was theory
still toying with past experience - AT artillery was still instructed
to deploy only in places impassable for tanks.80
Artillery Field Regulations 1937, part 2 (Boevoi ustav
artillerii RKKA, 1937, chart 2) which was in force until 22 June 1941
instructed 136 guns per one kilometer. On the eve of the war the
89. Anfilov, op.cit., p.134.
90. Ibid.
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Red Array had 67.335 pieces of artillery (50 mm. mortars not included)^
which were partially organic i.e. formed the artillery of various units
and partially organized as the Reserve of the High Command - RGK
(Rezerva Clavnovo Koraandovanya) .92 The RGK comprised 74 artillery
regiments of which 60 were Howitzer and 14 - guns , altogether 8% of
all the artillery of the ground forces.-3 A Gun Regiment consisted
of 48 122 mm. guns and 152 mm. Howitzer; a Gun Regiment of high force
(bolshoi raoshchnosti) of 24 152 mm. guns; a Howitzer Regiment of 48
152 mm. Howitzer, and Howitzer Regiment of high force of 24 203 nra.
Howitzer. The armament of an independent division of high force
consisted of 210 mm. guns, 280 mm. mortars and 305 mra. Howitzer,
altogether five pieces. The organic artillery of every infantry
division was 66 32 inra. and 120 mm. mortars.
Since 1934 experiments with rockets had been carried out under
the roof of the Rocket Scientific Research Institute - RNIX
(Reaktivniy nauclmo issledovatel'skii institute). By 1938 the results
of the first experiment with 'rail-mounted artillery' (rel'sovaya
artilleriya) were demonstrated in front of the military. A
91. M.V. Zakharov, Stranitsy Istorii ... Voprosy istorii, No.5, 1970,
p.34, quotes the figure 71.000 artillery pieces in the Red Army
[22nd June, 1941 J.
92. Marshal K. !<azakav, 'Sovershenstvovanie Artilleriskogo
Nastupleniya', VIZ, No.11, 1970, pp.33-34. Under the pressure
of battle and as a result of heavy losses infantry units were
left very soon after the beginning of the war, with only the
organic artillery.
93. Anfilov, op.cit., p.117.
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fragmentation - explosive rocket 1.7 m. in length had been developed
by B.S. Petropavlovsky, the engineer G.E. Langemak had been working
on the development of a credible launcher, and V.A. Artem'ev had
solved the problem of stability. For long, frustrating months no
satisfactory solution had been found to the innumerable problems
poised by the revolutionary weapon. Although it had already been
experimented with as an air-to-ground weapon during the Khallchin Gol
incident in late 1939 it had only got official approval on May 1940
designated BM-13 (Boevaya raashina, s kalibrom Minyi v 13.2 cm). By
that time the length of the rocket had bean enlarged to 5 m. and the
launcher, truck-mounted, could launch 16 rockets in a salvo instead
of 24 in December 1938.91f
BM-13 was tested operatively in November 1940 using seven
launchers. Apparently it had not yet been completed because as late
as March 1941 a large group of scientists in RNII were given state
subsidies to work on and further develop the weapon. BM-13 was
finally approved for series production on 21st June 1941. The first
BM-13 battery under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov was formed
only on 28th June 1941 still using 5 of the original 7 launchers which
had been allocated in November 1940 for operative experiments.95
In the months following the December meeting the artillery
went on training, occasionally using live ammunition, but then mostly
in range firing and only at a considerable distance from the western
border. When the Red Army started to call up reservists at the end
94. K.P. Kazakov, Artilleriya i Rakety, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968,
pp.69-74.
95. K.P. Kazakov, Vsegda 8 Pekotoi Vsegda s Tankami, p.11.
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of March and to move units from inland closer to the border they were
either not equipped with artillery in the first place or else ordered
to leave their heavy equipment behind while they went off the trains
and marched at night to their new locations.
In April training of artillery had intensified. Commander
courses were conducted on a large scale while whole artillery regiments
were pulled out of their locations and sent away inland for training.
Whether appreciated or not British warnings combined with Soviet
intelligence reports about heavy German concentration along the
borders to instill some urgency into military preparation. On 26th
April an order was issued to form 10 anti-tank artillery brigades,
five of which were formed in Kiev MD. They were to form part of RGK.
The bold line of theory which had prevailed over the opposition during
the December meeting, clearly substantiated by German success in
armoured warfare, won the day and commanders were ordered to train
their AT brigades and prepare them within a month. The soldiers
were put to a rigorous training programme - 8-10 hours a day and 2-3
hours night training. An attempt was made to select for these rather
specialist formations soldiers with a high standard of education and
some technical qualifications. These formidable formations could
not be operated by people of lesser qualifications. They were
completely mechanised and could produce a tremendous volume of fire.96
The concept behind these brigades was to create some counter to a
thrust of tanks mass formation which so far had overwhelmed the
defensive deployment of all the European armies. The brigade was a
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large, mobile and well equipped unit. With six out of its 12
Artillery Battalions (division) armed with AA guns, the brigade could
defend itself against air-raids as well as gainst tank attacks. 4
out of the AA Battalions were equipped with 85 mm. dual purpose guns.
Both the regular 76 mm. anti-tank gun and certainly the 85 ram. AA gun
could pierce any German tank which had been used by Germany until the
first half of 1941.
Navy
The navy emerged from the purges in a state of disarray. It
had several ships in hand and many others under construction, but due
to the lack of design experience and because of the small volume of
shipbuilding industry Soviet negotiators were pacing the corridors of
German, American and French (earlier on also Italian) ministries for
ship-building contracts, turrets and fire control systems. Although
they did not bring home brilliant contracts, they at least were im¬
pressed with trends in ship-construction of the traditional maritime
powers. Furthermore, they were supplied with designs blueprints by
tenderers.9' By the end of 1939 beginning of 1940 the Soviet Navy had
some ready made answers, to which it had not yet formulated the right
questions. The answers were imposed by a combination of political
instructions, assessment of construction currents in other navies and
estimates of tne capaoility of the existing Soviet units. Ine
questions - geograpnical, strategic, climatic and tactical - began to
take shape under the impact of experience in tne Far Fast, tne Finnish
97. Edward P. Von Der Forten, The German Navy In World War Two,
London, Pan Books Limited, 1972, p.24.
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War and the rudiments of the War for the Atlantic Ocean which had
just begun to rage.
The Russians, true to their philosophy of a long drawn out
confrontation of massive forces, did not tend to approach naval
operations in an adventurous way. Admittedly they paid tribute to
forays since 'foray is one of the most advantageous form of
activities'.98 The history of naval warfare knew many examples of
successful forays. Modern technology of which the Russians were
short in 1940-1941 but by no means ignorant, made daring blows at enemy
installations and convoys possible since 'contemporary fast surface
ships facilitated the conduct of scouting operations'." However,
For foray operations nowadays it is necessary
to use cruisers, destroyers, torpedo cutters
in coordination with reconnaissance planes and
bombers as well as submarines.100
Whereas the battleship still occupied prominant place in maritime
theory it was not assigned the role of the single hunter in Soviet
theoretical thinking. The Russians were impressed by the extensive
construction of mammoth ships in many foreign dockyards. In 1937
they believed that:
98. I have used Voprosy strategii and Voprosy taktiki as sources for
Soviet theories and Naval doctrine; see for instance Voprosy
strategii, p.729.
99. V.A. Belli, K.V. Penzin, Boevie deistviya v Atlantike i na
Sredizenmom more 1939-1945 gg, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967, pp.192-
i93. In analyzing the first two years of war (1939-1941) the
authors note the significance of the attack on convoys and
communication lines by superior gun fire of a big ship like the
Bismarck. However they emphasize the decisive role of air
force in naval operations. For direct reference see
strategii, p.729.
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.... in fact the theory that the battleship's
days have passed because of the development of
the submarines and aviation, was refuted.1"1
But lack of facilities, poor technology and insurmountable lists of
priorities taught them better. By 1940 the world was wiser after
almost a year of war at sea which was ended by the dramatic sinking
of Graf Spee and the battle of Narvik. The lessons of this period
dove-tailed with the most progressive part of Soviet Military and
naval erudition, the gist of which was co-ordination and co-operation.
Indeed these themes were prominent in Soviet military thinking.
Nowadays a single surface ship is used without co¬
ordination with other forces only under exceptional
conditions.
Even the heaviest ships are dependent .... on the
co-operation of lighter forces assigned to their
protection.102
Yet co-ordination within the unit is not enough, there need be:
Co-ordination between Navy and air force in
attacking enemy positions on the coast; and be¬
tween navy and coast artillery in defending a
coast.103
The main tasks of the navy were believed in 1939 to have been:
1. Destroy the enemy fleet in parts.
2. Struggle for sea communications, that is
defend its own military and commercial
routes and cut those of the enemy.




3. Struggle for the coasts, that is protect
its own coast from enemy invasion and
carry the war on to enemy territory at
sea.
4. Support the army flanks, having been put
out to sea, by helping the army offensive
and defence against enemy attack from the
sea.10lf
As for carrying the war on to enemy territory:
Operation against enemy bases is of great sig¬
nificance, when it is carried out systematically
in certain conditions creating for the enemy such
a situation that he may find staying in harbour
more dangerous than being out at sea.105
Notwithstanding theory the commanders of the navy at the end
of 1940, beginning of 1941 faced serious practical problems. True,
since 1933 they had had the rudiments of naval presence in the Arctic
Sea; indeed, since the Finnish War they had had a firm grip over the
Gulf of Finland while the White Sea canal facilitated movement from
the Baltic Sea northward; no doubt the Black Sea Fleet was growing
and the submarines of the Far Eastern Fleet had the Japanese worried.
Yet the problem had always been how to operate these four separate
fleets as an effective force for defence and if possible for offensive
operations.
On 30 December, 1937 a Separate Naval Commissariat was
104. Voprosy Strategii, p.725.. see also V.A. Belli, K.V. Penzin,
op.cit., pp.193-195.
105. Voprosy Strategii, p.728.
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established.106 P.A. Smirnov was nominated People's Commissar of
the VMF (VQENNO- MORSKOGO FLOTA) . But the main arbiter of Naval
affairs was the Main Naval Soviet (Clavnyi voennyi sovet voenno-
morskogo flota), whose president was Zhdanov.107 On 27 April, 1939
Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov replaced Smirnov as People's Commissar for the
Navy and Admiral I.S. Issakov was nominated Chief of Staff. Whether
this separation was necessary, or beneficial is an arguable point,
but it certainly created difficulties between the army and the navy.
Zhukov repeated 'For the sake of historical authenticity' (v tselyakh
istoricheskoi dostovernosti), that neither Timoshenko nor he were
invited to Stalin when naval questions were discussed.10® Later,
the navy issued its own orders concerning over-flying enemy planes.109
The main difference was that the navy orders were applicable only in
particular places whereas the same orders issued to the army were
generally applied.
106. Collective authorship, Boevoi put sovetskogo voenno-morskogo flota
Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967 Lfirst edition - 1964], p.582. I have
used this book for chronological data and for figures about the
stength of the fleets; see also J. Erickson, op.cit., p.472.
K>7. Ibid., p.476.
108. Zbukov, op.cit., pp.221-222.
109. N.G. Kuznetsov, Nakanune, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1966, p.314.
Kuznetsov who was at the time Cotnmissar of the Navy claimed that
on 3rd March, 1941 the Navy issued an order to fire on German
airplanes, but that after a meeting with Stalin and Beria this
order was changed and fighters were instructed to pursue and to
force German planes down; see also A.G. Golovko, Vmeste s Flotom,
Moscow, Voenizdat, 1960, pp.16-17. A.G. Golovko was at the
time commander of the Northern Fleet: see also, V. Achkasov,
'Krasnoznamennyi Baltiskii Flot Nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi
voiny', VIZ, No.10, 1970, pp.38,41.
After the beginning of the war in 1939 it became clear to the
Soviet leadership that an 'ocean going force' was but wishful thinking.
A steel-consuming investment like a navy centred round battleships was
incompatible with far reaching plans to expand the armoured forces, and
the artillery.**0 Second best was a defensive force based on sub¬
marines, destroyers, mine-sweepers, mine-layers and fast torpedo
boats. Indeed late in 1939 it was decided to suspend work on all
large units whether under construction or in blue-prints and to
concentrate on building smaller vessels. During 1940 the navy re¬
ceived 100 new boats, mainly torpedo boats, mine-sweepers and sub¬
marines. Under construction were 269 more vessels of all classes up
to the size of destroyers while the construction of bigger units slowed
down or stopped altogether.*** On several occasions hulls of big
ships already on the slip were cut and the steel used for the
construction of smaller units. However as the construction of ships
is a long process and the time from procurement to sea-worthiness, not
mentioning crew training, is between several months for the smallest
vessels up to three years for the larger, the navy planners could not
count in 1940 on many of these 269 boats. Nevertheless as far as
sheer numbers were concerned by 1941 the Soviet Union had a formidable
navy: 276 submarines - 76 in the Baltic Fleet (34 more under
construction); 45 in the Northern Fleet; 68 in the Black Sea Fleet
110. V. Yemel'yanov, '0 Vremeni, 0 Tovarishchakh, 0 Sebe. Zapiski
Inzhenera', Novyi Mir, No.2, February, 1967, pp.97-98. A memoir
of a man who took part in the discussions concerning the alloca¬
tion of steel during 1939-1940.
111. Jiirg Meister, The Soviet Navy, London, Macdonald, 1972, pp.8-13.
Data about Soviet ships and boats which were captured by the
Germans incompleted.
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(10 more under construction); 87 in the Far East Fleet (7 more under
construction).112 The oldest submarines were the D-(Dekabrist)
class, six of which were built in 1929. L-(Leninets) class followed
shortly afterwards. By 1941 there were about 100 SC class. In 1933
a small submarine M-(Malyutka) class was constructed. This class
designed for coastal waters was built in considerable numbers. The
S-class oceangoing submarines appeared in 1935 to be followed in 1936
by the K-class. In design and construction many of these boats could
compare with any others under the surface but they were lacking in
accustic and communication devices, therefore their co-ordination with
other boats at sea and with coast command was poor. Communication
between submarines and coast command was further hindered by inadequacy
of radar stations.113 Yet the most significant shortcoming was lack
of training of the crews; 'the navy commanders were not well prepared
112. Siegfried Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy, Annapolis, Maryland,
United States Naval Institute, 1970, pp.143-144. The data in
both Meister and Breyer's books should be checked against Soviet
Sources. For instance Boevoi Put Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo
Flota, p.288 quotes the figure 65 submarines in the Baltic Fleet;
47 in the Black Sea Fleet (p.368); 15 in the Northern Fleet;
see also p.167 for the number of submarines under construction
at the beginning of the war. Zhukov, op.cit., p.221, quotes
the figure 211 submarines for the whole Soviet Navy at the
beginning of the war. (Zhukov, op.cit., English Edition, p.185,
quotes the figure 218 submarines) Anfilov, op.cit., p.120, quotes
the figure 218, also, Kuznetsov, op.cit., p.300 quotes the
figure 218; also, N.P. V'yunenko, 'Sovetskoe Voenno-Morskoe
Iskusstvo Nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny', Morskoi Sbornik,
No.6, 1971, p.28, also quotes the figure 211 submarines.
113. V. Achkasov, 'Krasnoznamennyi Baltiskii Flot Nakanune Velikoi
Otechestvennoi voiny*, VIZ, No.10, 1970, p.33.
from ail operational and tactical point of view. ** Of surface ships
there were three battleships, all Czarist built - the 'Gangut' of the
Baltic Fleet launched 7 October 1911; the 'Marat' of the Baltic Fleet,
launched 9 September 1911; and the 'Parizhskaya Kommuna', of the
Black Sea Fleet, launched 29 June, 1911. Besides the battleships,
there were 1 heavy cruiser, 2 medium and 1 light cruiser in the Baltic
Fleet, and 3 medium and 3 light ones in the Black Sea Fleet.The
bulk of the ships were destroyers, torpedo and patrol boats. Apart
from sea-going navy there were 5 river flotillas which had already
played an important role in the Far East and during tense periods
between the Soviet Union and Rumania in 1939-1940. The composition
of the surface navy in the light of Russia's geographic and climatic
peculiarities ruled out turning the whole Navy into one mail fisted
fleet. As it was in 1941 each of the fleets found it hard to conduct
independent offensive warfare. Quality differences between the units
combined with inadequate air cover forced the navy to restrict its
range of activity.
114. V. Achkasov, 'Kra3noznamennyi Baltiskii Flot Nakanune Velikoi
Otechestvennoi voiny', VIZ, No.10, 1970, p.36, N.13. Only 25%
of all Submarine Brigade commanders had by 1941, a commanding
experience longer than two years. Among Submarine Division
commanders the percentage was somewhat higher, but almost none
of the commanders of surface ships had been in command more
than two years; see also, IVOV, 1963, Vol.1, p.450; also J.
Meister, op.cit., pp.19-20. Meister is of the opinion that the
purges destroyed the best part of the Naval command. He main¬
tains that in 1941 only junior officers had the skill necessary
for seamanship.
115. Boevoi Put Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo Flota, p.288, for figures
about the Baltic Fleet; p.367, for figures about the Black Sea
Fleet; see also, Achkasov, VIZ, No.10, 1970, p.34. The
figures in the text are quoted from J. Meister, op.cit., p.9.
Naval aviation proved to be one of the major stumbling blocks
on the way of naval development. The navy commanders were acutely
aware of new developments in naval aviation. If other evidence did
not suffice, there was British air raid on 11th November 1940 on
Taranto to emphasize the point.*16 The Soviet Navy traded offensive
capabilities for AA defence on board its ships. On several ships
torpedo tubes were withdrawn to be replaced by additional 20 and 37
mm. AA guns. As for aircraft the Navy had 2581 planes, 80% of which
were old types. Their breakdown T*as 45.3% fighters, 14% bombers;
9.7% torpedo-carriers; 25% reconnaissance 6% planes for special
duties.1*7 The Baltic Fleet Naval Air Force under the command of
Major-General V.V. Yermachenkov had 3 air brigades, one bomber and
two fighter, one independent bomber regiment and seven independent
squadrons. It still operated many of the MBR-2 of the 1936 vintage.
The new machines had just started to arrive. Noteworthy was the
scarcity of torpedo-carrier planes. The Black Sea Fleet operated 2
air brigades, one regiment and eleven squadrons. During the Khalkhin
Gol incident many of the best pilots were hurriedly taken away from
their units and transferred to the Far East. Their absence, although
temporary must have had repercussions on training of recruits. Naval
air force HQ in Tallin had direct wire communication only with 10th
116. For Soviet assessment of the significance of Air Force in Naval
operations see V.A. Belli, K.V. Penzin, op.cit., pp.193-195; see
also, N.P. V'yunenko, 'Sovetskoe Voenno-Morskoe iakusotva nakanune
Velikoi, Otechestvennoi voiny', Morskoi Sbornik, No.6, 1971, p.30.
117. Anfilov, op.cit., p.120; also Admiral V.F. Tributs,
'Krasnoznaroennyi Baltiskii Flot Letom 1941 goda', Voprosy istorii,
No.2, 1969, p.125. Tributs was commander of the Baltic Fleet
from May 1939 to 15th February, 1946: see also, unsigned
historical note, Mor3koi Sbornik, No.8, 1971, p.19 for the
breakdown in figures.
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bomber brigade and the units in Tallin itself. Communication with
other units was effected by what radio traffic there was or by
planes.118 Only 20.7% of the Naval Air Force (155 planes) was based
on western airfields; another 500 planes were strewn over airfields
so far removed from the sea they could not be of any use to the fleet.119
The tradition of the navy's command dated back to Imperial
Russia. Despite all the tribulations since the failure of the
'Mathematical Schools' of 1714 the Soviet Government did not have to
start from scratch after the revolution. Owing to the rise of the
general standard of education and to strict selection 98.2% of all
command staff of the navy since 1937 had finished secondary or higher
education.120 In July 1940 the Main Naval Soviet decided 'to make
use of the war experience of the Baltic and the North Fleets for
training of the VMF'.121 The same decree ordered the unification of
command, that is curbing the interference of commissars in strictly
military decisions. It also emphasized the need for co-ordination
between ships, air force, coast defence and land forces. Finally
the decree stipulated the need to raise the standard of commanders
and specialists, like artillery men.122 During December 1940 the
navy conducted its own High Command conference. Admiral I.S. Issakov
118. V. Achkasov, VIZ, No.10, 1970, p.35.
119. Yu.A. Panteleev, 'Na Dal'nikn Podstupakh k Leningradu',
Voyuet Baltika, Leninzdat, 1964, p.52.
120. Anfilov, op.cit., p.124; see also, Boevoi put sovetskogo
voenno-morskogo flota, pp.168-169.
121. IV0V, 1963, Vol.1, p.469.
122. Ibid., p.454.
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read the main report which was followed by general discussion.125
The Navy wa3 early in bracing itself for the year 1941.
Already on 13th December 1940 the Main Naval Soviet ordered a blackout
of all ships. It might have been an uneasy feeling of the Navy HQ
that ships are indecently vulnerable being flood-lit in ports; it
might also have been a response to systematic German aerial re¬
connaissance over naval facilities. Rear Admiral Panteleev, Chief of
Staff of the Baltic Fleet (KBF) submitted a report that the Germans
methodically reconnoitred Libau, Vindau, coastal fortifications, air¬
fields and ports.12t* On 15th February 1941, following the blackouts
of ships and the Navy's December meeting, the People's Commissar of
VMF promulgated a decree No.14750 instructing the navy to defend the
coast around each fleet and to parry enemy attack.125 Yet even as
late as June the main base of the Baltic Fleet in Tallin was fortified
enough to resist an attack only from the sea.126 On 26th February
Kuznetsov and Timoshenko signed a decree ordering all fleets to work
out a defence plan in co-ordination with the army.127 The problem
of co-ordination and training was apparently very much in the mind of
Navy commanders since on 4th March 1941 the Main Naval Soviet announced
yet again the need for training and preparing commanders. Yet the
123. Anfilov, op.cit., p.147.
124. Yu.A. Penteleev, op.jcit., p.49.
125. V. Achkasov, VIZ, No.10, 1970, p.38.
126. Admiral Tributs, Voprosy istorii, No.2, 1969, p.124.
127. Ibid., see also, Panteleev, op.cit., p.51. In the second half
of May there were further meetings in Riga and Libau between
Naval officers and the command of the Baltic MD to co-ordinate
activities.
co-ordination between the navy and the amy had not yet been sorted
out even at that date and on 19th June 1941 Tiraoslienko ordered
Leningrad, Baltic and Odessa MD's to work out within two days a plan
for co-ordination with the Baltic and the Black Sea Fleets, in
accordance with the Plan of Defence.128
Important as general training and plans might have been,
after the end of April the Kavy was seized with a sense of urgency.
From 30 April on the submarine S-4 was on patrol near the bases of
Libau. On 7 May 1941 the KBF was ordered to conduct the following
patrols from 8 May on - one destroyer or patrol boat at the mouth of
the Gulf of Finland, one submarine at the approach to Irben9k strait
and several units on the approaches to Tallin (main basis for KBF)
Libau and Khanko. To these measures the following ones were added
on 10 May, 1941 - reconnaissance planes went out every day after dawn
to patrol the area between Gotland and the Latvian coast and another
patrol went out before sunset to the mouth of the Finnish Gulf and
thence to the lighthouse of Svenska Biren. In that manner the whole
Baltic border was under observation. If the Russians could do very
little to prevent German movements in the Baltic Sea the Germans
could do very little that would escape notice. Indeed, responding
to Germany's heavy troop concentration the Soviet navy reacted by
reinforcing its patrols.129 On 14th June on top of the already
128. Anfilov, op.cit., p.182.
129. Ibid., p.50. It was indeed difficult to conceal the movements
of such ships as the Bismarck which sailed past Libau at the
beginning of April and the Hipper which conducted exercises in
the region of Memel with three destroyers and five submarines
in mid April. Kuznetsov, op.cit., p.316. The deteriorating
situation during May.
current patrols the Baltic Fleet added another ship to patrol the
strait of Irbensk at night, in the general direction of Riga. It
was either to be at anchor or to move around and to keep in touch
with patrolling submarines. On 16th June, Admiral Issakov ordered
the submarine 'Tshch-299' to the strait of Irbensk and the BTshch-
210 to the mouth of the Finnish Gulf. The distance between that
degree of preparedness and official alert was bridged on 19th June
1941 when the Naval Commissar ordered operational alert state 'number
2' as from 16.15 hours.130 At 17.00 hours on 21st June 1941 the
KBF command ordered all its units to be ready for immediate action.
The Black Sea Fleet and the North Sea Fleet were put on operational
alert 'number 2' on 20th June 1941.131
On 21 June, 22.00 hours, Admiral Tributs invited his staff
and told them that he had just been on the telephone and had been told
that he was to expect decisive development. Panteleeve alerted the
chiefs of the various sections in the Baltic Fleet HQ and they in
turn alerted the units. At 23.37 the Baltic Fleet was put in
operational state 'number 1'. At 24.00 the Commander of Libau was
ordered to send his submarines to Ust-Dvinsk and the Commander of Hango
was ordered to send all his submarines and torpedo boats to Poldiski.
At 4.00 the first German bombs were dropped over Tallin.132
130. Boevoi Put Sovetskogo Voenno-Horskogo Flota, p.583.
131. Pogranichnie Voiska, p.576; see also, Admiral Tributs, Voprosy
istorii, No.2, 1969, p.125; also Achkasov, VIZ, No.10, 1970,
p.38. A remark about the history of the procedure of opera¬
tional alert which was first worked out in the Pacific Fleet in
1937. p.41 a detailed account of the days 19-22nd June, 1941;
also Kuznetsov, op.cit., pp.324-336, an account of the days
19-22nd June as seen by the Commissar of the Navy.
132. Panteleev, op.cit., pp.54-56.
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The commander of the Northern Fleet since August, 1940 had
been Vice-Admiral A.G. Golovko: its main base was Polyarnyi, its
two other bases being Arkhangelsk (the White Sea Naval base) and the
Murmansk fortified area.133 The commander of the Baltic Fleet was
Vice-Admiral V.F. Tributs: two battleships were anchored in Tallin,
the main Baltic Naval base; other units were based in Ust-Dvinsk
Liepaya, Khanko and Poldiski. Kronshtadt was the main rear base.
Though, the biggest fleet in the Soviet Navy, it had only four tankers
and two water carriers. The Black Sea Fleet came under Vice-Admiral
F.S. Oktyabr'skii: its main base was Sevastopol, with some smaller
ones in Odessa, Ochakov, Novorossiisk, Nikolaev, Poti and Batum.13**
Apart from the four fleets there were several flotillas to
protect waterways and to support operations along rivers and lakes.
Rivers had always been essential for communications and commerce in
Imperial Russia and in the Soviet Union. With large investments of
money and manpower the waterways were enlarged and improved,
facilitating commerce at a time of peace and making them tactically,
if not strategically, important in war-time. The flotillas, named
after the rivers and the lakes in which they operated, were the
following: Flotilla of Amur, base - Khabarovsk, Commander (22 July,
1940 - 29 June, 1943) P.S. Abankin; Flotilla of the Danube, base at
the beginning of the war - Nikolaev, Commander (22 June - 16 September,
133. For the History of the Northern Fleet see I.A. Kozlov, V.S.
Shlomin, Severnyi Flot, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1966, p.79, see pp.
100-101 for the period 17th-22nd June, 1941. See Voprosy
istorii, No.5, 1970, p.40 for some information about Rear-
Admiral Golovko; see also B.A. Vainer, Severnyi Flot v Velikoi
Otechestvennoi Voiny, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1964, pp.7-10.
134. IV0V, 1960, Vol.1, p.472.
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1941) N.O. Abraraov;*35 Flotilla of the Ladoga, base - Slilisselburg,
Commander (25 June - 30 June, 1941) V.P. Baranovskii; Flotilla of
Pinsk, base - Finsk, Commander (22 June - 18 September, 1941)
D.D. Rogachev; Flotilla of the North Pacific, base - Soviet Hafboyr
Commander (22 June - 13 February, 1941) H.I. Arapov.136
Flotillas were organized on an ad hoc basis, formed when a
need arose and disbanded when they were no longer necessary. Over
the years since 1917 there had been flotillas in all the theatres of
war. The bulk of the force was river boats improvised to carry a
gun, sometimes a whole T--34 turret, armoured cutters and some smaller
vessels.
Air Force
In 1939 when the lessons of Spain had already been taken in,
the third Five Year Plan had been \7ell on its way and war in Europe
had already become a likelihood, the Soviet Air Force was still beset
by industrial and organizational problems of considerable complexity.
At the 18th Congress of the All Union Party in March, 1939, Commissar
of Defence K.Y. Voroshilov quoted the following figures:
135. I.I. Loktionov, Dunaiskaya Flotiliya v Velikoi Otechestvennoi
Voine, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1952, pp.11-13. The composition of
the Danube Flotilla.
136. The five flotillas in the text are those that were operative at
the beginning of the war. See Boevoi Put Sovetskogo Voenno-
Morskogo Flota, pp.572-578. For a descriptive account of
eight of the flotillas which took part in the Great Patriotic
War, see N.P. Vyunenko, R.N. Mordvinov, Voennie Flotilii v
Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1957.
The share of the heavy bomber force has risen
from 10.6% to 20.6%, or doubled; that of the
light bomber, attack and reconnaissance air¬
craft force has dropped from 50.2% to 26%,
that is down to one half of what it was; and
that of the fighter force has risen from 12.3%
to 30%, that is increased by a factor of 2.5.137
The policy of discarding light bombers and ground-support aircraft
was another indicator of the difficulty to assess the real needs of
modern warfare. On the basis of this policy the Soviet government
declined a German offer (which was made in October, 1939) to sell to
the Soviet Union the dive-bomber JU-87. At the time when speed was
so highly valued by military thinkers and designers the JU-87s were
considered by the Russians 'slow, outmoded couches'.138 It took
Soviet industry two years (1938-1940) to reorganize and to bring to
fruition their new ideas in design, constructions and serial production.
The task was almost insurmountable. At the end of the Spanish Civil
War Soviet planes were all outclassed by the new German models.
Messerschmit-110 with a range of 1400 km. and a bomb-load of 500-1700
kg., had a speed of 545 km/h, whereas the 1-16 Soviet fighter had a
speed of only 462 km/h which was even slower than the German bomber
JU-88 (465 km/h).139 Many of the difficulties which had been
revealed in 1938 did not find satisfactory solutions even in
137. A. Yakovlev, The Aim of A Life Time, Moscow, Progress Publishers,
1972, p.73.
138. Ibid., pp.81-82.
139. IVOV, 1960, Vol.1, p.453; see also, Collective authorship,
Sovetskie voenno-vozdu3hnie sily v Ve1ikoi Otechestvennoi voine
1941-1945 gg, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1961, p.9. The tactics and
armament of 1-16; also Colonel-General A. Yakovlev, ' Saraolety
tridtsatykh godov', Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, No.9, 1966, pp.75-
79.
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1940-41.11,0 However, among the view models which flew as proto-types
in 1940 there was also the 1L-2 which incorporated many of the
qualities of the rejected JU-87.11*1
In September, 1939, the Politburo decided 'to reconstruct
existing and build new aircraft factories'. Following this decision
nine new factories were built and nine old ones were reconstructed.
In the following year seven more factories were converted to aircraft
industry.11*2 This great effort was somewhat obstructed by sub¬
contractors who were late in producing several accessories. Although
the problem did not seem to delay the assembly of proto-type3 it
caused many troubles during the serial production stage. The Yak-1
for instance, was designed, assembled and had undergone flight tests
within about seven months (May-December, 1940) but it reached combat
140. V.B. Shavrov, Istoriya konstruktsii Savaoletov v SSSR do 1939 goda,
Moscow, Machinoatroenie, 1969, p.589. For difficulties in later
years see Lt.-General V. Pyshnov, 'Samolety Velikoi
Otechestvennoi voiny' Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, No.10, 1966; see
also, Heinz J. Nowarra and G.R. Duval (compiled and written),
Russian Civil and Military Aircraft 1884-1969, London, Fountain
Press, 1971, p.116. Wood in aircraft construction.
141. Colonel-General S. Il'yushin, 'Ily na Sluzhbe Rodiny',
Aviatsiya i koanonavtika, No.5, 1968, pp.6-11, (see p.8 for
difficulties in developing the airplane).
142. A. Yakovlev, op.cit., p.83; see also A.G. Fedorov, Aviatsiya v
bitve pod Moskvoi, Moscow, Nauka, 1971, p.12; also C.C. Grey,
Leonard Bridgman (compiled and edited) Jane's all the world
aircraft, London, Sampson Low, Marston i. Co. Ltd., 1940, p,145C.
Russian Military Aircraft Factories; see also, Ibid., 1941,
P.125C. Soviet institutions dealing with research development
and production of aircraft and engines; see also, Colonel I.
Sushik, 'Istochnik Uepobediinosti', Aviatsiya i kosvnonavtika,
No.7, 1963, p.4. The same decree of September 1939 which ordered
the expansion of aircraft industry instructed also the shift of
more engine factories to the east.
units in significant quantities only late in 1941. There were
difficulties in production policy as well. The PL-2 was originally
constructed as a high level bonber with pressurized cabin despite the
fact that the Soviet Union did not have at the time the necessary
facilities for pinpoint bombing. The policy had changed in 1939 and
with it the roles assigned to the PE-2. In its ultimate version it
was to be a dive-botaber, capable of strafing ground-support/attack
missions as well, but this new designation entailed the discarding of
the pressurized cabin, an additional air-brake to receover diving
speeds and new armament. All this was done at extremely high speed
but in the first half of 1941 only 462 PE-2's rolled off the assembly
lines.1*13 There have been various estimates of the production of
aircraft in the Soviet Union before the war. It was estimated at
400 per month in 1938, another source mentioned 5000 per annum in 1936
and 20,000 per annum in 1939.llft* A recent Soviet source claimed that
in the period from 1st January, 1939, to 22nd June, 1941 the WS
(Air Force) received 17,745 planes of which 3,719 were new models.11*5
About a thousand of the latter ones were built in 1939-1940 and over
143. P. Stefanovskii, 'V Pyatoin Okeane, Pervie Stratosfernyi'.
Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, No.3, 1967, pp.74-78. The history of
PE-2; see also, Profile, No.216, p.115; also, Novarra, Duval,
op.cit., pp.114-115.
144. D. Fedotoff-White, op,cit., p.355; see also, Jane's all the
world Aircraft, 1940, p.144c. Chief centres of aircraft pro¬
duction located round Moscow. Principal plant No.22 at Fili
employed 25.000 workers and was capable of producing 300-350
twin engine bombers per annum. Plant No.21 at Gorky was said
to have been able to run out five single scat fighters a day.
145. A.G. Fedorov, op.cit., p.12 the source mentioned is Arkhiv
Kinisterstva Oborony SSSR, p.35, OP.107559,D.13,LL158,162.
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2,600 in the first half of 1941. The new Soviet machines were Yak-1
which achieved a speed of 577 kmh. at a height of 5000 m. which it
could reach in 5 minutes 7 seconds, (the beginning of 1940) Lagg-3,
549 kmh., (1941) MIG-3, 620 kuh. (1941) 11-2, the armoured plane and
PE-2.146
The experience of the Spanish Civil War and Germany's progress
in armaments modernization stimulated similar measures in the Soviet
Union. No sooner was the aviation industry put on stable lines than
structural modifications were changing the air force. The fir3t
change was in the size of the units. The basic reorganization of
1938 divided the air regiments into eskadrili and subordinated them
in turn to air brigades. In 1940 the air regiments became sub-units
of air divisions.147 There was no separate air force command. Air
force units were either part of Armies in which case they were under
their command, or of Military Districts in which case they were under
VVS command of the district. About 55-60 per cent of the air force
was under the command of Armies and about 40-45 per cent under the
146. S. Tsepelyuk, 'Razvitie Talctiki Shturmovoi Aviatsii v Velikoi
Otechestvennoi Voine', VIZ, No.l, 1970, p.23; see also, N.E.
Nosovskii, 'Nadezhnyi Arsenal Vooruzheniya', Voprosy l3torii,
No.11, 1970, for aircraft armament; also, A. Minaev, 'Pervie
25 Let', Aviat3iya i kosmonavtika, No.12, 1964, p.18, the
development of MIG; also, Lt.-General V. Pyshnov, op.cit.,
Aviatsiya i kosxnonavtika, pp.16-20, for development of aircraft,
engines and armament; also, Colonel G. Zhirnykh, *Razvitie
Vooruzheniya Samoletov, Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, No.8, 1967,
pp.21-22. Comparative tables of Russian, German, U.S.A., U.K.
machine-guns and guns in 1940-41 and 1941-45.
147. Chief Marshal K. Vershinin, 'Voenno-Vozdushnie Sily' VIZ, No.9,
1967, p.32, see also Fedorov, op.cit., p.15, for the organization
of tactical units.
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command of districts.ll*8 Long-range bomber command (ADD) was a
separate force. As a result there was no significant air force
reserve left for the High Command to reinforce a sector in time of
need or to initiate large scale operations.
The air force had a considerable pool of man power to draw on.
Already at the beginning of 1937, 98.9 per cent of the command 3taff
of the air force had secondary or higher military education.1,49 In
1939 there were 32 special flying and technical aviation schools.
Voroshilov spoke of 'more than twenty thousand Communists and
Komsomols who were trained in the aviation schools'.150 According to
an article in Voennaya Mysl in 1939 '... all flyers were passed
through sanatoria, regardless of their state of health'; another
indication of the high priority given to the air force.151 Yet at the
beginning of 1941 the Soviet air force was still largely equipped with
the same planes which had been outclassed by Germany in the last stage
of the Spanish Civil War. The large scale air battles over Khalkhin
Gol revealed tactical weakness to which no remedy had yet been applied
148. Chief Marshal Vershinin, op.cit., VIZ, No.9, 1967, p.32, see also
Anfilov, op.cit., p.133, for demands of commanders to change
this state of affairs; also Zhukov, op.cit., p.213; see also
S.A. Krasovslcii, Zhizn v Aviatsii, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968, p.
112. Rrasovskii and other coramnders obviously believed that
they had been on the verge of becoming an independent command,
but the figures in the text do not bear out that notion.
149. Anfilov, op.cit., p.124.
150. Fedotoff-White, op.cit., p.373. Note, many of these 'schools'
were actually courses of three months to a year.
151. Ibid., p.422; see also, Soyetskie Voenno-Vozdushnie Sil, pp.
15-17, for the annual crop of Air Force personnel in 1940 and
the allocation of Air Force Staff.
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at the beginning of 1941.152 In line with the air force short¬
comings which had been voiced during the December "leeting a decree of
the Central Committee and the Government was promulgated 'On re¬
organisation of the Soviet Air Force'. It stipulated organisation
of 106 new regiments, that is about 20-25 new air divisions. The
decree also planned raising the standard of the pilots and preparing
them to master the new machines. Further reorganisation was ordered
in a decree of 10 April, 1941. Services and rear installations were
withdrawn from the combat units to form regional air bases and
battalion air field facilities. The regional air bases were to
become the rear service of Army's air force and front.153 Towards
the end of May only nineteen out of the 106 planned regiments were
formed but not yet fully equipped.15lf New machines arrived in the
air fields in great haste without armament and without radio sets, many
of them even without canopies and radio masts.155
Long before any of these improvements could take effect, the
new MIG-3 was still facing construction and producing difficulties,
though the Soviet government tried to cash in on its anticipated
performance. In April a German delegation was invited to visit a
152. Voprosy Taktiki, p.334; see, Colonel V. Yemelyanenko,
'Takticheskaya Vnezapnost', Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, No.7, 1966,
pp.31-36 for the tactical lessors learned in Spain, Khalkhin Gol
and Finland.
153. Zhukov, pp.217-219; see also, Chief Marshal K. Vershinin, op.cit.,
VIZ, No.9, 1967, p.34.
154. Zhukov, op._cit., p.218.
155. IVOV, I960, Vol.1, p.454; see also Nowarra and Duval, op.cit.,
p.117. According to this sources the YAK-l(IP) might have been
the first Soviet aircraft of its type to embody a radio
installation.
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Soviet aviation factory and air force installations near Moscow.
Its head Oberst Heinrich Ashenbrenner German air attache in Moscow,
who headed the delegation was duly impressed. The MIG-3 with all
its deficiencies, which remained unknown to the German delegation,
was nevertheless a major improvement on anything that the Germans had
known so far in the arsenal of the Soviet air force.156 Rumours
about a powerful new aircraft leaked out to the European press and
the strength of the air force was mentioned by Soviet diplomats.157
While the MIG-3 and the air force were featuring so prominently in
the diplomatic war of nerves, on the shop-floor and in the air the new
machines were coming across a complicated process of production and
introduction into service. The MIG-3 was the first plane of the new
vintage to arrive in combat units in quantity. After several accidents
in test flights it was rumoured to be a difficult plane to handle.158
Pyotr M. Stefanovslcii, one of the leading test pilots in the Soviet
Union was sent to a fighter division under the command of General
Osipenko. It was the first division to be fully equipped xrith MIG-3s,
but the pilots stuck to their old 1-153 and 1-16 and would not
convert to the new machines until Stefanovskii demonstrated the
capabilities of the MIG.159
156. Air Enthusiast, Vol.1, No.5, October, 1971, p.252; see also,
Colonel N. Kon'kov, 'Zapiski Aviakonstruktova' (review of
Yalcovlev's book Tsel Zhizn) Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, No.2, 1967,
p.84. In 1940 Soviet constructors and aircraft designers were
instructed to study German aircraft.
157. See above p.148.
158. Lt. General V. Pyshon, op.cit., Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, No.10,
pp.16-20. The combat qualities of MIG-3; see also, Colonel-
General A. Yakovlev, 'Konstruktor Samolet Vremya', Aviatsiya i
kosmonavtika, No.7, 1968, pp.12-16; see also, Nowarra, Duval,
op.cit., p.118.
159. Stefanovskii, Trista Neizvestnykh, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968, p.161.
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The expansion of the air force and the new borders of the
Soviet Union created a shortage of airfields, a problem which grew
in seriousness as troops were moving closer to the borders with
almost no air defence at all.160 The NICVD was partially in charge
of man power for large scale construction. When the tension along
the borders mounted a huge complex of airfields was being constructed
or reconstructed simultaneously along the western border. Many of
the airfields were rendered useless for the duration of the work and
civil aviation including German was diverted by instruction of the
Commissar for civil aviation to military airfields some distance from
the border.161 The problem of airfields cropped up in another context
at the end of May when top officials of the Aircraft Industry
Commissariat and high ranking commanders of the air force convened
in the Kremlin.162 They were invited to discuss the problems of
camouflage in the airfields. Not only were the planes packed in
neat rows along a brightly lit airfield but also no attempt was made
to camouflage buildings, control towers, runways, white tents in the
air force camps, indeed the planes themselves. During the conference
it was discovered that SB bombers were painted silver and fighters
in solid green from the waist upwards and blue from the waist downward.
160. Fedorov, o£.cit., p.15; see also, IVOV, 1963, Vol.1, p.476.
The NKVD which was in charge of construction works sent crowds
of workers to many border airfields at the same time so that by
22nd June 1941, many of these were out of use; see also Zhukov,
op.cit., p.219; also, Anfilov, op.cit., p.168; also L.M.
Sandalov, 'ha Brestsko-Bobruiskom Napravlenii v Pervie Dni
Otechestvennoi voiny', extract of Perezhitoe, p.181. The new
machines - YAK-1, 1L-2, PE-2 - started to arrive at 15th June,
into the airfields which were supposed to be ready in a month
and for the time being were half covered with concrete.
161. Meretskov, op.cit., p.204.
162. A. Yakovlev, op.cit., pp.128-130.
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Both bombers and fighters had glistening gloss paint all over.
Unfortunately there was no solution at hand; it took several days
before the right pairt was tested and a well camouflaged model produced
and approved. The results of the conference were translated into
action only in the middle of June when Meretskov inspected the
districts and personally saw to it that planes were dispersed in
operation airfields and camouflaged. Orders to camouflage reached
Military District commanders only on 19 June.163
However the major concern of the air force was pilots' lack
of experience. The main problem was co-ordination within units,
between units as well as between air and ground.16tf Up to 1st May,
1941, pilots had the opportunity to train for only 15.5 hours in the
Baltic MD, nine hours in the Western MD and four hours in Kiev MD.165
In Moscow MD 'only 15 per cent of the fighter pilots could fly at
night, the rest were trained for combat activity in day light only'.166
On the other hand 13th Bomber Division in Bobruisk airfield had so
many hours of night training that the pilots complained. One of
them said:
163. Anfilov, op.cit., p.182, Timoshenko 'special order' of 19th June
to camouflage the airfields; see also Yakovlev, op.cit., pp.
128-129; also, Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries, London,
Corgi Books, 1972, p.278; also, R. Jackson, The Red Falcons,
London, Tandem, 1970, p.79.
164. Sovetskie Voenno-Vozdushnie Sily, pp.20-21. The new Field
Service Regulations fPU-36] which was authorized in June 1941
dealt with air-ground co-ordination, as well as with co-ordination
between the Air-Force and the Navy.
165- HOY, 1963, Vol.1, p.476.
166. A.G. Fedorov, 'Na Vozdushnykh Podstupakh k Moskve', Voprosy
istorli, p.116. Fedorov claims that 18% of the pilots were
trained for night activities.
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My wife is asking for a divorce. For
weeks I have not even dropped in at home.167
In several units Radio transmitters and receivers were installed only
in flight commanders' planes and communication was effected by verey-
lights and wing signs.165 Against such odds it was hard to expect
a high degree of expertise in handling the new machines, let alone
precision in co-ordination. Intensive training made conversion from
old models to new ones even more painful than usual not only because
it was a complicated process demanding patience and time but also
because every pilot had in fact two machines, his old one which had
been kept for the duration of the conversion and the new one. Con¬
sequently command and control as well as maintenance were further
complicated. Yet training was the only solution.
In December 1940 Rychagov had outlined the planned development
of the Air Force in 1941. The new, promising prototypes had already
been tested, a trickle of new machines had found its way to combat
units forming the basis for a modern force. The reorganization of
combat units, logistics and rear services was also moving slowly ahead
leading some commanders to believe that the Air Force was on the verge
of becoming an independant branch like the Navy. Evidently there
were other forces which cut right across this process. Rychagov
did not stay around long enough to see the fruits of his efforts.
Just before the war he became another victim of the
167. F.F. Polinyn, Boavie Marsnruty, Moscow, VoenizUat, 1»72, p.80.
168. For a different account see Major-Geoeral fc. Luganskii, 'Na
Glubokikh Virazhakh', Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, No.10, 1963.
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'cult of the personality',169 a phrase that had so often suggested
that an individual had been shot. Rychagov was replaced by P.F.
Zhigarev. However, not only at the top were there troubles, further
down the line in the Leningrad MD there was a complete reshuffle of
Air Force Command. In August 1940 Lieutenant-General E.S. Ptukhin,
until then C-in-C Air Force Leningrad MD had become C-in-C Air Force
Kiev MD and was replaced by his Chief of Staff A.A. Novikov. At 20th
June 1941 Novikov was ordered by Timoshenko to report in Moscow. He
rushed back from an inspection tour" that the MD commanders had been
conducting around Murmansk and Kandalaksha. As soon as he arrived
back in Leningrad he phoned Timoshenko and was told by General Zlobin
that he had been assigned to the post of C-in-C Air Force of Kiev MD,
whereupon he handed his command over to General A.P. Nekrasov. How¬
ever when he asked about Ptukhin Zlobin reply was very curt to the
effect that Ptukhin's new assignment had not yet been decided.170
It was very likely that by that time Ptukhin's fate had already been
sealed. He became yet another victim of 'Kult Lichnosti'.171 Since
no official confirmation for Nekrasov's assignment came through from
Moscow and the tension along the Western borders grew by the hour
Novikov was ordered by General D.N. Nikishev COS Leningrad to resume
his old consnand. Popov, C-in-C Leningrad, was about to return from
Murmansk on the following day, and Zhdanov, the strong man of the
Military Council, was expected to come back from Sochi. Nikishev
169. Major-General S. Andreev, 'Pavel Rychagov', Aviatsiya i
kosmonavtika, No.3, 1963, pp.76-77.
170. A.A. Novikov, V Nebe Leningrada, Moscow, Nauka, 1970, p.39.
171. Lev Vasilevskii, 'Stranitsyi Geroicheskoi Biografii',
Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, No.9, 1963, p.84. date wentioft&j.
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was in command and Novikov had no option but to obey.172 This was
only one example of the growing chaos in the Air Force Command.
Under the reorganization following Timoshenko's appointment
to the post of Commissar for Defence in 1940, the Air Defence PVO had
become a Main Administration (Glavnie upravlenie) in the Commissariat
for Defence. Chief of PVO had been appointed Lieutenant-General D.T.
Kozlov,173 who was replaced in turn by Colonel-General G.M. Shtern.
The latter assumed his command on 19 March 1941, in the wake of the
reshuffling of the Soviet High Command after the December meeting.
However on 14 June 1941 Shtern was suddenly removed from his post and
was replaced by Colonel-General N.N. Voronov, a General already
heavily burdened with his duties as Deputy Conmander Artillery.174
Colonel-General Shtern's biography also ended in 1941, making him a
third victim within a very short time. The removal of a group of
high ranking officers suggested a potent though small-scale purge.
Indeed it was a blow aimed at the Air Force and its close affiliate
the PVO. However, the first three victims formed a group in more
ways than one.175 Not only were they all Air Force or Air Defence
172. A.A. Novikov, op.cit., p.44.
173. See also Anfilov, op.cit., p.121. Note also the close links
between the Air Force and the Air Defence; Collective authorship,
Voiska Protivo Vozdushnoi Oborony Strany, see also, Anfilov,
op.cit., p.121, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968.
174. Ibid.
175. On 22nd June, 1941 C-in-C Air Force of the Western Front I.I.
Kopets committed suicide. He was also a veteran of the Spanish
Civil War. On 25th June, 1941 T.F. Kutsevalov replaced A.P.
Ionov as C-in-C Air Force of NWF. In July, 1941 F.A. Astakhov
replaced Michugin as C-in-C Air Force SF. The last three were
replaced after the failure of the Soviet Air Force during the
first days of the war.
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commanders but they had all been Soviet advisers during the Civil War
in Spain. In the face of such perils the Air Force and its
coramanders could only find it difficult if not impossible to discharge
their duties.
Fixed Defences
After 1938 the fortifications along the borders of the Soviet
Union consisted primarily of several Fortified Areas (Ukrepleniaraioni-
UR - FA).176 In Leningrad MD - Karelia, Kingisepp and Pskov FA, in
Belo-Russia MD - Polotsk, Minsk and Mozirsk FA; in Kiev MD - Korosten,
Novgorod-Volinsky, Letichesk, Mogilev - Yampolsk, Kiev, Rebnitsk and
Tiraspol FA. In all these 13 Fortified Areas there were 3196 strong
points. They were manned by 25 machinegun battalions, altogether
18,000 men. During 1938-193S work started on the construction of a
further 8 Fortified Areas along the 'old borders': Ostrovsk, Sebezhsk,
Slutsk, Shepetovka, Isiaslavl, Staro-Konstantinovsk, Ostropol and
Kamenets-Podolsk FA, Pskov FA and Ostrovsk FA were united. But while
these FA were under construction the Soviet Union annexed several more
areas and pushed the border westward as a result of which work along
the old border x*as frozen and the defensive works, uncompleted, were
not manned. Following a decision taken in 1940 nine additional FA
were constructed and by the first half of 1941 they reached various
degrees of completion: Murmansk, Sortaval Keksholm, Viborg, Knanko,
176. A form of defence which had already been used during the Civil
War in Russia. See, A.M. Karbyshev, Izbranie L'auchnie Trudy,
Moscow, Voenizdat, 1962, pp.281-285. On the Eastern Front
there were about 25 Fortified Areas some of them stretching to
a depth of 100-150 Verst.
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Telshai, Kovel, Verkhne-Prut, and Nizhne-Prut. After the occupation
of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina preparations were made for the
construction of Dunai, Odessa and Chemovich FA.177 This was the
general outline of fortification to which modifications should have
been made according to the situation along the borders.
On 12th October, 1940, Major General A.F. Khrenov, Chief of
Main Military Engineering Direction presented the Chief of General
Staff (Meretskov) with a report on Fortified Areas (UR). According
to his report the Fortified Areas had two main drawbacks: no study
was made of the enemy forces which the Fortified Area might have to
engage; who, how and with what it would be necessary to fight in
the Fortified Areas. The whole idea of fortification and fortified
areas came under scrutiny during the December Meeting and the
January War Games. In essence they were not fully compatible with
Soviet ideas about the offensive spirit and about carrying the battle
on to enemy territory.178
Attempts to solve this seeming theoretical contradiction were
made by enlarging the depth of the Fortified Areas which provided for
strong armoured reserves at the depth of an attacked sector of the
front. These forces were to be held back until the opportune time
177. Marshal M.V. Zakharov, 'Stranitsy Istorii Sovetskikh
Vooruzhennykh Sil Nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny 1939-
1941', Voprosy istorii, No.5, 1970, p.31. See also,
Cberkommando Des Heeres, Denkschrift uber die Russische Landesbe-
festigung, Berlin, Gedruckht in Der Reichsdruckherei, 1942, pp.29,
p.59, plan of defence works in Minsk; p.64 plan of defence works
in Novgorod Volinsky.
178. However it is interesting to note that in the inter war period
thought was given not only to the material side of defence works
but also to the psychology of the soldiers who manned them.
See Karbyshev, op.cit., pp.288-289. For Khrenov's report see
Anfilov, op.cit., pp.152-163.
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when they would be forcibly committed to a counter-blow, destroying
enemy wedges. However their immediate purpose was to protect areas
of strategic importance, be they economic or military. Further
theoretical development was contributed by Sokolovsky, who attempted
to 'break' the rigidity of concrete and iron defence lines, by elastic
A/ea. if
tactical manoeuvres. Against the^'sacred soil' which the army was
not allowed to relinquish, he suggested that the ultimate aim of war
was to bleed the enemy white to destroy his morale, in short to win.
Inherent in this dispute was the old clash between a classical,
positional war of stages, aamely - mobilisation, concentration,
border skirmishes, major encounters, and a war of movement which en¬
gulfed the whole depth of the battle-field from the very beginning.
When after the December Meeting and the January War Games179
the Soviet Government realised that the Red Army would not be
prepared for modem warfare to the extent some people believed it
had been, they had to fall back on the fortified areas. The whole
idea of fortified defence lines and areas was to make it difficult
for an armoured enemy to advance on essential centres, or to occupy
significant strategic positions. During the January War Games,
Zhukov had demonstrated how weak the fortifications were in the Western
Military District and how a bold and unexpected blow might overwhelm
them. At the time his criticism of the FA both regarding their
location and their state was overruled by authority, but when he
became a GCS he tried to rectify the situation. His orders and the
directives of NKQ and the Supreme Military Council followed, at least
179. Anfilov, op.cit., p.130. In January 1941 the sappers conducted
a War Game directed by Colonel Proshlyakov.
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partially, Khrenov's comments. Notice was taken of the German
concentration and an attempt was made to fortify the areas accordingly.
On 20 February, 1941, there was a directive (NKO and Supreme Military
Council) to the effect that the depth of the Fortified Areas should
reach 30-50 km.; they should defend important operative directions or
regions; they should provide defence for troops in defence or on the
offensive: there should be anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles.180
Regarding the last item the directive specfied that the obstacles
(mines) on the main directions of a possible enemy advance should be
in position even in peace time whereas in secondary sectors they
were to be laid during the period of mobilisation. During February
and March, 1941, the Supreme Military Council met twice to discuss
the problem of the new Fortified Areas (along the new borders).
Kulik, Shaposhnikov and Zhdanov recommended that the artillery be
moved from the old to the new Fortified Areas. Zhukov and
Timoshehko's objections were overruled.181 On 18 March the Commissar
of Defence directed Kiev Military District to hasten the pace of
fortification. The growing German concentration along the Soviet
borders convinced the government to modify its stand regarding the
old Fortified Areas and some sectors were allowed to maintain their
former artillery strength. Altogether the budget for fortifications
in 1941 was 1.5 times more than in 1940 and it was divided between
the Baltic MD (50%) the Western MD (25%), Kiev liD (9%) and others
(16%). In April it was noted that students of Engineering schools
180. Anfilov, op.cit., p.163.
181. Timoshenko and Zhukov's recommendations were based on a tour
of inspection they have conducted in the Fortified Areas in
February 1941, see Zhukov, op.cit., p.214.
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were suddenly recruited.182 The whole country was divided into 138
construction zones under the supervision of UNS (Upravlenia nachalnika
stroitelstva), Headquarters of the Chief of Constructors. 38 con¬
struction battalions were formed; 25 independent construction
companies; 17 transport battalions; 160 engineers and sapper
battalions in the border districts; and 41 battalions of engineers
and sappers in other districts. During 1941 there were 17.820
volunteers for fortifications. 57.778 workers were occupied daily in
the Baltic Military District; 34.930 in Western Military District and
43.006 in Kiev Military District. (This breakdown does not follow
the budget allocations, but there might have been other factors.)
Much use was made of artillery lorries and tractors to the detriment of
their training programme. By May a fortified area was completed on
the right flank of Kiev Military District, but it was neither armed
nor manned.183
On 8 April the General Staff issued directives (No. YH/584815)
to the Western and Kiev Military District ordering the maintenance of
Slutsk, Sebezh, Sepetovka, Izyaslavl, Starokonstantinovska and
Ostropol as Fortified Areas in their present state. It gave further
instructions regarding training of commanding personnel, artillery,
type of fortification and the use to be made of the old reinforced-
concrete constructions built in 1938-1939 in Letichev,
182. Foreign Relations of the U.S.A., 1941 Vol.1, p.136. The report
specifies that these students were sent to the border to erect
defence works there.
183. Fedyuninskii, op.cit., p.6; see also Nekrich, op.cit., pp.83-
84; also, Grigorovich, op.cit., p.12. There was a gap of 25
km. in the fortifications in Sokal region between the left flank
of the 5th Army and the right flank of the 6th Army; see also,
Denkschrift Uber Die Russische Landesbefestigung, p.133. The
defence area of the 5th Army; also, Moskalenko, op.cit., Vol.1,
pp.21,28.
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Mogilev, Yampol, Novgorod-Volynsky, Minsk, Polotsk and Mozyr Fortified
Areas.101* On 14th April Zhukov was forced to issue a new order to
the same effect because very little was done after his former ones.
Too little was done concerning the second Khrenov aomment in his re¬
port of 12 October, 1940.185
The Fortified Areas could be manned by Field Troops, that is
forces other than the garrisons, only by direct command of the Military
District commander, which in turn could be issued only with specific
permission of the Commissar of Defence. Otherwise the border was
defended by the Frontier Troops which in peace time took orders from
the NICVD (the Ministry of the Interior headed then by L. Beria). In
emergencies the Frontier Troops of each sector were subordinated to
the nearest military Headquarters. Under such circumstances the
Frontier Troops, together with the Covering Army, [about a third of
each first line ArmyJ were supposed to withhold the first enemy on¬
slaught. It was not entirely clear what was an emergency and how to
ensure that every soldier and each unit was properly alerted, received
its orders and knew what to do. As was the case with full mobilis¬
ation, general alert and a test of all lines of communications, a
general emergency case along the borders had not been exercised.
There was more than a hint of possible trouble in the liaison between
the army and the Frontier Troops at all times and during the occupation
of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in particular.
By 1 June along the West MD there were 193 elements of armed
184. Zhukov, op.cit., p.229.
185. Ibid. , p.230.
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permanent fortifications (Vooruzhennikh dolgovreraennikh sooruzhenil )
909 field type installations (Sooruzhenia polevoftO typa) and 193
entrenched tanks (MS-1) with 45 mm. guns. Along 470 km., which was
the length of the West MD front, there were an average of three fire-
points to one kilometer. Yet, even these defensive works were in
poor shape, trenches half covered with sand and gun-ports cluttered
with soil. On 11 June Tirnoshenko ordered the cleaning and repair of
the fortifications by 15 July 1941. By the middle of June 1941 there
were still gaps of 10-80 km. in the fortified defence lines a factor
which to a large extent forfeited their original purpose.186
Signals
Communication was in poor shape indeed. The heritage of the
Imperial Army was pitiable. There were several telephone switch¬
boards of different makes and no radio installations worth mentioning.
To rectify this situation, several measures were taken by the Red Array
in 1921 and later. A High Military School of Signalling for command
staff of the Red Army (Vyshaya voennaya shkola svyazi komandnogo sostava
RKKA) and a High Electro-technical School within the Military Electro-
technical Academy of the Red Army and Navy, were established in 1921.
Medium rank commanders were sent to short courses in Leningrad and Kiev
signalling schools.107 However, radio and electronic industries
had not sufficiently developed in the Soviet Union, and
186. Anfilov, op.cit., pp.162-166.
187. Lt. General Kurochkin, 'V Obshchem Stroya Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh
Sil', VT7, No. 10, 1969, p.102; see also, Collective authorship,
Voennie Svyazisti v Dni Voiny i Mira, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968, p.96.
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consequently the use of radio iu military units vas not widespread.
It was almost non-existent when the Red Army invaded Finland. In
the later half of 1940 and the beginning of 1941, when German
reconnaissance planes became a serious problem, the army had to make
use of the Frontier Troops communication lines for aircraft warning
system VNOS (vozduahnoe nabludenie opoveshchnle i sviaz). Not only
at home was there a shortage of radio transmitter-receivers, but
Soviet agents in Europe who sensed the approaching crises were crying
out in vain for radio sets.188 The army, then, had to rely on
telephone or telegraph communication. In air formations, commanders
of units were equipped with radio sets, and the rest of the formation
had to follow the commander, keeping a visual link with him. After
1936 the aircraft of several long range bomber commander had been
fitted with the new RSI-4 sets. These new sets could transmit and
receive on all wave-bands and not less important, the UK.V radio station
could transmit and receive while in motion. But only a few of the new
sets had been produced before the war.189 On a national level the
system of signalling was inadequate for smooth, elastic traffic:
The system of line signalling at that time was
radial. According to this system Moscow and
most of the republics and regional centres had
radial line signals shooting out of their
lines. All the country's net works of lines
188. Gilles Perrault, The Red Orchestra, London, C. Nicholls and
Company Limited, 1970, p.41.
189. Voennie Svyazieti v Dri Voiny i Mira, p.96; see also IVQV,
1960, Vol.1, p.455.
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consisted of a series of supposedly autonomous,
and as a rule, not inter-connected system of
signals.190
For instance in Karelya the telephone and telegraph system was not
satisfactory. On the face of it there were many lines but their
plan and the scarcity of parallel lines made it difficult to use them
in the necessary places. Telegraph poles were too thin and could
not carry the weight of extra lines and the whole system had been
long overdue for general repair. Evidently there were troubles
also in underground cables connecting Leningrad and Moscow. The main
line was put into the frozen ground in the winter and the cold workers
eager to finish as quickly as possible did not take great care in
isolating the lines, and consequently there were occasionally crossed
lines. Institutionally the same lines were in use and under the
authority of the Commissariat of Signals (NKS - Narkomat svyazi),
the Commissariat of Communications (NKPS), the Frontier Troops and the
Air Defence (PVO), each with its specific technical demands and
switchboards. There was not one underground cable in all the Western
theatre of military activities (TVD - Teatr voennykh deistvii) while
stationary radio stations were not available to the army everywhere
and therefore had not been much in use.191 Due to the shortage in
radio transmitter-receivers, the technical deficiencies of the
existing ones and lack of experience, commanders on the whole
preferred the much easier and simpler telephone conversations, because
there was no need for code and complex decoding tables. However as a
190. I. Peresypkin, 'Svyaz General'nogo Shtaba', VIZ, No.4, 1971, p.21.
191. P.M. Kurochkin, Pozyvnie Fronta, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1969, pp.112-
113.
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result of the telephone system the volume of information through
these lines was limited, extending the time it took for an order to
go all the way from the centre to the individual soldier and
restricting the urgent information from the field to the centre. The
same applied in regard to the telegraph, which had been much in use by
the Red Army. The few short-wave 5AK radio sets which were installed
in commander tanks failed to function properly while the vehicles were
in motion, or else their range was considerably shortened.
Radio was first introduced into combat by the southern group
during the 'incident' at Khalkhin Gol. Headquarters operations of
the 57th Rifle Division, 5th and 11th Tank Divisions and 8th Armoured
Brigade were co-ordinated by radio, but radio signals not for direct
combat was widely used in August, 1939, in the Far East.192 Probable
correlation between effective command and control and effective signals
lines, if it was not completely lost, was certainly slow in taking
effect. During the operations in West Ukraine and Belo-Russia in
late 1940 failure in signals was one of the major halting factors.
Telephone and telegraph systems there could not stand up to the demands
of the Red Army.193
The December meeting which had been a theoretical breakthrough
in many respects dealt with some of the problems of signals too. At
the beginning of 1941 signals units were in the process of reorganis¬
ation, together with the mechanised formations:
192. Voennie svyazisti, p.107.
193. Ibid., p.109; see also, IVOV, 1960, Vol.1, p.455.
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Signals (independent regiments, battalions and
companies) consisted of signal units of Military
Districts and of Annies and also of separate
battalions and small units which were in the
process of reorganisation within the mechanised
combined arms tank divisions and battalions.194
A signalling unit of the front consisted of a signalling regiment;
radio battalion; 5-6 line battalions of signalling of front type;
3 companies of telegraph constructors; 3 companies of telegraph
operators, 3 companies of telephone constructors; radio battalion
for special duties; military pigeon-cote; field post set-up; depot
and service shop. A signalling unit of the Army consisted of a
signalling regiment of the Army; line battalion of signalling Army
type; 2 companies of telegraph constructors and operators; 4
companies of telephone constructors; depot and servicing shop;
field post set-up; and military pigeon-cote. Yet for lack of range,
Headquarters had to use radio-cars which revealed their location to
the enemy.155
On 8 March, 1941, the General Staff ordered the signalling
troops to make use of the Commissariat of Signalling (NKS) radio
stations for military purposes. 228 radio-stations were assigned
for use in case of war, but due to local difficulties the signalling
command did not comply.156 Following the March order the General
Staff, this time together v.'itli the NKS, decided to appoint commanders
of the signalling corps to communication centres of the NKS.157
1.94. IVOV, 1960, Vol.1, p.459.




42 Communication points were prepared along the Western border,
according to the Plan of Operation, 93 per cent of which were in the
West MD. However, in the spirit of the offensive war which would
carry the Red Array on to enemy territory it was not considered necessary
to build fortified signals points. Until after the beginning of the
war the General Staff signals system was dependent on the signals
net of NKS. The Commissariat lines were given to the General Staff
on lease. Since in peace time the volume of information was not
large there was no need to establish an alternative network.198
Two major problems had not been solved by the beginning of
June, 1941:
The problem of organisation of signals between
arms and services was not properly worked out.199
and actual mobilisation of the signals troops:
Most of the Army and Front signals units should
have been formed after mobilisation had been
announced.208
On 27 October, 1940, General N.I. Gapich, Chief of Signals, sent a
report to Timoshenko to the effect that the signals stock was
deteriorating for lack of replacement, complement and renovation.
According to this report it would have taken two to five years if not
more to complete the material currently in use and to build up a
198. Voennie svyazisti, p. 122.
199. Ibid., p.120.
200. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.88.
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reserve.201 On the eve of the war Lieutenant-General P.S. Klenov,
Chief of Staff Baltic MD, complained in a report to the General Staff
that the poor signals strongly suggested crisis (mogushchim vizvate
krizis) in command and control of troops.202 Nowhere was the whole
signals system put to the test. As tension along the borders mounted
it was considered imprudent to assemble all the commanders of a
district for command and control check-up for fear that they might all
be trapped in one place leaving the whole district without command.
Thus, the plan to conduct a signals war game in Odessa MD which was
to take place on 18 June was called off at the last minute.203
Apart from the Signals Forces (svyazisti voiska) proper there
were another two signals networks - the Frontier Troops one and the
PVO - Air Defence. In 1939 the PVO received RADAR sets of the Model
R-US-1 (RADIOLOKATSIYA) and later on the better type RUS-2.
201. Voennie svyazisti, p.124.
202. Ibid., p.120.
203. M.V. Zakharov, 'Stranitsy istorii sovetskikh vooruzhenniykh sil
nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1939-1941', Voprosy
istorii , No.5, 1970, p.45.
CHAPTER V
SURPRISE ATTACK
The war, which had not yet been officially declared or even
effectively opened, came in a variety of guises to many soldiers and
people. For Lieutenant Mazurenko it had started already on Friday
20 June at 18.5 hours when he exchanged fire with a German
reconnaissance bomber over Brest.1 For the Frontier Troops in the
Baltic IID near Taurage the war started on the night of 20-21st June
with two fire exchanges at 2.40 hours and at 3.15 hours. Tension in
the Gulf of Finland had started to intensify as early as the 16th of
Dune when German ships hastily left Baltic harbours and sailed for
home. It was not abated by the fact that the Ccrmano kept laying mines
in the water nor yet by the appearance of the battleship Bismarck and
the ostentatiously exercising Hipper. Along the River Bug the Germans
were busy building a tall hedge. The work lasted two days (19-21)
and when it ended a distinct din of tanks and motor-vehicles came over
the Bug from behind this hedge.2
Frontier Troops, and occasionally other units too, had already
been accustomed to the ebb and flow of tension since the end of April.
Such times were tedious, they meant less sleep, with the inevitable
result that the soldiers became ill-tempered and the commanders edgy.
By the end of June the commanders in Western MD had ceased to pay very
1. Pogranichnie Voiska SSSR 1939-1941, p.401 (Document 396, 20th
June, 1941).
2. Dolotov Ivan Ivanovich, 'Pod Znamenem Lenina', Geroicheskaya
Oborona, Sbornik vospominanii oh oborune Brestskoi kreposti v
iyune-iyule 1941 g., Minsk, Gosizdat BSSR, 1961, p.326. Note,
the attitude towards the battle of Brust has changed after
Stalin's death when official acknowledgement of the Red Army's
unpreparedness tore the 'Stalin version' to pieces.
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much attention to such alarms.3
For many Soviet chroniclers Saturday 21st June in Brest and
its vicinity impressed itself on their minds as a warm and sunny day.
Units were scattered all over the region in fire ranges, in tactical
courses and in training. In case of an emergency it could have taken
a day or a day and a half merely to assemble the units of the 4th
Army.1* On Saturday evening, still clear and warm, the soldiers in
the fortress and along the Bug were enjoying a well deserved free
evening after a long day. Many went to the cinema. 44th Rifle
Regiment enjoyed a film show in the open air, the 98th Independant
Anti-tank Artillery Division was preparing for a play and on Saturday
night there was a rehearsal. Other soldiers went to bed in antici¬
pation of the coming, lazy Sunday with its better food (Khoroshii budet
klev. Zavtra pokushem svezhei ryby). Sergeant I.P. Kotov's unit of Frontier
Troops was preparing a surprise for him: the following day, 22nd June,
1941, was his birthday. Frontier Troops unit No.90 took the evening
off complete with guitar and balalaikas.5 All the commanders in
Sokal had a day off in Lvov and when the duty officer in charge of the
Sokal bridge searched for explosives because he observed suspicious
3. For false alarms see Zhukov, op.cit., p.213; also P.V.
Sevastyanov, op.cit., p.9. Alarm on 14th June, 1941; also
V.V. Platonov, op.cit., p.15. 87th Rifle Division was put on
the alert for a fortnight at the end of April and then sent back
to camp; also Anfilov, op.cit., p.178. False alarm in May.
4. Major-General Popov - Commander of 28th Rifle Corps and Colonel
Lukin - COS 28th Rifle Corps 'Boevie deistviya chastie korpusa s
22.6.41 g po 1.7.41 g', Geroicheskaya Oborona, p.598. See the
whole report for the deployment and the activities of part of
the 4th Army on 21st June, 1941.
5. V.V. Platonov, Oni Pervymi Prinyali Udar, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1963,
p.17. Note the pastoral atmosphere of the description.
movement round the bridge he could not find the officer in charge of
explosives. He too had gone to Lvov, as it transpired.
However, towards evening strange things started happening.
There were flares all along the Baltic border. Information about
agents and saboteurs, combined with stories of deserters, created a
feeling of uneasiness which amounted to a real concern in border HQs
and brought apprehension to the chain of higher command. Yet it
seemed that for the whole day throughout the evening and most of the
night those commanders who were worried sent their reports along
routine channels - along which they wound their way from one echelon
of command to another. Meanwhile the soldiers were left alone in
fully-lit barracks and camps; families of Commanding personnel were
not evacuated. Some of the units which were alerted were sent to
advanced positions with little, or no ammunition.6 There were two
reasons for keeping ammunitions under lock and key. The fortress of
Brest was a huge place with women and children living in officers
messes and with a constant flow of units coming and going. The unit
on duty was given a ratio' of ammunition - 600 rounds for the regiment.
Rifles were duly stacked, as were machine-guns with their magazines
fitted - but not a single round in them. This was the usual routine
of an army in peace time. The second reason was political.
Commanders of units which were eventually alerted and sent out to the
perimeter of the fortress were ordered not to issue ammunition. Some
of them did not obey the order.7
6. D.I. Ivanovich, op.cit., Geroicheskaya oborona, pp.328-329; see
also, P.V. Sevastyanov, Heman-Volga-Dunai, Moscow, Voenizdat,
1961, p.10.
7. Ibid.; According to Sevastyanov the order not to issue ammunition
was pursued locally by the political side of the Military Council,
suggesting constant friction which grew under the pressure of events.
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Only towards evening did information from the border start
to activate the clumsy and creaking decision-making machinery in
Moscow. The General Staff had been busy all day sifting information
and sending out instructions within the boundaries allowed to it -
namely, not to stir any trouble close to the border and not to give
room for any provocation (whatever that might mean). It should be
noted that the meaning of 'provocation' had not been clearly and
openly defined. The Politburo, which was in session on the 21st June,
issued a decree forming the units of Odessa MD into an Army with an
operational command centre in Vinitsa but with real control left many
miles away in Moscow.8 Effectively two overall commanders were
appointed to Odessa MD - Eudenny and Zhukov.8 The decision seemed
to be both military and political in nature - probably with the hope
of keeping Rumr.nia out of a possible war.
While Saturday 21st June lingered on warm and peaceful on the
Soviet side of the border German comaando units were being briefed
about their targets. German agents,,volunteers or recruits from among
the local population of the Goviet Union (Volkischer Aktivisitengruppen)
were preparing their arm-bands by which they were to be recognised by
the advancing German array.10 The recruitment and training of these
8. Anfilov, op.cit., p.182. The fact that the Politburo issued such
a decree on Saturday 21st June suggests that it was either in
session or stood by in anticipation for at least 24 hours before
the German attack.
9. On 22nd June, 1941 after the beginning of the German attack I.V.
Tyulenev was nominated C-in-C South Front, see I.V. Tyulenev,
Cherez Tri Voiny, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1960, p.142.
10. Anlage Zu Abschnittsstab Ostpreussen, Ic/V.O. ABW. II Nr.574/41
G.K. Chefs. 13.6.41. In a document entitled Entwaffnung
Volkischer Aktivistengruppen, the German units that were to meet
the agents were instructed to disarm them.
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agents, not unbeknownst to the Soviet Frontier Troops,11 the selection
of meeting points, the compilation of data about military installations
and units were the fruit of long months of preparations by German
Intelligence services. The targets were selected with pinpointing
accuracy.12 Hie aim of the operations was to confuse, to stun, to
paralyse and to achieve control over the Soviet military 'nerve'
system. To that end enough signals networks were to be destroyed in
order to break the Soviet chain of command but by no means all of
them so as to enable the conquering array to make use of them as soon
as they could secure these networks in their hands.13
The Germans managed to obtain accurate and nearly complete
information about the Red Army in near proximity to the Western borders
of the Soviet Union. Furthermore they had good knowledge of post
offices, telephone and telegraph cables and radio stations. Special
11. V.V. Flatonov, op.cit., p.16 about capture of OUN (Ukrainian
Nationalist Organization) agents: see also Pogranichnie Voiska
SSSR 1939-1941, p.392 Document 378, 13th June, 19413," p7393
•Document 379, 14th June, 1941] pp.397-398 [Document 389, Not
before 16th June, 1941J; see also L.M. Sandalov, Na Brestsko-
bobruiskom napravlenii v pervie dni Otechestvennoi voiny. Off
print of a book - Perezhitoe, p.181. The same version appears
in L.M. Sandalov, Perezhitoe, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1966, pp.89-90.
Sandalov writes that there were spies and agents despite the
evacuation of the border population; see also L.M. Sandalov,
Na Moskovskom Napravlenii, Moscow, Nauka, 1970, p.73. After
19.00, 21st June two houses were set to fire on two sides of the
Elver Bug. At the time the Russians did not guess what it was
but looking back at it Sandalov concluded that these fires were
signals for agents.
12. Anlage Zu Abschnittsstab Ostpreussen, Ic/V.O. ABW.II Nr.574/41
G.K. Chefs, 3.6.41. Die Einsatzpunkte des Regiments 800.
13. Ibid.
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care was taken by the Germans to knock out these places and if
possible and where necessary to secure them in their hands. Many of
these operations demanded fine precision in timing and co-ordinating
three separate organizations - local agents, Army commando and
Regiment 800 of the Brandenburg Division.1'* Local agents had been
lying low inside the Soviet Union for some time before 21-22nd June
awaiting the attack, but the German commandos had to sneak in or to
parachute into the unknown and hostile, even though as yet unalarmed
enemy country. Many of them were at their assigned posts long before
dawn announcing their presence by wild shots at commanders' cars that
by now started to rush to their various command posts. At 2.00 hours
the electricity station in Brest was mysteriously blown up and many
telephone wires were cut.15 The German plan was beginning to take
lethal effect.
The concern of the Red Army observation posts along the border
was fed into official channels and thus began to have some effect in
Moscow towards Saturday evening (21st June). However, the defence
line along the border itself was not alerted. On the night 21-22nd
June Guderian was satisfied with the German preparation and
14. Anlage Zu Abschnittsstab Ostpreussen, Ic/V.O. ABW.II Nr.574/41
G.K. Chefs, 3.6.41 Die Einsatzpunkte des Regiments 800.
15. Ibid. Document entitled Nachtrag zum Vortragsvermerk vom 6.6.41
unter gleicher Mummer defines exactly the objectives of sabotage;
see also, L.M. Sandalov, off-print of Perezhitoe, p.183; also
P.V. Sevastyanov, op.cit., p.13; see also, M. Kudryavtsev,
'Topograficheskoe obespechenie voisk v Velikoi Otechestvennoi
voine', VIZ, No.12, 1970, p.22. The Topographic Centre was one
of the first targets to be bombed.
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... the Russians convinced roe that they knew
nothing of our intentions. We had observation
of the courtyard of Brest - Litovsk citadel and
could see them drilling by platoons to the music
of a military band.16
Guderian arrived at his command post south of Bohukaly, (9 miles
north-west of Brest) at 3.10 hours. The artillery barrage started
at 3.15 hours. 4th Company, Panzer Lehr Regiment was assembled at
22.00 hours to hear an order of the Fiihrer, An den So Ida ten der ost
front;
Soldiers of the Eastern Front!
Weighed down for many months by grave anxieties,
compelled to keep silent, I can at last speak
openly to you, my soldiers
About 160 Russian divisions are lined up along
the border. For weeks this frontier had been
violated continually - not only the frontier of
Germany but also that in the far north and in
Rumania.17
Long months of meticulous reconnaissance and arduous intelli¬
gence work facilitated path finding and target selection before dawn
22 June, 1941.18 The main problem was to maintain the element of
surprise in a very elaborate timetable which had to make allowances for
the various pace of different branches of the armed forces. Reconn¬
aissance flights had been conducted by squadrons attached to Army Groups and
16. Guderian, op.cit., p.153.
17. Paul Carell, hitler's War on Russia, p.4; see also Sevastyanov,
oj>.cit., pp.7-8. Interrogating a Latvian deserter Sevastyanov
asked him if German soldiers really believed that the Soviet
Union had had any intentions of attacking Germany.
18. Auszugwelse Abschrift (Anl. 6a zu la 200 g k. CH.) May, 1941.
Document entitled Besondere Anordnungen fur die Luftaufklarung.
Very detailed routes and targets for tactical and operational
reconnaissance.
Panzer Groups.10 Information collected by these squadrons was sifted
by the staff of ground forces, but when it came to programming the
attack the discrepancy of approach between the Air Force and the
ground forces became plain. Complications were not alleviated by
the fact that attacking so many targets simultaneously strained the
resources of the Luftwaffe to breaking point.20 Even after bringing
forward several formations from the Balkans the Germans were facing a
numerically formidable, qualitatively unknown enemy, with less air¬
craft per square kilometer than they had had on former campaigns.21
Eventually the element of surprise was to be retained by
sending in small number of bombers in high altitude which were to
attack before the first wave of bombers ana fighters came in. The
aim of the first wave was to confuse the enemy both as to the intention
of the raid and to its size. This wave had completed its mission and
was on its way out when the first main wave came in at 3.15 hours
corresponding to the beginning of the artillery barrage in the main
direction of the German attack.
Wliile the Germans were building up their forces and particularly
in the face of Russian counter measures the Wehrmacht was taking
precautions against an unexpected attack. Indeed steps taken under a
19. Auszugweise Abschrift (Anl. 6a zu la 200 g k. CH.) Hay, 1941,
op.cit., these particular air units were attached to Keeresgruppe
Kord. Pz. Or.4 und A,O.K. 18.
20. Field Harshal Kesselring, Hemoirs, London, William Kitnber, 1953,
pp.85-90.
21. U/Cdr Asher Lee, The German Air Force, London, Duckworth, 1946,
p.99. It is quite natural that Kesselring would claim that he was
short of men and aircraft, but that is also Asher Lee'3 opinion.
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plan of defence named Akte Berta helped to confuse the Soviet
intelligence.22 However defensive activities were very quickly
dropped and after the conference of 14th June Hitler ordered the
commanders of his Army Groups to go ahead with their attacking
preparation. While the Soviet Union - Government, General Staff and
Armed Forces - was clumsily and hopelessly slow in apprehending the
danger, large German formations were moving into their starting
points, carefully aiming at well defined targets, i.eticulously
preparing to capture bridges intact, to isolate and paralyse HQ and
signalling centres.23
Tracking and tracing the chronology of Soviet reaction to a
threat which grew by the hour on the night of 21st June presents some
formidable problems. Since there was no general recognition that a
war situation was in the making, then there was no coherent or
co-ordinated response. This platitude, mundane though it nay appear,
sums up the situation. Equally relevant is the fact that such Soviet
plans as did exist - a defensive response to a perceived threat and
preparedness for attack - did not correspond in any way to the
situation which was actually developing on the frontiers. Thus it is
22. A.0.K. 4la, Anlage zum K.T.B. Nr. (number unreadable), Akte Berta_,
V7 4.6-15.6.1941, Frames Nos. 704748-704753; see also,"
Pogranichnie Voiska SSR 1039-1041.
23. A.O.K. 4la, Anlage zum K.T.B. Nr. 7TJ.R, BUT, Vorbereitungen zum
Angriff, V. 1.5-17.6.41; Frames Nos. 704496-704504; also,
Aufmarschanweisung Barbarossa, vom 14.6.1941, dazu karten aus der
Vorbereitung zeit und dera Aufraarsch. Frames Nos. 704781-704800;
also Armee Oberkomraando 6 Ta/Storaarsch Az.6 Nr. 1517/41 g.k,
16.6.41 Frame No. 704561 entitled B. Organ!zatorische Magnahraen,
the attack orders for Panzergruppe T bzev. die Gen Kdos, to force
the river Bug.
only possible to reconstruct this situation in the form of individual
response to a variety of situations which produced only a series of
idiosyncratic decisions. At the same time the very size of the
Soviet Union prohibited simultaneous action on the side of the Germans
and inevitably on the Russian side too. The documentary evidence
also conveys a picture of sporadic events along a huge front in which
millions of people were involved. On the night of 21st June most of
the people were caught by surprise, which literally meant that they
did not know what was happening.
Signals failed the Red Army even before the first German shot
shattered the waiting. All day long (21 June) the alarming intelli¬
gence reports from the borders evoked no decisions and no new orders
in the Kremlin.2lf between eight and nine o'clock on the evening of
21 June, Timoshenko and Zhukov prepared a draft of an order to the
troops and brought it to Stalin. De jure he was not the commander-
in-chief of the armed forces, nor was Timoshenko; dc facto Stalin
did not address the troops directly, and Timoshenko could not do
that either without at least Stalin's verbal approval. At 21.00
hours, Stalin refused to approve the Timoshenko-Zhukov draft.25
24. Ror'ba za Sovictskviv Pribaltiku, p.37. Reports of flares along
the borders. Since 17 June the Germans had used captive
balloons. According to an intelligence report General Von
Lengwitz in a speech he made to the 12 Army Corps bad said: "...
you are the first to cross the border in our war against Russia';
see also, Nekrich, op.cit., pp.149-154; also, Anfilov, op.cit.,
p.184; see also Sandalov, Perezhitoe, p.90; also Zhukov, op.cit.
pp.251-252. Tliis sequence is not convincing. It is not clear
why Stalin authorized Order h'o.l on the basis of one report in
which he did not entirely believe. For a different account of
Stalin's reaction on Saturday 21st June, morning, see I.V.
Tyulencv, op.cit., p.140; see also, A. Shiranskii, M. Rolokhov,
'Za vysokii ideinyi uroven voenno-nemuarnoi literatury', VIZ, No.7
1967, p.87. Two thirds of PUP IIoscow consisted of YAK-1, MIG-3
and LAGG—3.
25. Zhukov, op.cit., p.252.
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Reports from the borders disclosed German deserters' stories, all
pointing to an imminent German attack. Between 21.00 hours and
22.00 hours, while the Timoshenlco-Zhukov draft waa being watered down,
Zhukov advised MDs commanders of chiefs or staff to stand by for an
important message.
Zakharov, Chief of Staff, Odessa MD, was called to the bodo
(telegraph) at 22.00 hours, whereupon he was ordered by his conmander,
Colonel-General Ya.T. Cherevichenko (C-in-C Odessa MD), to stand by
the telegraph for an important message from Moscow. Zakharov was
also told that Cherevichenko himself would come to his HQ in Tiraspol
on the 9.00 p.m. train the next day (22 June). To make absolutely
sure that the message, when it came, would be received without a
hitch, Cherevichenko inquired whether Zakharov knew how to decode
telegraphic messages. Satisfied on this point, Cherevichenko left
the matter with his Chief of Staff. Upon receiving this order,
Major-General Zakharov alerted his chief of coding department and
then personally asked the officer on duty in the General Staff in
Moscow when he could expect the 'most important message', but the
officer on duty had not been informed. At 23.00 hours,26 Zakharov
(using the telegraph CT-35) alerted Major-General D.G. Yegorov,
Commander of the 14th Rifle Corps; Major-General I.F. Dashichev,
26. L.M. Sandalov, Perezhitoe, p.90. At approximately the same hour
Korobkov, Commander of 4th Army and Sandalov his COS had a
telephone call from Klimovskii instructing them to assemble all
the Army's Commanders in HQ. Compare Korobkov's behaviour in
the Opera to that of Pavlov in the theatre: Nekrich, op.cit.,
pp.151-152; see also I.V. Boldin, Stranitsy Zhizni, Moscow,
Voenizdat, 1961, p.81. The conversation between Pavlov and
Colonel S.V. Blokhin his intelligence officer in the theatre on
the night of Saturday, 21st June.
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Commander of the 35th Rifle Corps; Colonel M.D. Gretsov, Chief of
Staff, 2nd Cavalry Corps (its commander, Major-General P.A. Belov was
on holiday in the district rest house - sanatorium - in Odessa); and
Major-General Malinovskii, Commander of the 48th Rifle Corps
(communication with him was by Morse telegraph). Whatever the
political considerations delaying the Moscow message, Major-General
Zakharov guessed its possible contents. He ordered his commanders to
put staffs and troops on the alert, to move their units out of
populated areas, to order units of the Covering Army to occupy their
regions, and to establish contact with Frontier Troops' units.
Zakharov, taking emergency measures on his own initiative, managed to
alert 7 rifle, 2 cavalry, 2 tank and motorized divisions, and 2
fortified areas. Major-General Michugin the MD Air Force Commander
who was ordered to disperse his airplanes in operative airfields before
dawn argued that they might be damaged in the process. However,
having been given a written order, he complied.
At exactly 2.00 a.m., 22nd June, the officer on duty in the
General Staff cabled:
The G.S. officer on duty speaking,
(U aparata otvetsvennyi dez'nurnyi Genshtaba)
receive telegram of utmost importance and
immediately forward it to the Military Soviet.27
The telegram, signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov read as follows:
27. M.V. Zakharov, op.cit., Voprosy istorii, No.5, 1970, p.46, but
see the whole article for an account of the Soviet Union and
particularly the Southern border on the eve of the war; see
also, Anfilov, Nachalo Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, p.48.
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To Commanders of Frontier Military Districts
1. In the course of 22 - 23.6.41 a surprise attack by the Germans
is possible on the fronts of Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western
Special, Kiev Special and Odessa Military Districts. A German
attack may begin with provocative actions.
2. The assignments for our forces - not to give way to provocative
actions of any kind which might produce major complications.
At the same time troop3 of the Leningrad, Baltic Special,
Western Special, Kiev Special and Odessa Military Districts are
to be at full combat readiness to meet a surprise attack by the
Germans or their allies.
3. I thereby order:
a. During the night of 22.6.41 secretly to man the fire points
of the fortified districts (URs) on the state frontier;
b. Before dawn 22.6.41 to disperse on field aerodromes all
aircraft including Red Army support aviation, and thoroughly
camouflage them.
c. All units to be put at combat readiness. The troops should
disperse and coroouflage.
d. Anti-aircraft defence is to be put in combat readiness with¬
out supplementary mobilized personnel. All measures should
be prepared to black out cities and installations.
e. No other measures are to be taken vrithout special author¬
ization.28
28. This text is based on Anfilov, op.cit., p.186 and Zhukov, op.cit.,
pp.252-253, which are identical. However the directive must
have been much longer judging by the time of transmition. It is
improbable that all signals lines were cut or broken at that early
hour, although it is quite possible that there were disruptions
after 2.00 hours.
Order No.l was entitled '0 razvertyvanii voisk s sootvestvii s
planom prikritiya mobilizatsii i strategieheokogo sosredotocheniya'.
See J. Erickson, 'The Soviet response to surprise attack: Three
Directives, 22nd June, 1941; Reprinted from Soviet Studies, a
quarterly journal on the USSR and Eastern Europe, Vol.XXIII, No.4,
April, 1972, p.533.
Colonel Bagrarayan, Chief of Operations, Kiev MD, was on his way to
the new HQ in Ternopol. He had been driven in a motor car, leading
a long column of 'soft* vehicles which kept breaking down throughout
the night of 21-22 June. He was extremely worried lest he fail to
reach his destination by dawn of 22 June.29 In Ternopol, General
Dobikin, Chief of Signals, Kiev MD, had managed to establish contact
between Ternopol, Moscow and the District Armies. It was quite an
achievement, considering that the order to move Kiev MD's HQ to
Ternopol had only been given on 19 June. Dobikin had only a fraction
of his command operational. On the night of 21-22 June he had found
that instead of the 4 Line Battalions of the Front, 8-10 Telegraph-
Constructing, Telegraph Operating companies and 5-6 Field and Pole
Wire Line construction and operating companies which he should have
had according to the plan of mobilisation [MP-41] he had only one
signals regiment.30 He based his signals network - telephone,
telegraph and radio - on those of the NKS (Narkom svyazi). At 24.25
hours, the telegraph in Ternopol sprang to life. It was the beginning
of a long dispatch from Moscow of 'the utmost importance'.
Tiie Commander of Western MD, was not in his HQ, nor was his
Chief of Staff.31 The Chief of Signals, General A.T. Grigorev, was
29. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.85.
30. Voennie svyazisti, pp.128-129.
31. Nekrich, op.cit., pp.151-152; see also Zhukov, op.cit., p.255.
Zhukov writes that he spoke on the same night with Kuznetsov -
Commander of Baltic MD, Pavlov - Commander of Western MD, Kirponos
- Commander of Kiev MD, and their COS but he does not disclose
when he spoke to them, nor does he mention speaking to
Cherevichenko - Commander of Odessa MD and Popov - Commander of
Leningrad MD. For their whereabouts see pp.204, Ch.IV, 230, Ibid;
also B.V. Bychevskii, Gorod Front, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1963, p.7.
According to Bychevskii Popov returned from Murmansk only on the
23rd June.
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200 km. away from the Western MD's HQ, in Minsk. Grigorev's signals
centre was in Volkovysk, not far from the border where he had
elements of the 36th Independent Signals Regimentk equipment, but
hardly any operative units.32 Lieutenant-General Popov, too, was not
at his command post in Leningrad, when the Timoshenko-Zhukov Directive
started to coine through.
While Stalin was pondering over the draft of the directive,
more intelligence reports were flowing in from the borders. The
deserters' reports, streaming in as their interrogation progressed,
were alarming. The German soldiers could name their units, as well
as the time and nature of the attack which their units were ordered to
carry out. All their stories dovetailed - could they then all be
provocateurs? Each one mentioned the same night and the same hour for
the beginning of the attack.33 If it was deception, it was an
32. Voennie svyazisti, p.130.
33. Bor'ba za Sovietskviv Pribaltlku, p.37. On 20.6.41 Unit 107 of
the Frontier Troops interrogated a German deserter - a Private
from 58 Regiment, 6 Infantry Division which had arrived from Paris
and was told that war against the USSR would start in 8-10 days.
Zhukov, op.cit., p.254. On 21.6.41 Kiev MI) reported a German
deserter - a Sergeant Major. V.V. Platonov, op.cit., p.19. At
midnight Kiev MD reported another deserter from 222 Infantry
Regiment, 74 Infantry Division. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.91. 5
Army reported a deserter - a Feldfebl who disclosed that the attack
would start at 4.00.
N.A. Antipenkn, Na Glavnom Napravlenii, Moscow, 'Nauka', 1971, p.53.
Frontier Troops HQ reported a deserter - a Private who had said that
the 'attack' would start at 4.00. K. Fokossovsky, Soldatski Dolg,
Voenizdat, 1972, p.9. A report of a deserter - a £ole serving in
the German Army who had stated that the Germans were preparing to
attack on 22nd June.
Pogranichiye Voiska SSSR 1939-1941, p.404. [Document No.401 dated
not before 21st June 1941.X Report of Efreitor Liskow Alfred
Helmanovich of 222 Sapper Regiment who had disclosed that his unit
was to force the Bug after an artillery barrage during the night
2l8t-22nd June.
ingenious plan exercised with great precision. Little wonder that it
took so long to authorize the directive, which, when it was eventually
issued at 24.25 hours, bore the traces of the confrontation which had
been part of the process of drafting the document in its final form.
It took an hour and thirty-five minutes before it was received in full
in Tiraspol. In Ternopol, it was received in full only at 2.30 a.m.,
and in Minsk only at 3.00 a.m. From MDs' HQs, the Moscow dispatch
was transmitted on to the Armies HQs, thence down along the line to
the units on the first line of defence.34 Yet by 3.15, the first
reports of enemy fire and air raids on Ochakov and Sevastopol started
to reach local HQ. Many of the first enemy activities were directed
precisely at the lines of communication which at this very moment were
carrying the alert signal to the troops on the border; meanwhile in
HWs, the signal 'Groza' was received - i.e. commanders started to tear
at their 'red packages' which contained instructions relating to the
contingency of war - while soldiers in advanced positions had already
been engaged by enemy fire.35
Three and a half hours elapsed between the time Timoshenko,
Zhukov and Vatutin felt that the data they had received from the borders
34. Sandalov, op.cit., p.92. 4th Army HQ in Kobrin received Order
No.l at 3.30. All telephone and telegraph lines of the HQ were
cut at about 2.00 and repaired after about an hour; see also
Boldin, op.cit., p.86. 3rd and 4th Amies managed to decode only
part of the message before the beginning of the German attack,
while 10th Army received it only after the beginning of the attack.
35. Anfilov, op.cit., p.197; see also Sandalov, Perezhitoe, p.98.
Until 3.30 hours, 22nd June 17 out of 20 posts of Frontier Troops
had nothing to report, while two others Souta of Brest reported
noise of tanks approaching the river Bug and one reported a
deserter; also Boldin, op.cit., p.36. According to Boldin Order
No.l included also an instruction to open the Red Envelopes.
justified calling the alarm, and the time that they were ultimately
authorized to send the directive. It took another two hours and
thirty-five minutes from the beginning of dispatch until it was
received, decoded and comprehended in all MDs. Further down the line,
in the 9th Mechanized Corps of the 5th Ariay, Rokossovsky received the
message on the telephone at 7.00 a.m.36 Ee was ordered by the
Deputy Chief of Operations, 5th Army, to open the top secret 'red
package'. Rokossovsky was uncertain as to the authenticity of the
message. According to regulations, he could open the 'red package'
only on direct orders from the Chairman of Sovnarkom or from the
Commissar of Defence. He decided to verify the message both locally
and in Moscow and meanwhile called for his Chief of Staff, his Political
Deputy and his Chief of Special Section in order to prepare for any
crucial decisions. However, it was already too late for such an
extensive process of verification. While Rokossovsky was discussing
the situation with hi3 senior commanders, all of whom felt that the
telephone message from the 5th Array had been too unreliable to act
upon, the officer on duty informed him that communication had been
disrupted and that he could not get in touch with either Moscow, the
district command in Kiev, or the 5th Army command in Lutsk.37
Although the Germans concentrated their efforts on eliminating
communications between HQ and the troops, that is between commanders
and soldiers, in order to isolate the units by disrupting the chain of
36. Bychevskii, op.cit., p.6, claims to have received Order bo.1 only
at 8.00 hours.
37. K.K. Rokossovsky, Soldatskii Dolg, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1972, p.10.
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command, some information had filtered through.3® Cerman air-raids
and subversion achieved a chaotic confusion in the flow of information
from the centre to the front and back again. Some commanders knew
what some of their soldiers were doing, certaiix units maintained in¬
cessantly interrupted communication with some other units, but no-one
had either a complete or a true description of the situation along
the whole front.
In Moscow, the mood in which the first directive of 24.25
hours had been formulated prevailed (namely, cautiously preparing for
defence while trying not to precipitate any attack) until well into
the following morning. Stalin was shaken when he was first told
about the German attack. Significantly his immediate reaction was
political - diplomatic in nature and not military.39 For some time,
between the first reports of large scale German air-raids which
reached Moscow at about 4.00 a.m. and the official declaration of war
handed by Schulenburg to Molotov at 5.30 a.m.,90 Stalin and the Soviet
leadership could still maintain the crumbling hope that it had all
been a large scale provocation, although the logic of this argument
led also to the conclusion that Germany xjanted war. But even after
realizing that this was war, there was little Stalin could do.
38. On occasions those lines which were not cut were used by local
agents to further confuse Soviet commanders, see for instance
Fedyuninskii, op.cit., p.18. A false emergency call from a
village SOVET.
39. Zhukov, op.cit., p.256.
40. NSR, p.347. The text of the German Declaration of War sent from
Berlin by radio on 21st June, 1941. It was signed by Ribbentrop
and addressed to Schulenburg who was instructed to hand it over
to Molotov.
On the night of 21-22 June 1941, Stalin was the General
Secretary of the Communist Party, the Chairman of the Council of
Commissars, but not the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. He had
neither the staff nor the facilities to proceed as head of state and
as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.1*1 Moreover, the initial
German success in disrupting so many signals lines deprived Stalin,
Timoshenko and Zhukov of first-hand coherent information from the
battle field. They knew that only a relatively small percentage of
the Red Army could have been committed during the first hours of
battle. They also knew by noon, 22 June, that fighting had broken
out in many places along the Western borders. There was some
comfort in this information. If Stalin had ever suspected that the
Red Army would not fight, he could sigh with relief - the worst had
not happened. Although the scarcity of troops along the borders and
the way they were deployed were the result of a chain of blunders, on
the morning of 22 June 1941, it seemed that the bulk of the E.ed Army
was still intact and the situation, as looked at from Moscow, did not
seem desparate. With no other information as yet about the size and
the direction of the German attack Stalin, Timoshenko and Zhukov's
assessments were based on intelligence reports which had been collated
on the eve of the war. The gist of this information was that Germany
would be able to use only 50 per cent of its forces against the Soviet
Union if war was to break out, while keeping the other 50 per cent in
41. S.M. Shtemenko, Generalnyi shtab v gody voiny, Voenizdat, 1968,
pp.30-31; see also, I.V. Tyulenev, Cherez Tri Voiny, Moscow,
Voenizdat, 1960, p.142. Already after the beginning of the
German attack Tyulenev was asked by Voroshilov where the command
post of the High Command was. He replied that he had never been
asked to prepare such a post and offered his own command post at
Moscow MD's HQ which also served the PVO.
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Vie stern Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean.1'2
In the field, even the corananders who guessed what had
happened were very cautious in assessing their own situation. Those
who by 4.00 a.m. had already been pressed hard did not have time to
think about their neighbours, while desparately fighting for their
lives.
Very early in the morning, 3rd Army Commander Lieutenant-General
V.I. Kuznetsov made an accurate guess at the pattern of the German
attack when he reported to Minsk, HQ of the West Front:
At 4.00, 22.6.41, the enemy crossed the border
in a sector stretching from Sopotskin to
Avgustov, bombed Grodno, including the Army HQ.
All wire contact with units is broken, we
switched to radio, two radio stations have been
destroyed.113
At about 8.30 a.m., Kuznetsov managed to report again to the effect
that:
At 7.15, 16 airplanes bombed Grodno from a height
of 1000 m. There are fires in Grodno .... Wire
communication is broken and until 8.00 hours no
radio communication was established. Signals
messengers have been sent out to the units.lflf
llajor-Ceneral A.A. Korobkov reported to HQ that.
42. Zhurov, op.cit., p.227; see also I.V. Tyulenev Cherez Tri Voiny,
Moscow, Voenizdat, 1960, p.141. Conversation between Timoshenko
and Tyulenev on the evening of Saturday 21st June.
43. Anfilov, op.cit., p.221; see also Boldin, op.cit., p.84.
44. Ibid.
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At 4.15, 22.6.41, the enemy started to fire
at the fortress of Brest ... There was no
information about the 49th Rifle Division.1*5
General of the Army D.G. Pavlov was hardly in a position to help
his harassed commanders. Not only was he himself lost amidst the
broken pieces of information which trickled in, but he also lacked the
means to assemble his signals system which had fallen asunder. His
Chief of Signals, General A.T. Grigorev, who had originally been
ordered to proceed to Volkovysk where the field command and a small
signals centre trere meant to be established, was now ordered to come
back to Minsk as Volkovysk was under immediate threat of occupation.
By the time Grigorev arrived in Volkovysk with his signals equipment
and what few signallers he had before full mobilization (all under
German air-raids), he had to go all the way back to Minsk. Having
thus rushed 400 km. to Volkovysk and back, he set out to establish
communication with HQ and with units that had now been in the thick
of battle for hours. Not raucu better was the lot of Colonel l.F.
Akhremenko, Chief of Signals 13th Army. He was on his way, with the
675th Independent Battalion of Signals, to Novogrudok. While they
were on their way, Pavlov changed the destination of the 13th Army
Staff, but Colonel Akhremenko learned about the change too late,
whereupon he changed course forthwith in a desperate attempt to fulfil
the new order.
45. Anfilov, op.cit., p.221; see also Baldin, op.cit., p.84; see
also Pandalov, e^.cit., p.9? According to Paodalov the German
barrage started at 4.00 hours.
46. Voennie svyazisti, pp.130-131; see also Anfilov, op.cit., p.221;
also Pagramyar op.cit., p.89. Frdle«s reports about difficulties
in radio communication testify to lack of experience in their use,
to the bombing of many radio station? but it nay also suggest some
German jamming device.
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The South-West Front had reports from the 12th Army to the
effect that the Hungarian border was quiet, and from the 26th Army
where German pressure had not yet been fully exercised, but
comnunication with the 5th and 6th Armies had been completely dis¬
rupted. General Ptukhin, Chief of the Air Force, SW. Front, was
unable to contact his units in the airfields, nor were the vnos
(vozdushnoye nabliudeniye, opoveshchniye i sviaz) - Aircraft Warning
Service - people able to cope with all the enemy aircraft and to give
useful instructions to fighter wings.1*7 180 planes were lost before
10.00 a.m.
Colonel P.M. Kurochkin, Chief of Signals North-West Front,
managed to operate wire and radio signals with Moscow and with Army
HQs. He had one radio station in the command point in Panevezhys
and five other:, about 2 km. away, but since the beginning of German
air-raids, all these stations had either been destroyed altogether or
else had come under such pressure that they had almost stopped func¬
tioning. Especially affected was the 11th Army which suffered the
main blow of the initial German attack. It was effectively cut off
from its neighbours, its units isolated and then some of them cut to
pieces. Despite great effort, the NW. Front command did not succeed
47. P. Batitskii, 'Razvitie Voisk PVO Strany v gody Velikoi
Otechestvennoi voiny', VIZ, No.9, 1972, p.16; see also Anfilov,
op.cit., p.188. Aircraft Warning Service (VNOS) failed to
notify all air units simultaneously of enemy approaching planes;
see also Zhukov, op.cit., p.255. The Black Sea Fleet had some
minutes advance warning. Admiral Oktyabr'skii telegraphed
Zhukov at 3.17 minutes about approaching aircraft and was given
permission to open fire.
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in co-ordinating the activities of the 8th and the 11th Armies.48
Into the 'signals vacuum' between the two Armies the Germans stuck a
wedge which was getting deeper before local commanders and certainly
commanders in Moscow knew what was happening.
As a result of a systematic destruction of signals,
the command of the NW. Front and the commanders of
the 8th and the 11th Armies as well as their staffs
could not assess correctly the situation while
simultaneously reporting to the General Staff,
taking necessary decisions and organizing their
large and small units.49
Commanders who were educated to give orders face to face, or
to use the telephone as a second best, were utterly lost when they
were left with radio signals as the only means of controlling their
troops.50 Before 9.00 a.m. on 22 June, Kirponos complained:
'If the signals service keeps functioning so badly,
how will we be able to command our troops?'
(Yesli i vpred svyaz budet rabotat tak plokho,
to kak zhe my sroozhem upravlyat voiskami?)51
48. Bor'ba za Sovetskuyu Pribaltiku, p.62. The route of 48th Rifle
Division, 8th Army, was the result of 'disorientation' and com¬
plete surprise; see also Anfilov, op.cit., pp.221-222. 29th
Tank Division on the road to Sopotskin could not ask for the
help of 3rd Army for lack of signals communication while 3rd
Army reported the bombardment of its HQ and radio stations; see
also Sandalov, Perezhitoe, p.94. 4th Army HQ bombed.
49. Anfilov, op.cit., p.217.
50. Field Service Regulations [PU-90] Section 29 emphasizes the
importance of personal contact between commander and subordinate
to ensure comprehension of orders. Second best is a telephone
in case the commander cannot reach his subordinate or invite him
to his place. Remnants of these notions can be found even in
the most modern Soviet writing, see, for instance Major-General
U. Ivanov, 'Tankisti vosstanavlivayut boesposobnost', Voennyi
Veatnik, No.8, 1972, p.23.
51. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.90.
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The commanders themselves did not know how to use the radio
stations,52 so they had to count on their radio operators, a process
which at crucial moments is too cumbersome for instant decisions.
However Signals Troops were not mobilized until the second day of
war and on several occasions the radio-operators were ordered to
function as rifle patrols.53
There were very few radio stations in the first place, and
many of these were destroyed by the first German strike. The equip¬
ment was obsolete, no transmission and no receiving was possible while
in movement, and static radio cars became easy prey to low flying
German fighters whose command of the air was rapidly becoming absolute.
Major-General M.P. Vorobev, Chief of Engineers, W. Front, reported on
the radio the exact location of the mines, in clear.5** It was neither
whim nor carelessness, since code instructions were locked in HQ
safes to be opened only after mobilization.55
Moscow was officially informed about the opening of hostilities
at 5.30 a.m., 22nd June 1941. Henceforth it was no longer a question
of how to prevent war, but rather of how to conduct it. Items of
information that streamed in after 3.15 a.m. left too many blank
52. Voennie svyazisti, p.132.
53. Ibid., p.136.
54. In clear - not in code; see also J. Erickson, op.cit., p.587.
55. Voennie svyazisti, p.129: see also Bychevskii, op.cit., p.5.
'Red envelopes' were also kept in safes.
244.
spots on the map.56 For many hours the signals channels functioned
not to reflect the real situation at the front but rather as to
project the image several commanders had, though they had, or wished
to convey in some wistful fashion.57
On the SW. Front, local commanders were trying to understand
what was happening around them. They gathered that the Red Army was
fighting, but they managed to send the first report to Moscow only at
15.00 hours because of lack of information. The report gave neither
a clear nor a true picture of the situation. Chief of Staff, W.
Front, Klimovskii, sent his first report to Moscow at 22.00 hours.
In spite of not having had any contact with the 4th Army all day long,
he still led Moscow to believe that the 4th Army was holding its own
on the border. Actually by that time the Germans had penetrated to a
depth of 60-70 km., leaving Brest behind them. At the same time
(22.00 hours) General Klenov, Chief of Staff NW. Front, reported to
the General Staff that the Front was still defending the border,
56. A.M. Vasilevskii, 'K. voprosu o rukovodstve vooruzhennoi bor'boi
v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine', Voprosy istorii, No.5, 1970,
p.63; see also I.T. Starinov, "liny Zhdut Svoego Chasa, Moscow,
Voenizdat, 1964, p.194. Midday, 22nd June in Pinsk airfield
under air raid everybody thought that only Pinsk airfield was
bombed and in other places it was different; see also Zhukov
op.cit., p.273; also, I.V. Boldin, op.cit., p.91, 22nd June,
21.00 hours - 10th Array had not yet sent a report despite the
fact that it had radio; also Fedyuninskii, op.cit., p.15. 22nd
June, early morning, all contact with 5th Array was severed; also
Rokossovskii, op.cit., p.11. 22nd June, morning, Staff Officer
in Lutsk did not know what the situation was.
57. I.T. Starinov, op.cit., p.193. The news bulletin on Moscow radio
on 22nd June, at 6.00 hours is a symptom of the confusion and
impotence of the Soviet government under the impact of surprise,
and the disruption in the flow of information.
whereas 111 fact the Gerrnns had managed to seize bridges - wholly
intact - over the Neman. The 4th Pontoon and Bridging Regiment
(11th Army) under the command of Major N.P. Belikov had been allocated,
according to plan, the task of destroying the four bridges over the
Neman. At 13.00 hours, Belikov carried out his orders and destroyed
three of the bridges. At 14.00 hours, Belikov was ordered by
Lieutenant-Colonel Firsov, Chief of Engineers (11th Army) to carry out
his preplanned orders, namely to destroy the fourth bridge, but by
that time there was no communications contact with any other superior
officer. Many Soviet units were stranded on the southern side of the
Neman and their commanders who controlled the withdrawal of their
units through the last ren_aining bridge did not allow Major Belikov
to destroy it.58 This tug of war between two different interests
lasted so long that some of Belikov's men were eventually captured by
the Germans, who were also racing towards that same bridge.
At 9.45 a.m., Colonel-General Kuznetsov, Commander-in-Chief
NW. Front, ordered a counter-attack to be carried out by the 12th and
3rd Mechanized Corps under the general command of the 8th Army. The
aim was to hit at the rear of the German Army which was pushing towards
Taurage. The order instructed the 3rd Mechanized Corps (minus 5th
Tank Division) to carry out its attack on the night of 22-23 June.
Unfortunately, owing to the break-down in signals, the 3rd Mechanized
58. Anfilov, op.cit., p.216; see also, Sandalov, op.cit., pp.98-99.
Description of the capture of the River Bug bridges. According
to Sandalov the bridges were seized 5-10 minutes before the
beginning of the artillery barrage; see also, Starinov, op .cit.,
p. 196. The capture of the River Bug bridges including the
mined railway bridge of Brest; see also Guderian, op.cit., p.153.
It is interesting to note that an hour or so before the beginning
of the barrage Guderian thought of abandoning it in order to
achieve surprise because he was so sure that the Russians were
unprepared.
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corps received the message only in the evening. Consequently it had
no time to prepare for the attack. However, General Klenov, in his
report of 22.00 hours, gave the General Staff the impression that the
attack in the direction of Taurage was on its way.59
Towards evening on the 22nd of June, General Ptukhin,
Commander of the Air Force SW. Front, managed to organize the remnant
of his forces. By that time the colosal scale of the attack could
no longer be in any doubt. Yet towards evening, the pace of the flow
and processing of information was much slower than that of the German
attack. Some units could be contacted only by delegates.60 In the
middle of the morning (desparate for information) Colonel-General
Kirponos, Commander SW. Front, was obliged to order Colonel Bagramyan,
his Chief of Operations, and Colonel Bondarev, his Chief of Intelligence,
to go on a fact-finding mission:
Go, Colonels, and at any price bring in a
reliable and concrete report about the troops.61
It was a tormenting decision with which the Soviet commanders were
faced time and again. Kirponos had to choose between keeping his best
analysts and organisers in the office, ready to render their services
if and when information started flowing again, and sending them out.
59. Anfilov, op.cit., pp.217-218.
60. Ibid., p.225; see also, Shtemenko, op.cit., p.30; also,
Sandalov, op.cit., p.97; also Boldin, op.cit., pp.84-85, 87-88.
Pavlov's trip to Belostok and Boldin's trip to 10th Army HQ;
also, Rokossovskii, op.cit., p.15. Attempts to contact 19th and
22nd Mechanized Corps by delegates.
61. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.90; see also Rokossovskii, op.cit., during
the whole day L22nd June] Rokossovskii could not contact SW.
Front's HQ.
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By sending out Bagramyan and Bondarev, he guaranteed the best possible
on-the-spot information, collation and processing, but on the other
hand he sacrificed time and risked the lives of his staff over and
above losing their analytical power while they were away on their
mission. Bagramyan and Bondarev's findings nevertheless became the
basis for the SW. Front report which was sent to Moscow at 15.00
hours.62
Although they had only part of the picture, all the commanders
felt that they had been hard pressed and harassed by the Germans'
advance.
Towards the evening of the 22nd of June, the very
thought of an immediate counter-offensive
(kontrnastup 1 enie.) had not crossed the mind of
even one amongst the commanders and staff of our
front. If only we could hold on.
(Lish be vistoyat)6"
Moscow obviously had different ideas. At 23.00, HQ SW. Front received
a directive signed by Timoshenko. The General Staff had rightly
assessed the direction of the main German attack, but had only scant
idea regarding both the position of the Soviet units and, as far as
SW. Front was concerned, what had happened since the last report had
been sent at 15.00 hours. Regarding the W. Front and the NW. Front,
the assessment at 23.00 was impossible because these fronts' reports
62. Bagraiuyan, op.cit., p.112. Bagraiuyau admits that this report was
sent before there was any real information available.
63. Ibid., p.Ill; see also Boldin, op.cit., p.94. Being on the spot
Boldin knew that the 10th Army was not in a position to conduct
any offensive operations; see also, Fedyuninskii, opj,cit., The
German pressure on the link between the 5th and 6th Armies created
terrible problems for 124th and 87th Rifle Divisions in Ustilug
district. By the morning 23rd June the 124th Division had to
retreat towards the River Styr and the 87th towards Vladimir-Volynskii.
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had arrived in Moscow at only 22.00 hours, by which time they had
guessed in Moscow that these reports were inaccurate. On the basis
of the 15.00 hours SW. Front report, the General Staff and the
Commissar of Defence could not have known about two German motorized
corps, one moving in the direction of Sokal-Radzheduv and the other
on Ustilug-Lutsk.The rest of Timoshenko's directive gave orders
to mount counter-attacks on all fronts, and instructed the front
commanders in great detail which troops to use and for what purpose,
all based, of course, on the reports from the fronts.65 Reading
Directive No. 3 Sagramyan thought:
Automatically it ha3 occurred to me that the
optimistic assessment in the document, which
has been sent from the centre, is in large
part based upon our own rather cheerful reports.
(... vo mnogom bil naveyan 1 nashimi davol^no
bodrim donesenyami)66
During the first twenty hours of war the Germans succeeded in
effecting what might be called reverse anaesthesia - only the area
affected came painfully to life, while the rest of the body politic
was neutralized. According to their plan the Germans had achieved
surprise, as Ilalder duly noted - the Red Army was caught unawares and
the delirium of shock seized the echelons immediately involved in battle.
By destroying signal nets, the Germans wrought havoc among commanders
54. Fedyuninskii, op.cit., p.17. The situation of 87th Rifle
Division near Ustilug.
65. A.M. Vasilev3kii, 'K. voprosu o rukovodstve vooruzhennoi bor'boi
v Velikoi Oteehestvennci voine', Voprosy istorii, No.5, 1970, p.52.
According to Vasilevskii the policy of an all-out counter-
offensive which was adopted at the beginning of the war wa3 wrong
and caused unnecessary casualties.
66. Bagramyan, op.cit., p.111.
who lost contact with each other and with their units. By high
speed thrusts the Germans managed to isolate, encircle and on many
occasions rout small units and dispersed strong-points, with little
loss of time.67 Under the impact of German artillery barrages and
fast moving armour, the channels of command and control in advanced
units were effectively choked or broken; on a larger scale they
managed to cut the channels between Front HQ and Armies' HQ, and
between these and the High Command in Moscow.68 The immediate
effects were unexpected. The first line Soviet soldiers, many of
whom were professionals, went on fighting, although they were stunned
and confused, while the Soviet High Command, aware of an attack but
ignorant of the way it was developing, became extremely worried by
the scarcity of information, but by no means desperate. In other
words professional soldiers and commanders reacted in the way they
had been trained to react for years - the soldiers used all the fire-
puwer they could produce until they were out of ammunition, exhausted,
wounded or dead, and the commanders tried to analyse a highly baffling
situation in order to make or to improvise decisions.69 For some
time the lack of repporfi-''. t between soldiers and commanders did not
have the catastrophic effect that surprise is designed to create.
However, this situation could not last long. Feverish steps
67. Rokossovskii, op.cit., p.14. On its way towards the front
Rokossovskii could see the effect of the German success by the
stream of stragglers (Okruzhentsev) who escaped battles of
encirclement.
68. Vasilevskii, op.cit., Voprosy istorii, No.5, 1970, p.52.
69. Fedyuninskii, op.cit., p.15. An order to give ammunition to
soldiers; see also, Rokossovskii, op.cit., p.11.
were taken in an attempt to redress it. Since radios were scarce,
unused or misused, there was a constant struggle between telephone
and telegraph linesmen and German low-flying bombers which made endless
sorties to prevent the establishment of signals link3 between HQs and
units. The existing lines were cut time and time again, or else
became congested.7"
After the official declaration of war had been handed over at
5.30 a.m., the Soviet High Command realized that it had no information
about the main directions of the German blows, and no quick and
reliable way of finding out. The people in the General Staff, haggard
after a long sleepless night, had realized how narrow was the scope of
any reasonable action; moreover, the existing plan KQV0-41, which had
been meticulously worked out and revised for an emergency, proved to
be too drastic for the situation as it was seen at the time.71 It
was a plan to mobilize the whole country - man-power, industry, front
and rear from Brest to Vladivostok. It meant martial law over the
whole country and a complete halt to every activity other than military.
Until 7.15 a.m., 22 June, no-one in the Soviet leadership had felt
that such extreme measures ivere necessary. Furthermore, since the
liaison between the military machine and the political apparatus had
not yet been established such a move could hardly be conceivable.
For the time being the military and the Politburo were functioning
70. On 2nd July, 1941, Lieutenant-Ceneral O.K. Kalandin [who replaced
Klimovskii as Chief of Staff UF.i informed the CGS that the
Signals Units of UF had not been mobilized and that the Signal
Units of 3rd, 4th and 13th Armies had had 50-100 per cent casual¬
ties.
71. Bagramyan, op.clt., p.92; compare B. Collier, The Battle of Britain,
London, Collins, p.120, the difficulties of putting 'Cromwell'
('invasion imminent') into operation.
wide -•/ aide in a uouw-faac cu..w»ersocsa fashion. Conducting operations
oa a tactical scale fall attain tno responsibility of the Caneral
litaff, but for lac:: of iaforaacloa, and under the iupact of tae
dramatic s.sift frora diplomatic to military activity, tae tendency was
to taalie decisions of a strategic nature. The Politburo, the
Commissariat for defence and the General htuff, cut off from the events
upon which they ware called to adjudicate, and with jo chain of
coKLiiand, fell bach on oc tanical reactions a id squally mechanical
formulae about tie need to atop ch- enemy.72 Directive do.2 of 7.15
a .to,, issued by Timosuenko and authorised by Stalin, retained sone
alenanta which had characterized Directive No.1. Zhukov suggested
ordering that the troops mould use full strength to hold the enemy.
Titsoshenko corrected:
'Annihilate, not hold up*
(Ne zadarzhajt, a unichtozhit)7 3
Sue to disrupted signalling lines, Directive No.2 reached SW. Front KQ
at about 10.00 a.w.7®* It read*
'At 4.00 a.m., 22 June 1941, Geman planes, without
any causa, carried out flights over our airfields
and towns along the borders and boshed then. At
the same time, German troops opened artillery fire
and crossed our border in several places.
72. Vaailevskii, op.cit., p.63, claina that during some time at the
beginning of the war the high Command in Moscow received inform¬
ation only through the Aircraft Warning bervice .VKOSj. The early
warning and visual service rather like the Joyal Observer Corps.
73. Zhukov, o£.cit., p.256.
74. The time between issuing Directive No.j2 and its receipt at the
fronts was almost the e»aw.e as that of Directive l.o.l of 24.25
despite the difference in circumstances.
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Following the unprecedented German attack on
the Soviet Union, I order:
1. Troops will use their full strength and all
the means at their disposal to attack and destroy
enetry forces in those regions where they have
crossed the Soviet border. Ground forces will
not cross the border without special authorization.
2. Reconnaissance and attack planes will locate
concentrations of enemy aircraft and groupings
of its ground forces. Bombers will inflict strong
blows, destroy aircraft on enemy airfields, and
bomb the train concentrations of its ground forces.
Air raids are to be carried 100-150 Ton. into German
territory. Bomb Konigsberg and Memel. No
flights are to be carried out over Rumania and
Finland's territory until a special authorization
is given.75
It was a restrained directive which caused some perplexity among
pilots, but its fundamental shortcoming was that it could not be
carried out. The whole tone of the Directive suggested that its
authors were not familiar with the situation along the borders and
that they still toyed with the idea of a local though large attack,
that could perhaps be neutralized.
No-one in the Soviet leadership, either on the political or
the military side, had had any experience in comprehensive command.76
For the time being Stalin seemed satisfied to retain all but nominal
75. Bagramyan, op.cit., pp.93-94. It is difficult to establish on
what factual data Order No.2 was based, as 5th Army for instance
managed to send its first report at 10.30, 22nd June. See Ibid.,
p.90; For the text of Order No.2, see also Anfilov, op.cit.,
p.210. There are no variations.
76. Zhukov, Meretskov and Timoshenko were the most experienced
commanders in the Soviet High Command, but even Zhukov had only
combat experience on one front fKhalkhin Golj large though it
was, Meretskov did not do very well in the Finnish War where he
was eventually replaced by Timoshenko.
control over directives and decree-. The urgency of endless details
of command and control, and of defining 'strategy' or 'grand strategy',
could not be perceived before studying the Germans' intentions and
before having the complete picture of the battlefield. The picture
at 8.00 a.m. seemed grimly unclear:
There had been a powerful enemy bomb strike at
many airfields in the Beiorussian, Kiev and
Baltic MDs, where serious damage had been in¬
flicted on our aircraft, which had no time to
take off and disperse to field airstrips.
Many towns and railway junctions in the Baltic
area, Belorussia and the Ukraine, together with
naval bases at Sevastopol and on the Baltic
coast, had also been bombed.
Bitter fighting was going on against German
land forces along our entire Western frontier.
On many sectors the Germans had engaged forward
units of the Red Army.
Alerted infantry units belonging to the first
'covering echelon' were going into battle from
the move without time to take up prepared
positions.
In the sector of Leningrad MD, all was still
quiet. The enemy did not take any action.78
At 9.30, Timoshenko and Zhukov met Stalin and presented hiia
with a draft of a decree calling up from 23 June all reservists born
between 1905 and 1918, and declaring martial law in European Russia.
The commanders who were in their HO before 10.00 a.m. could piece
together even less information than their superiors in Moscow
because they were already busy with a stream of command and control
77. B.H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy - The Indirect Approach, London, Faber
and Faber Ltd., 1967 [Revised edition' pp.333-337.
78. Zhukov, oi>.cit., p.257.
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details.79 By the time Timoshenko's Directive No. 2 reached the West
and South-West Fronts, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, West
Front, X.I. Kopets, had already been badly shaken,80 and Ptukhin,
Commander-in-Chief of the SW. Front Air Force, had lost 180 planes
and his signals system had been put out of action. He could hardly
send out any planes at all. The bombers that had been sent out did
not have fighter escorts and subsequently were brutally massacred.81
Towards noon, still without any clear notion of the situation
along the borders, the Politburo finally decided that it was a full
scale war. Molotov, Deputy Chairman of Sovnarkom and Commissar for
Foreign Affairs, broadcast to the nation at 12.00 hours, 22 June 1941,
announcing that the Soviet Union had been at war with Germany as from
4.00 a.m. There was still no Coimiander-in-Chief of the armed forces
but real power lay with Stalin.82 At 13.00 he phoned Zhukov, told
him that the Fronts commanders were inexperienced and that the
Politburo had decided to send representatives (predstaviteli) to help
them and coordinate operations: Colonel-General 0.1. Gorodovikov to
NW. Front, Marshals G.I. Kulik and B.M. Shaposhnikov to W. Front and
General of the Army G.K. Zhukov to SW. Front. They were to leave
79. Rokossovskii, op.cit., p.11; see also Bagrarayan, op.cit., pp.124-
126,131; also Boldin, op.cit., p.86; also, Fedyuninskii, op.cit.,
pp.19-21.
80. I.I. Kopets committed suicide on 22nd June and was replaced by
his deputy Major-General U. layurskii. Apart from the shock of
losing a large part of his command with many of the aircraft lost
on the ground Kopets was no doubt under the pressure of the purge
of the Air Force and PV0 commanders.
81. Rokossovskii, op.cit., p.12. By 22nd June, 14.00 hours, the
Germans had air supremacy at least over the road Novgorod -
Volynskii-Rovno-Lutsk, one of the main axis of the attack.
82. Slarinov, op.cit., p.98. On 26th June Starinov was surprised when
Timoshenko relegated to him vast authority without mentioning
Stalin, but this was the period when Timoshenko was officially
authorized to give such orders in his capacity as the Chairman of
STAVKA which had been formed on 23rd June and of which Stalin was
'merely' a member.
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immediately. To Zhukov's question, who was going to replace him as
CGS, Stalin replied:
'Leave Vatutin in your place ... don't waste
time, we will manage somehow.'
(my tut kak-nibud oboidemsya)83
Evidently, in the centre, a process was taking place similar
to that which was in progress on the fronts. There too, under the
pressure created by the lack of information, it was decided to send
the top people to the battle field to assess the situation and help
the commanders on the spot.
The chain of command during the latter half of the first day
22 June became complicated. By virtue of their professionalism and
the immediate task at hand, the military in Moscow were more active
than the political institutions. They were in direct contact with
those military HQs that could still respond to signals but they had
no legal power to issue decrees even of a military nature. The
Politburo which had been assembled by Stalin at 4.30 a.m. and had
since been in constant session did not have any military information
apart from the reports provided by the Commissar of Defence. But
even after appraising itself of the situation, it did not have direct
contact with combat units, nor was it geared to tackling such problems.
The Commissariat of the Wavy was still independent, operating its own
signals net which had already proved more reliable than that of the
Commissariat of Defence, let alone that of the Commissariat of
Communications. The result was that both Timoshenko and Stalin became
83. Zhukov, op.cit., p.259.
Com-aanders~i.n-Chi.ef, with the former initiating military decrees and
the latter authorizing them wholly or partially. For lack of a
Supreme High Command, the Supreme Military Council (GVS), which had
been established in the wake of the purges of 1938, but which had been
kept subordinate most of the time since then, was given a new lease of
life. At 21.15 hours, it issued a. directive to the Military Soviets
(!) of NW Front, S Front and SW Front, assigning to them their
immediate military tasks.81* Further down along the chain of command
were the Front Commanders with their military aides and the Military
Council whose members participated in any process of decision making.85
Among the military aides of the Front Commanders, there were
professional specialists who had been sent down from Moscow to help
the commanders solve problems of engineering, artillery, armoured
forces warfare and signalling. Over and above this system, there
were imposed as from 13.00 hours three overall commanders, who set out
post-haste to discharge their duties.
Since Zhukov had to go part of the way by car, it took him a
considerable time to reach his destination - Kirponos HQ in Ternopol.
Leaving Moscow at about 14.00, he arrived in Kiev in the late afternoon
whereupon he met Khrushchev, Chairman of the Military Council, SW Front,
and was briefed about the situation. By that time, the first
official report of the situation on that front had been sent to
Moscow (15.00 hours) and the situation had deteriorated considerably.
Arriving in Ternopol, he had a talk over the H.F. (radio) with his
84. Anfllov, op.cit., p.235. This is another indication of the lack
of C-in-C of the armed forces. Two hours later [23.15 hours]
Timoshenko issued Order No.3.
85. This system of decision making was not without some friction.
See, for instance, Bagramyan, op.cit., pp.124-126.
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replacement in Moscow - Vatutin. During this conversation he learned
that Moscow had not as yet had any accurate information about either
Red Army or German movements. Colonel-General F.I. Kuznetsov,
Commander NW. Front, and Colonel-General D.G. Pavlov, Commander W. Front,
said Vatutin, had left their HQ without reporting to the Commissar of
Defence, and in their HQ there was no information of their whereabouts.86
Zhukov further learned that Stalin had ordered Zhukov's signature to
be attached to Timoshenko's Directive No.3 which had been issued at
23.15 hours, 22 June.
Timoshenko's Directive No.3 waB well nigh impossible to carry
out from a purely military point of view, but in a way it formulated
the character of the war. The idea was to carry out unceasing and
powerful counterblows. Although this strategy did not succeed in
snatching the initiative, it certainly halted the German advance, it
forced the Germans to throw in larger forces than they had originally
planned, and it caused them telling losses in material and human
lives.87 However, having some success at the beginning, these attacks
petered out after a while because the Red Army at that time could not
sustain the pressure.88 Most of the armoured formations which were
86. This is an indicator of the control that Moscov,* expected to have
over the activities of Front commanders. See Boldin, op.cit.,
pp.84-85, for the sequence which led to Pavlov decision to go to
Rclostak. At the time of Zhukov - Vatutin conversation he might
have been on his way between Lelostok and his HQ in Minsk, but
this HQ was already preparing to move. A comparison between
Boldin, Ibid., Zhukov, op.cit., pp.277-281 and Anfilov, op.cit.,
p.227 create an impression that Pavlov was completely lost among
the endless problems he had to solve.
87. Fedyuninskii, op.cit., p.17.
88. Ibid., pp.19-20; see also, Boldin, op.cit., pp.92-93; also
Bagramyan, op.cit., pp.123-138. Chapter entitled Sil Ne Khvataet.
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supposed to carry out the counterblows were still on the move under
merciless air-raids, with no air cover and with little AA defence.89
On 23 June 1941, the Central Committee and the Council of People
Commissars authorized a decree calling up reservists from 14 Military
Districts (except Central Asia, Trans-Baikal and the Far East
districts) and announcing the establishment of the Stavka of the
Soviet High Command [ Stavka Glavnogo Kommandovaniya Vooruzhennykh Sil
SSSR], Its composition was as follows:
Chairman - Commissar of Defence:
Marshal S.K. Timoshenko







Commisar of the Navy:
Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov
89. Rotmistrov (Editor), op.cit., pp.54-55. The deployment of
Mechanised forces.
This move did not resolve the duality of having two commanders-in-
chief, but it created the liaison between the Political and the
Military authorities and brought in the Commissariat of the Navy.90
Given a strong-point and fire power the Red Army soldiers
used both until they were destroyed. But the bulk of the Red Army
was not given these two prerequisites as most units were either on
their way to the front or in the process of formation, organisation
and training when the war broke out. Soviet sources tend to
emphasise the heroic conduct of the Red Army performance during the
first three days of the Great Patriotic War, which is on the whole a true
picture. Yet, while most soldiers were caught unprepared, though not
all of them necessarily surprised, and fought it out the best they could,
90. For the ideological problems of regular army Versus militia sees
Bukharin and Preobrazhensky. The ABC of Communism [Edited by
E.H. l^arr], London, Penguin Books Ltd., 1969, p.234, note in
particular: "... the first people's army ... participating in the
administration of the country'. p.255, the model of the Swiss
Republic with its national militia pp.267-269. 'The Red Army Is
Provisional'; see also A.B. Ulam, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, London,
Fontana Library, 1969, p.547. The example of the French revolu¬
tion and the shadow of Buonaparte, p.574 '... the attraction for
the military mind of Trotsky's 'New Model*: an army where profess¬
ional competence and discipline were to be the ruling considerations'
see also E.H. Carr, op.cit., Vol.1, pp.105-106. The difficulty to
adhere in practice to lofty ideas about 'proletariat army', Vol.2,
pp.134, 140. The problem of the Tsarist officers in the Red Army,
pp.398-412. The eighth and the ninth Party Congress; the 'single
military doctrine'; Frunze, Tukhachevsky and the 'spirit of the
offensive'; for the problem of Commissars see J. Erickson, op.cit.,
the entry Commissars; also the entry Command and Command Staff;
also, Fainsod, op.cit., pp.465,466,468,469 deals with the problem
of commissars; For the problem of the duality in the Soviet
Government see W.W. Rostow, op.cit., p.63. Stalin assumption of
nominal power on 7th May 1941; also L. Schapiro, op.cit., Chapter
27, mainly pp.490-493; also Sokolovsky, op.cit., [English edition]
pp.358-364 deals with the facts not with the reasons; also Roman
Kolkowicz, op.cit., pp.64-65. Apart from J. Erickson none of these
sources deals squarely with the period 22nd June-26th June, or 22nd
June-3rd July, 1941, but they all throw light on the development of
dual system in Soviet military command and Soviet governmental
system.
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there were others who were well prepared and yet others who succumbed
to the shock in one way or another. Listening to Molotov's broadcast
at 12.00, 22 June one could see:
On the faces of people, which had just been gay
and smiling, incredulity, confusion and even fear.9*
Although it is not entirely clear what is meant by the repetitive
allusions to units that had to withdraw under enemy pressure during
the first three days of war, breakdown of morale suggests itself as a
possible explanation.92
However, many units were well prepared. The 1 Anti-tank
Brigade, under the command of K.S. Hoskalenko was fully motorisad,
there was not even one horse.93 The brigade had the full complement
of ammunition, including armour-piercing shells. Most of the men
had completed or nearly completed their secondary education. They
91. S.S. Biryuzov, Surovie gody, Moscow, Nauka, 1966, p.13.
92. Bor'ba za Sovetskuyu Fribaltiku, p.63. The retreat of 11th Army
to Kaunas and Vilna on 22nd June C... vynuzhdeny byli s bol'shimi
poteryami neorganizovanno i pospeshno Otstutpat ...J, see also,
Anfilov, op.cit., pp.247-254; also Zhukov, op.cit., pp.273-275.
The disorganized command and control of 4th Army; also, Sandalov,
off print of PejrezhJ^toe, p. 186. Description of a panic that over¬
whelmed several units at 6.00 hours, 22nd June, as a result of
disorganisation, lack of initiative and cowardice of several
commanders; see also, Biryuzov, op.cit., p.15 for the effects of
panic on the civil population and its spread among the militia
and civil authorities; also, Boldin, op.cit., p.90. Belostok,
at 18.00 hours, 22nd June. The behaviour of a Senior Lieutenant
under the impact of surprise; also, Colonel V. Maramzin, 'Pryt
strategieheskikh oboronitel'nykh operatsii v Velikoi Otechestvennoi
voine', VIZ, No.10, 1970, p.24. The effect of German air supremacy
on the morale of Soviet soldiers.
93. K.S. Moskalenko, op.cit., p.14; see also N. Malyugin, 'avtomobilnyi
transport frontov i armii v gody voiny', VIZ, No.2, 1971, p.89.
On 24th June, 47th Rifle Corps, 4th Army moved to the front on
lorries. However, generally speaking logistics and transport at
the beginning of the war were badly managed.
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were also well equipped as far as their technical approach was con¬
cerned, since the majority of then were heavy industry workers. **
On 21 June the tanks and artillery of lloskalenko's brigade were well
hidden and camouflaged. Like so many other units the pre-war orders
of the brigade were changed at the beginning of the war. The
brigade, ell motorised, was elastic in its manoeuvres and its commander
insisted on digging the guns in and camouflaging them properly at
every new position the brigade had been ordered to take. Since the
Germans kept mostly to the main roads for their tanks thrusts the
brigade had done the same, retreating slowly along the main axis of
movement. Junior commanders and soldiers fought ably and effectively,
and the brigade maintained its mobility and fire-power not only
during the first three days of war but also throughout the following
three months of bitter fighting.95
The surprise attack had had an unsettling effect on commanders
too. While soldiers were primarily fighting to survive, commanders
had also to make decisions concerning survival of others besides
themselves. Upon receiving the first news about the war, Stalin, the
politician, was badly shaken, but Stalin - the commander - had not yet
emerged. Timosbenko, Zhukov and Vatutin had not lost their
analytical power and applied it immediately to process any piece of
information which came their way. Commanders of TTPs, which became
Fronts at the beginning of hostilities as well as commanders of large
94. Moskalenko, op.cit., p.18.
95. Anfilov, op.cit., p.244. Conduct and tactics of 9tii Anti-tank
Brigade; see also Antipenko, op.cit., pp.54-56, for the conduct
of 41 and 99th Rifle Division. These two held on for six days
without support of tanks or air force.
formations reacted in such a variety of ways that only deep psycho¬
logical and environmental analyses could account for their behaviour.
The Commander of the W. Front Air Force, I.I. Kopets could
not stand the shock of losing nearly all his planes and committed
suicide on the very first day of the \/ar. Another conspicuous
suicide, that of Division Commissar Vashugin was delayed a whole week,
until 29 June, but even before the beginning of operations he had
shown signs of great strain. Fulfilling what he felt was his duty
he urged Kirponos to effect counter-attacks which proved to be ill-
prepared. His loyalty to the letter of Tiraoshenko's Directive No.3
in the face of strong opposition on the part of the 'professional'
soldiers in SW. Front IIQ, led to acrimonious exchanges of words. The
pressure of surprise combined with the clash of wills to mount
unbearable tension. Pavlov, Commander of W. Front did not manage
to recover from the first shock for a whole week. He lost control
of his Armies and issued conflicting orders that helped to increase
the confusion. Shaposhnikov and Kulik had been sent as representatives
of the High Command to help Pavlov in his sector of the front which
proved to have been subjected to the main German blow. Unfortunately
Shaposhnikov fell ill and Kulik lost contact with Moscow for nearly
four days.96 Of the High Command representatives only Zhukov proved
very capable. On the second day of the counter-blows (24 June)
Zhukov had a long conversation over the telegraph with Potopov,
commander of 5th Army.97 During the conversation it became clear
96. Zhukov, op.cit., p.278. Conversation between Zhukov and
Klimovskii on 28th June.
97. Ibid., pp.265-267. Potopov was Zhukov's subordinate in Khalkhin
Gol.
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that the situation locally was very difficult and getting worse, hut
that it was no longer in complete chaos. The 5th Amy was conducting
fierce battles, retreating slowly in many sectors but fighting as an
organised formation. Potapov already had some idea of German
intentions. His information about their strength was exaggerated;
his radio system was not functioning properly but he could easily
show on the map where his forces were and where the enemy was. Zhukov
who had by now a fairly accurate picture of the situation as regarding
forces, material and resources could alread}? see beyond the needs of
the next move. He ordered Potapov not to send infantry to the attack
without the support of tanks.98 When Potapov told him that he had
30 KV tanks but no ammunition for their heavy guns (152. mm.) Zhulcov
instantly told him to use the 09-30 concrete-piercing shells,"
displaying his remarkable skill in using all his resources. When a
complete breakdown of command and control befuddled the W. Front on
26 June, Zhukov rushed hack to Moscow on Stalin's instruction and was
ordered to work out a plan to save that Front. 08
Several commanders of smaller formations were killed in action
within the first week of the war. Major-General Pedaev, commander
of 67th Rifle Division was killed on 26 June. His division bad to
defend the coast line of the Baltic Sea from Libau to Ventspils a
section far too extensive for one division. Also in NW. front
98. Anfilov, op.cit., p.284.
99. Shells, model 1930 which were in store in the district but which
no one thought of using for the KV tanks.
100. These two occasions created a pattern. Throughout the war
Zhukov was sent to whichever sector of the front was in danger
of collapse, or in need of strategic analysis.
Lieutenant Colonel Avdeev was killed on 28 June. He had been COS of
Major-General Lelyushenko's 21st Mechanised Corps of the High Command
Reserve (RGK). On the W. Front Major-General Puganov Commander of
22nd Tank Division, 14th Mechanised Corps, 4th Army, was killed on
24 June not far from Brest. This division, like many other mechanised
formations, suffered many casualties from German air-raids after the
German air-supremacy had been established by the end of the first day
of war. Major-General Khatskelevich Commander of 6th Mechanised
Corps (10th Army) was killed in action defending the line on the river
Narev, on 25 June. Major-General Nikitin, Commander of 6th Cavalry
Corps, 10th Army was also killed on 25t.h June. Chief of Organisation
and Mobilisation of the unfortunate 13th Army was also killed on the
same day. Further south on SW. Front Major-General Mishanin,
Commander of 12th Dank Division, 8th Mechanised Corps, (5th Army) was
also severely mauled and its commander Major-General Kondrusev wounded.
There are many reasons why the commander should be in the first
line with his soldiers, but it seems that several casualties were a
direct result of the confusion at the beginning of the war. HQ,
were attacked not only from the air but also by tanks. Command points
had to move more than once to avoid encirclement and capture, and to
keep in touch with retreating units.
At the beginning of the war 46% of the commanders of large
formations and of Armies were older than 45 and 16% were older than
50.101 At that age people may be. at their best, as far as their
analytical power is concerned, but their physical agility tends to
101. Voprosy istorii , No.5, 1971, p.40.
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deteriorate. If under the confused circumstances which had been
created by the surprise attack these commanders had to exert their
physical strength it might have had some effect on their performance.
Armoured formations were major victims of air-raids, premature
counter-attacks and diversity of tasks as well as of bad logistics,
transport ana maintenance.*02 Thus 41 Tank Division (22nd Mechanised
Corps) was divided into small units which were then used to support
infantry. In the very first hours of war the motorised regiment of
this division was given to 45 Rifle Division. On the following day
two tank battalions were given to 37 Rifle Division and five tanks were
assigned the task to defend 5 Army's HO. On 24 June 20 tanks were
given to help 45 Rifle Division and 30 tanks to 64 Rifle Division.
During the night (24 June) one tank company was ordered to deal with
German parachutists and several hours later 2 tanks were taken to
protect 15 Rifle Corps' HQ.103
As the result of the surprise, the signals net collapsed with
a devastating effect on command and control. The speed of the German
advance created the impression that they were everywhere in force.
In the frantic attempt to repel them the Soviet commanders attempted
an 'active' policy, namely striking at all directions, at all costs
trying to defend all along the length of the front. Only Zhukov's
perceptive eye detected the weaknesses in the German tactics of deep
armoured thrusts, leaving the infantry far behind. However, most
Soviet armoured formations were still on the move towards the battle-
102. A. Karpenko, 'Sovershenstvovanie Tekhnicheskogo Obespecheniya
Bronetankovykh Voisk v Cperatsiyakh' VLZ, No.4, 1967, p.16.
103. Anfilov, op.cit., pp.289-290.
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field when Zhukov was forced by local pressure of events and by harsh
orders from Moscow to apply the available armoured units piece-meal.
The immediate results of the German surprise were very heavy
losses inflicted on the Air Force resulting in German air supremacy,
loss of armoured forces and the lack of any armoured mass, heavy
casualties and loss of territory. That latter loss meant the
constriction of both space and time, and thus further casualties.
Surprise finally confused the priorities, because without information
no Soviet commander was in a position to decide which of three
elements was to be traded: was it to be time, space or bloodt
104. K. Halan1 in, 'Razvitie organizatscnnykh form suklioputnykh voisk
v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine', VIZ, No.8, 1967, p.30.
Already in July the Red Army was forced to reduce rifle
divisions manpower by 25%, 66% anti-tank and regimental (heavy)
artillery, 50% machinegun and 75% automatic small arms. For
German account of Soviet Generals killed or captured see:
OberkoEuaando des Heeres Gen STdli. 0 Qu IV-Abt., 1 remde keere Ost
(lib) Nr.2383/41, H. Qu. den 27 October, 1941, Frames No.
443384-4438C.
SOVIET FORMATIONS AND UNITS MENTIONED IN SOVIET












5 Commissars of the Corps








NORTH FRONT 2 2ND JUNE, 1941.
Staff
C-in-C Lieutenant-General Popov, M.M,
COS Major-General Nikishev, D.N.




NORTH FRONT - 14 ARMY
C-in-C Lieutenant-General Frolov, V.A.
COS Colonel Skvirskii, L.B.
Member of Military Council - Commissar of the Division -
Kriukov, A.I.
42 Rifle Corps - Major-General Panin, R.I.
I 104 Rifle Divisions :
Major-General Morozov, S.I.
II 122 Rifle Divisions:
Maj or-General Shevchenko, P.S.
III 1 Tank Division:
Baranov, V.I. - no rank mentioned.
14 Rifle Divisions - no commander mentioned.
52 Rifle Divisions - no commander mentioned.
23 Fortified Area - no commander mentioned.
NORTH FRONT - 7 ARMY
C-in-C Lieutenant-General Oorelenko, F.
NORTH FRONT - 23 ARMY
C-in-C Lieutenant-General Pshenikov, P
NORTH FRONT
8 Independent Rifle Brigades (Hango)
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Assistant for Armoured Forces.
Major-General Vershinin, V.G.
H. Q. RxGA
uoin, WEST r. oi-rr - 11 ARMY
C-ia-C Lieutenant -Cuuaral ?!orozov, 7.E.
Chief of Engineers Liautenant-Colonel, Firsov
3rd Mechanised Corps - Major-Ceneral jurkin, A.V.
I 5th Tarn; Division - Colonel Fedorov, F.F.
II 2 Tank Division - Major-General Solyonkin, S.R
III 84 Motorized Division - Ho commander mentioned
29th Rifle Corps :-?o eoimander mentioned
I 184 Rifle Division;
:ent to the rear to complete its manning.
II 179 Rifle Division;
Sent to the rear to complete its vanning.
III Ho information
16th Rifle Corps - Ho cotsnander mentioned
I 5 th Hi fie Diviaion
II 33 Rifle Division




- Colonel Ozerov, P.P.
- Ho cowuauder mentioned
- Colonel Ivaaov, P.I.
- Ho cor rnader mentioned
- Ho corraander mentioned
- Ho commander mentioned
4th Pontoon-Bridge Regiment - Major iielikov, U.r.
NORTH WEST FRONT - 27 ARMY
C-in-C Major-General Berzarin, N.E.
COS Colonel Bolznev, V.V.
65th Rifle Corps: No commander mentioned




I 180 Rifle Division; No commander mentioned
II 182 Rifle Division: No commander mentioned
III No information
27th Rifle Corps:
I 181 Rifle Division: No commander mentioned
II No information
III No information
3rd Independent Brigade - Colonel Gavrilov, P.M.
NORTH WEST FRONT - 8 ARMY
C-in-C Major-General Sobenikov, T.T.
12th Mechanised Corps - Major-General Shestopalov, N.M.
I 23rd Tank Division - Colonel Orlenko, T.S.
II 28th Tank Division - Colonel Chernyakhovskii, I.D.
III 202nd Motorised Division - Colonel Gorbachev, V.K.
10th Rifle Corps - Major-General Nikolayev, I.F.
I 10 Rifle Division - Major-General Fadeev, I.I.
II 90 Rifle Division - No commander mentioned
III 48 Rifle Division - Major-General Bogdanov, P.V.
11th Rifle Corps - Major-General Shumilov, M.S.
I 125 Rifle Division - Major-General Bogaichuk, P.P.
II No information
III No information
22nd Territorial Rifle Corps (Formerly Estonian Army) - No names of
commanders for the Territorial Corps.
180 Rifle Division
182 Rifle Division
29th Territorial Rifle Corps (Formerly Lithuanian Army)
179 Rifle Division
184 Rifle Division
24th Territorial Rifle Corps (Formerly Latvian Army)
181 Rifle Division
183 Rifle Division
67 Rifle Division - Major-General Dedaev, N.A.
11 Rifle Division - No commander mentioned
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WEST FRONT - 22ND JUNE, 1941
Staff
C-in-C General of the Army Pavlov, D.G.
Chief of Staff:
Major-General Klimovskii, V.E.






Chief of Engineers: Major-General Vasil'ev P.M.
Chief of Engineers: Major-General Vorob'ev, M.P.
from 17/7/41.
Commander of Air Force:
Xopets, I.I., Committed suicide 22/6/41
Commander of Air Force:
General Tayurskii, U. (Ropets deputy).
Chief of Staff Air Force:
Colonel Khudyakov, S.A.
H.Q. MINSK
WEST FRONT - 4 ARMY
C-in-C Major-General Korobkov, A.A.
Chief of Staff - Colonel Sandalov, L.M.
Division Commissar Shlikov, F.I.
14 Mechanised Corps - Major-General Oborin, S.I.
I 30 Tank Division - Colonel Bogdanov, S.I.
II 22 Tank Division - Major-General Puganov, V.P
III 205 Motorised Division - Colonel Kodyurov, F.F
28 Rifle Corps - Major-General I'opov, V.S.
I 42 Rifle Division





I 121 Rifle Division - No commander mentioned
II 155 Rifle Division - No commander mentioned
III 143 Rifle Division - No commander mentioned
IV 55 Rifle Division - Colonel Ivanyuk, D.I.




WEST FRONT - 10 Aid-?!
C-in-C Major-General Golubev, K.D.




6th Mechanised Corps - Major-General Khatskelevich, M.G.
I 4 Tank Division - Major-General Potaturchev, A.G.
II 7 Tank Division - Major-General Borzilov, S.B.
III 29 Motorised Division - No commander mentioned
11th Mechanised Corps - Major-General Mostovenko, D.K.
[Transfered to 3rd Army on 23-24th June]
I 29 Tank Division - Colonel Studnev, N.P.
II No information
III No information
6th Cavalry Corps - Major-General Nikitin, N.S.
I 36 Cavalry Division - No commander mentioned.
II 6 Cavalry Division - No commander mentioned.
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HEST FRONT - 13 ARMY
C-in-C Lieutenant-General Filatov, P.M.
COS Petrushevskii, A.V. - No rank mentioned
Chief of Signals Colonel Akhremenko, I.F.
21 Rifle Corps - Major-General Borisov, B.S. (?)
24/6/41 given from the reserve of W.F. to 13 Army.
I 17 Rifle Division - No commander mentioned
II 24 Rifle Division - Major-General Galitskii, K.N.
III 37 Rifle Division - No commander mentioned
IV 50 Rifle Division - No commander mentioned
44 Rifle Corps - No commander mentioned
I 108 Rifle Division - No commander mentioned
II 64 Rifle Division - No commander mentioned
WEST FRONT - 3 ARMY
C-in-C Lieutenant-General Kuznetaov, V.I.
11 Mechanised Corps - Major-General Mostovenko, H.K.
[Transferred from 10th Army 23-24th June]
WEST FRONT - 16 ARMY
C-in-C Lieutenant General Lukin, M.F.
5 Mechaniaed Corps - Major General Alekseenko, I.P.
I 109 Motoriaed Division - No commander mentioned
II 13 Tank Division - No commander mentioned
III 17 Tank Division - No commander mentioned
WEST FRONT - 19 ARMY
C-in-C Lieutenant-General Konev, I.S.









WEST FRONT - 21 ARMY
C--in-C Lieutenant-General Gerasimenko, V.F.
WEST FRONT - 20 ARMY
C-in-C Lieutenant-General Kurochkin, P.A.
WEST FRONT - 22 ARMY
C-in-C Lieutenant-General Yershakov, F.A.
SOUTH in:: T FRONT •• 22ND JUi.E, 1941
281.
Staff
C-in-C Coloriel-General Kirponos, M.P.
Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Purkayev, M.A.
Member of Military Council:





Deputy Chief of Logistics:
Major-General Trutko, I.I.
Aide to Chief of Ops.:
Colonel Danilov
Chief of Armoured Forces:
Major-General Morgunov, F.N.
Chief of Combat Training General Paniukhov, V.V.
Chief of Intelligence Colonel Bondaryev, G.I.
Chief of Chemical Warfare General Petukhov, N.S.
Chief of Artillery Lieutenant-General Farsegov, M.A.
Chief of Engineers Major-General II'in~Hitkevich, A.F.
Chief of Air Force Ptukhin.
ii.Q. K.IEV
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SOUTH WEST FRONT - 26 ARMY
C-in--C Lieutenant-General Kostenko, F.Ya.
Rifle Corps
I 99 Rifle Division - Commander Colonel Deinentiev, N.I.
II No information
III No information
8 Mechanised Corps - Lieutenant-General Ryabyshev, D.I.
I 12 Tank Division - No commander mentioned
II 34 Tank Division - Colonel Vasilyev, I.V.
III 7 Motorised Division - No commander mentioned
150 Machine gun Battalion - No commander mentioned
52 Independent Machine gun Battalion No commander mentioned
SOUTH WEST FRONT - 12 ARMY
C-in-C Major-General Ponedelin, P.E









SOU'lt) VIE ST FRONT - 6 ARMY
C-in-C iiieutenant-Geueral Muzichenko, E.N.
COS Ivanov, N.I. - No rank mentioned
4 Mechanised Corps. ~ No commander mentioned
I 8 Tank Division ~ No commander mentioned
II 32 Tank Division - Colonel Pushkin, E.G.
III 81 Motorised Division - No cotrmiander mentioned
6 Rifle Corps - Alekseev, I.I. - No rank mentioned
I 41 Rifle Division - Najor-General Mikushev, G.N.
COS Colonel Yeremin N.J
II 97 Rifle Division - Colonel Zakharov, P.M.
III 159 Rifle Division - Maleev, M.F. - No rank mentioned
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SOUTH VE ST FRONT - 5 ARMY
C-in-C Major General Potopov, M.I.
COS Pisarevskii, D.S.
15 Rifle Corps - Lieutenant-General Fedyuninsky, L.I.
COS Major-General Ragoznyi
I 45 Rifle Division - Major-General Sherstiuk, G.I.
II 62 Rifle Division - Colonel Timoshenko, M.P.
III No information
15 Mechanised Corps - Major-General Karpezo, I.I.
I 10 Tank Division - General Ogurtsov, S.Ya. -
No definite rank.
II 37 Tank Division - No commander mentioned
III 212 Motorised Division. - No commander mentioned
IV 25 Motor-sycle Regiment - No conmander mentioned
22 Mechanised Corps - Major-General Kondrusev, S.M.
COS Major-General Taniruchi, V.S.
I 19 Tank Division - No commander mentioned
II 41 Tank Division - No commander mentioned
III 215 Motorised Division - No commander mentioned
27 Rifle Corps - Major-General Artemeuko, P.H.
I 87 Rifle Division - Alyabushev, F.F. - No rank mentioned
II 124 "ifle Division - Commander Major-General Sushchev, F.G.
III 135 Rifle Division - Commander General Smekhartorov, F.N.
- No definite rank
ODESSA MILITARY DISTRICT 22RD JUKE, 1941
(24TH JUKE, 1941 SOUTH FRONT)*
Staff
C-in-C Colonel-General Cherevichenko, Ya.T.
COS Major-General Zakharov, M.V.
Member of Military Council:
Commissar of the Corps Rolobyakov, A.F.
Deputy COS Colonel Koshkin, A.M.
Chief of Engineers:
Major General Khrenov, A.F.
Commander of Air Force:
Major General Michugin, E.G.
H.Q. ODESSA
*C-in-C Appointed General of the Army Tyulenev, I.V.
The MD Forces were Reorganised as the 9 Army and
Reinforced by 17 Rifle Corps and 16 Mechanised Corps
of 12 Army (SI!. Front) which were Reformed as the 18
Army.
4h uitiu tori- • Major General Malinovs-Rii, IV a.
I 74 Rifle Uiviaioa - ho ccismaacler cautioned
II No information
III No information
35 Rifle Corps - Major General




- No commander mentioned




2 Mechanized Corps - Major General hovoaelskii, V.V.
I Ho information
II lio information
III lio infori .ation
-00.
4 Anti-Tank Brigade * iiedelin, M.I. - Ho rani; mentioned
2 Cavalry Corps - Major Ceiieral helov, I .A.
I 9 Cavalry Division - Ho commander mentioned
II 5 Cavalry Division - No commander mentioned
III 72 Cavalry Division - No commander mentioned
IV Motorized Division - No commander mentioned








* 25th June, 1941 transferred to SVI. Front.
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For nearly two years - August 1939 to June 1941 - the Soviet
Government tried to keep out of the war while secretly, desperately
preparing to defend itself. The outbreak of the war in Europe,
while leaving the Soviet Union physically untouched and even creating
an opportunity for some territorial gains, nevertheless impinged
directly, and not always favourably, on several economic, military
and political processes.
The economic process dates back to the beginning of the
thirties when collectivization was enforced to enable the industrial
'take-off'; the military policy of modernization also started at the
beginning of the thirties when Tukhachevslcy took command as 'Chief of
Ordnance' to supervise the technical planning of an offensive-minded
Red Army, highly motivated and well equipped to cope with the problems
of modern warfare. The political process dates back to the ideas that
have eventually shaped the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Economic 'take-off' and the modernization of the armed forces
originated new theoretical ideas about modern warfare, which created
and were in turn boosted by some fine examples of aircraft, artillery
and small arms design.* However, before the modernization of the
armed forces succeeded in putting the Red Army on a par with other
European forces, the process was cruelly hamstrung by the purges -
the bizarre political off shoot of a totalitarian regime.
The war in Europe intensified and started to close in on the
* These ideas and processes were dealt with in Chapters II and IV.
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borders of the USSR exactly at the time when the Red Army began to
recover from the severe shock of the purges and when the first
prototypes of new aircraft and tanks rolled off the production line.*
Research and development (to use a modem phrase), which preceded the
appearance of new weapons, implied an amplified effort of vocational
and training schools, and a considerable psychological modification
in the outlook of foremen and workers. Many failures and belated
achievements notwithstanding, the capability of Soviet industry to
create the basis for a future war industry at a reasonable, although
by no means low cost, was noteworthy. Vocational education and
psycho-technical preparation of skilled labour usually takes many years
before bearing fruit but the sense of uneasiness created by the war in
Europe introduced into the Soviet system an element of haste.
At no point during that period was the Soviet Union able to
attack Germany a most damaging situation for an army that was imbued
with the 'offensive spirit'.** The impossibility of any military in¬
itiative forced the Red Army into a defensive posture, very much
against its own doctrine and training. Late in acknowledging the
impossibility of carrying the battle on to enemy territory, the
Soviet leadership tried desperately, feverishly and at the very last
minute to create some possibilities for defence by erecting and re¬
pairing fortifications and by ordering hasty redeployment.*** The
inherent contradiction between military doctrine and military posture
* See Chapters II and III.
** This is the subject of Chapter II.
*** See Chapter IV.
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sheds light on the asymmetry in Soviet-German relations.
The stage was set after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
pact. On the one hand there was vigorous, ruthless Germany, which
was aiming at a domination over Europe, and, on the other, an isolated
USSR powerful in potential but weak in fact. For the whole length of
this period every move of the two signatories emphasized the
divergence between their different motivations until there was no
more leeway for political bargain, diplomatic formula or military
manoeuvre.* The German offensive and the Soviet defensive postures
persisted until the very first shot of the war. All the warnings
about the German threat could not change the fundamental dichotomy
between a country which was prepared for surprise and one which was
not only unprepared but, indeed, quite incapable of any act of
preemption, which is the only true antidote to 'surprise'.
This seems to be a lesson which modern Soviet strategists
have come to apply in the nuclear environment.**
This is the argument of Chapter III and the first part of Chapter IV.
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APPENDICES
Surprise (s/uprorz), sb. bornis: scctlievero;
also 6 Sc. surpry is, 9 Sc. seerprccso. [a. AK.,
01'*. surprise (■= It., Sp. so/prcsti, Pg. sttrprcsa),
pn. pplc. fern., used subst., ai surprendre: see next.
Cf. the earlier SuprniSE j3.]
1. Mil. The (or an) net of assailing or attacking
unexpectedly or without warning, or of taking by
this means ; sudden attack or capture of a fort, a
body of troops, etc. that is unprepared; + formerly
also in more general sense, seizure (of a person,
a place, or spoil).
1457 Harding Chron. in Eng. Ilist. AVr\ Oct. (1912! 747
The wynncrs had it all. withoute surpryse. 1583 Kg. ldtg.
Sg. Scot. 196/2 Odiosissimc ct innaturalis surreptlonis he
Mirpryis, captivitatis, restricriouis lie restraint regie pcrsonc.
X617 Moryson Itin. n. 159 Carcfull watches against sallies
6S
SURPRISE.
or surprises of thr Emmy. 1635 Hi- vwoon Hierarchy 11.
£1 .Eneas caried his. .ln>u-hnld gods into Italy, after the
Surprise an«l enmbu-ui >n of Troy. 1645 I'aciit Heresiogr.
i. 11 11)'' surprise of Monster | which had hecn besieged
iS month1.]. 1643 /-.V/.-."/ Bits. x.\i. igt Nor doc 1
think, that hy the sin prize of my Leitcis, 1 have h»t any
more limn so many paper*.. 1704 Swiit Haft. Bks. Misc.
(lynlryi Resolving by Policy or Surprize, to attempt some
tirr.le. u-il <Ju.\rt«-r of t)i«: Autirnt* Aimy. 177a Cft ran. in
Arm. Keg. izo-'i Those taken prisoners in the mii prize of
the luggage. 180a I amis Milit. Diet. s.v., When it is
f mn.1 esp'-dicnt to att< inpt a surprise in the field, a sufli-
c.i'-nt nuiniwr of nu n must he collected for the purpose.
1879 Fi.ocdk C.riar xiv. 203 A fortified camp, .capable of
resisting surprises. Ibid. 710 The surprise was complete:
the Koid m army was in confusion.
'2t. gen. The (or an) act of coming upon one un¬
expectedly, or of taking unawares; a sudden
attack. Now rare or Obs. exc. as in b.
1598 Siiaks. Merry JV. v. v. 131 The guiltincssc of my
manic, the sodainc surprize of my powers. 1609 Tourkeuk
Funeral Poem 439 Where sodainc dangers with a fierce
access Have made sunn Be upon him. 1622 R. Hawkins
I 'ay. S. Sea (1S47) 135 Neither pneke nor chest is free from
their [j,-. insects'] surprises. 1796 Burke Carr. (ic.44) IV.
194 This is no casual error, no lapse, no sudden surprise,
1894 H. Ihu'siMONii Assent a/Man i«)S What deer have to
arm themselves mo>t against is surprise.
b. To take by surprise (f at a surprise) : to
conic upon unexpectedly, take unawares ; hence, to
astonish by unexpectedness: « Spkphish v. 3. 5.
(1687 T. I .row N Saints in Uproar Wks. 1730 I. 7S To
hinder the wirk<*d from attacking you by surprise.1 1691
tr. Emiiiar.ne's Obset-r. J'ourn. Maples 305 He might al¬
ways he sure of his Blow, and could never be taken at a
Surprise. 1R06 I. Brkfsfokd Miseries Hum. Life (cd. 3)
11. vii, A 11;' hy jw»ol, which takes you by surprise. 1849
Macaclav Hist, Eng. viii. 21. 365 That he was taken by
surprise is true. But he had twelve hours to make his
arrangement*, i860 Tvndali. Glae. it. xx. 338 This .state¬
ment, 1 confess, took mi* hy surprise. 1875 Srunns ('oust.
Hist. 11. xvi. 402 Richard took the kingdom by surprise.
fc. An attack of illness; a sudden access of
emotion. Obs.
1670 W. Montagu in Buedeueh MSS. (Hist. MSS.Comin.)
I. 4to She. .was at tlic time of her surprise actually intend¬
ing tHe proposal. 1697 Collier list. Mar. Subj. 1. (1700) 120
In the Heat and Surprize of Passion. 17x9 Dr. Foe Crusoe
jr. (Globe) 330 An Excess of Joy, a Surprize of Joy.
3. Something that takes one by surprise; an un¬
expected occurrence or event; anything unexpected
or astonishing.
159a A nien ofFrrcrshant 111. tit. 30 Such great impression
tooke this fond surprise. God grnunt this vision bcdccmc
rue any good. 1670 Cotion Espernon in. xit. 639 lie was
in Bed...when this r.cws came to him; and doubtless it was
convenient for him, that it should find him in that posture,
the better to rc-»Bt so strange a surprize. 1770 Foote Lame
Lc: cr 111. 69 My being here was as much a surprize upon
M iss Chariot as —. 1772 1'rikstley lust. Kdig. (1782) 1. 273
They arc never any surprize to us. 1G70 Mozlf.y Univ.
Serin, iv. (1876) qx Surprises ol this kind here..look like
auguries of a greater surprise in the next world. 1879 S. C.
Bakti.ktt Egypt to Fat. iv. 97 Egypt, it has been well
said, is the land of surprises.
b. spec. A fancy dish, or an ingredient of a
dish, a present, or the like, designed to take one
by surprise.
1708 W. King Cookery v, A Surprize is., a dish., which
promising little from it-- lust appearance, when open abounds
with ail sorts i f variety. *883 Harper't Mag. Jan. a.10/1
One l.»dy.. w.uk-d day ai.d night, .to achieve her various
' ■erprbe1833 * j. S. Winikk' Footle's Chilar, xi, We
w.int y-nt to in.Ac us a surprise to put Father's Christmas
pr r.l in. 1893 Eaku Dlnmoit. Fuinitj II. 243 Plates
of hot dough, wi'.h all sorts of juicy surprises inside them.
4. The feeling or emotion excited by something
unexpected, or for which one is unprepared. *t*a.
Alarm, terror, or perplexity, caused by a sudden
attack, calamity, or the like. Obs.
1608 Siiaks Per. 111. ii. 17 Our lodgings..Shookc as the
earth did <4uake:..l'ure .surprize and fcare, marie me to
the house. 1722 J >1. Futt Plague (-1754) 2?I, 1 have
'1 them in strange Agitations and Surprises on thi ; Ac-
c ui.t. 1758 S. Havwahd Serin, xvi. 496 Every thing.,
MVigaci to fill the soul with gloom and melancholy, nay
with the greatest surprize and consternation. 1816 Scott
A nth/, xxvii. My lord has been in sic a distress, and sic
seer pro-.*, as I ne'er saw man in my life.
b. The fcclingor mental state, akin to astonish¬
ment and wonder, caused by an unexpected occur¬
rence or circumstance.
x5S6 tr. Char.H'fs Trav. Persia 20 The Vizier, faigninga
kind of surprise, And what, said he, Arc those Gentlemen
Still here? 1743 I' • :ockv Descr. East I. 11. v. 123 We went
on to the norm, the Nile running through the rocks... I
ask'd them when we should come to the cataract, and to
my great surprize thvy told me, that was the cataract.
a 1763 Siiknstoni: Ess. Wks. 17' 3 II. 214 Surprise quickens
enjoyment, and expectation banishes surprise. 182a Scott
Nigct x, Lord I'a igafiiO expressed much surprise at under¬
stand;-;; that Nigel proposed an instant return to Scotland.
1908 G. K. Chesterton Orthodoxy iii. (190.9! 52 By asking
for pleasure, lie I >st the chief pleasure; fur the chief pleasure
B surprise.
with a. 17x3 Addison* Sped. No. 357 ?S Circumstances
which give a delightful Surprize to the Reader. 1794 Mrs.
Kadcldke Mrs!. U:\lfh > xxvii. She looked with a sur-
pic on Annette. 1P93 ' H. S. Mkkkiman ' Koden's Corner
xiii. itS Cornish..looked at the printed words with a vague
surprise.
5. altrib. and Comb., as surprise attack, target,
turn, visit; surpriso packet, a sealed packet with
contents designed to surprise, sold at a trivial price;
i ;
I : 24.2
also Jig. ; surpriso-party, (a) a body of troops
for an unexpected attack; (/>) U.S. and Colonial,
a party who meet by agreement at a friend's house
without invitation, bringing provisions with them ;
aurpriso-pioco, a part of the mechanism of a
repeating watch (see quot-).
1900 Daily News 4 Aug. 6/1 Our •surprise attacks only
sur pi Bod out selves by 1 lie thoroughness of the enemy's pre-
j p.nalien tor them. 1900 U'rsfiu. <la15 Sept. 3/2 There is
a dash of the 4 'surprise packet '—if the expression may pass
— about this bulky volume. 1841 Lkvi-.k C. (i'Malley xlv.
333 Three cavalry regiments., intended for a "surprise party.
s86o O. W. Holmes Prof. J>reah/.-t. iv, Now, then, for a
surprise-party I 1872 Suiei.e uf. Vekk Americanisms 236
On such an occasion friends and parishioners appear sud¬
denly- for it is generally a surprise-party at the same time
—at the parsonage. 1884 F. J. 13kiti en* Watch Clocknt.
254 *Surprise Piece.., a loose plate tinder the quarter snail
ot a repeating watch which prevents the quarter rack reach¬
ing the snail if the mechanism is set going at the hour. 1894
United Scruice Mag. Oct. 39 Practice at •surprise targets
appearing suddenly at unknown ranges. 1891 Const.
MacEwen Three 11 'out. in One Boat 72 "Surprise-turns and
crooked bends make you, if you know your river, as crafty
as any old fox. 1891 15i». W. How in F. D. How Mem.
xxiii. (1S9S) 323, I..paid them a *surprisc visit.
b. Cell-ringing. Applied to certain complicated
methods of change-ringing.
1874 Ban 1 steh Change Kinging ifi New Doubles, .may be
rung by a system generally adopted by experienced ringers
in surprise methods. Hid. 58 London Surprise Major. 1902
Eneye I. Brit. XXVI. 521/2 A variety of 'plain methods'
anil 'Treble Bob methods', among the latter heing the so-
called 'Surprise 'methods, the most complicated and diffi¬
cult of all.
Sui"X>rise (siuprorz), v. Also 5-6 surpryse,
6-9 surprize, (7 -pryze, -prico). [f. AI'\, OIr.
surpris-c, pa. pple. of surprendre (*= Tr. sobrc-,
sorprendre, It. sorprcndcrc, Sp. sorprender, Pg. sur-
Jrender)mcd.L.supcrpretidfre, ^-prechendtre : see
Suit- and Prkhknd, and cf. the composition of over¬
take. See also the earlier Sumtisi: and Suspuise.]
1. trans. To,1 take hold of' or affect suddenly or
unexpectedly.
-f*a. Chiefly pass. To be seized with (or of) a
desire, emotion, etc., a disease or illness. Obs.
1485 Caxton Chas. Gt. 231 Thenne gancllon was sur-
pryscd wyth lliys fals auaryce. 1490 — Eneydos vi. 2S He
shall he soo surjiryscd wyth nngrc and furyousc woodnes.
c 1500 Mclusinc 1. 10 He was so surpryscd of her lone that
he coudc nat holdc contcnauncc. 1570 Foxf. A. «V PI. (cd. 2)
11. 995/2 The ruler., who surprised with lykc pride and dis-
daine. .caused hys cappc to be hanged vp vpon a pole,
chargyng. .all. .to do obcysance to the cappc. xS7^ Flem¬
ing Panofl. F.pist. 3x5 My myndc being surprised with
sorrow. 1594 Flat jexvcll-ho. in. 17 [They] were suddenly
surprised with a great loosencsse. i6ji Bible Isa. xxxiii. iz.
The sinners in Zion are afraid, fearefulncsio hath surprised
the hypocrites. 16x7 Morvson* Itin. 11. 296 He was sur¬
prised with a burning Fcuer. X667 Milton P. E. 11. 753 All
on a sudden miserable pain Surpris'd thee. Ibid. vi. 774
Them unexpected joy surpriz'd. a 1700 Evelyn Diary id
Apr. 1606, Visited Sir William D'Oylie, surprized with a fit
of apoplcxie. CX720 Dit For: Men:. Cavalier S40) 39 Sur¬
prised with joy at the motion.
t b. To overcome, overpower (the mind, will,
heart) ; to captivate. Obs.
1474 Caxton Chesse m. vi. (1S83) *32 that ye wyn or
drynkc inrprj^e hym and ouarcumo his bmyn. 1481
Myrrour 1. v. 26 The moncyc hath so surpryscd them that
they may extende to none other thinge. x6xx Siiaks. Wint.
T. ttt. i. xo The carc-dcafTiutig Voycco th' Oracle,, .sosur-
pib.'d in j> Ulull, Thai I was uuthhig. xGzx Elsinu Debit res
Ho. Lords (Camden) 84,1 may be surprised with crrour, but
not corrupted. 1633 1*. Adams Exp. 2 Peter ii. 14 A fair
skin surpr;scth a fleshly heart. 1676 Dkyden Anrcngz. iv.
i, 1'ow'r, like new Wine, docs your weak Brain surprize.
a 1700 Evelyn Diary (Chandos Classics) 17 So. .temperate,
that I have heard he had never been surprised by cxccssc.
c. absol. or intr.
a 1700 Evelyn Diary 8 Feb. 1645, The vapours ascend so
hot that cut ring with the body erect you will even faint with
cxcev ivc perspiration, but stooping lower as suddainc a cold
surprizes.
2. Mil., etc. To assail or attack suddenly and
without warning; to make an unexpected assault
upon (a place, body of troops, person, etc. that is
unprepared); + to take or capture in this way.
a 1548 Hall Chron., Ed'.u. IV, 222 b, By some gyle
or cngync sodaynly to trap and surprise the eric. 16x1
Bible jcr. xlviii. 41 Kerioth is taken, and the strong
holds are surprised. 1687 A. Lovkll tr. Thevenofs 'l'rav.
111. 29 11 is march was secret enough, though he hastened it
to vorprBo Snrrxt. *688 Hoi \h- Armoury tit. xv. (B.oxb.)
27/1 Lowe built boatc*.. wlrich..will strike to the sides of
grunt shipper., and with their guns, .either suddenly 5«n prh.v.
the same or stake it. 1709 Steele Taller No. 1 ? o The
Enemy had formed a Design to surprize two Battalions of
flip allipv, 1803 J.»nk Pomtt'r That tdeus ii. (iSji) 16 A plan
was laid for surprising and taking the royal person. 1808
5con Lijc Dryden ]>.'s Wk>. 1CJ2 i. 173 A man, stupiBcd
in the dark and l-catcn by ruffians, loses no honour hy such
a misfortune. 1867 Fhhuman Norm. Com/. (1877) i. vi. 459
Every ctTort to take or surpusc the Norman outpost wa*
rendered hopeless. x8C3 J. F. Maurice Milit. Hist. Camp.
iSS.' xii. 73 An army suddenly.attacked within the lines which
it had reckoned upon to ward oft"its enemy is in a military
sense surprised.
'}*b. gen. To capture, seize; to take possession
of by force ; to take prisoner. Obs.
158S Skaks. Tit. A. 1. 1. 284 Treason rrty Ixsrd, Lauinia is
snrprisM 1593— 7 Hen. VI, iv. ix. 8 Is the Traitor Cade
surpris'd? 1606 G. WIqodcocke]//BV. Ivstinc ix.41 Some he
SURPRISE.
beheaded,others hanisht, and all their goods were surprised.
/bid.xv.(>5 Surprizing t he kuudoin.; to hiiu->e)f. 1632 l.iurooiv
Trav. 111. 04 When Nigropont, anil diuerse other lies hi'io
surprised from the Venetians. 1661 Act 13 Chas. He. 9 § 6
Ships which shall he-surprised or seized as prize. 1667 Mm k,«<
P. L. xii. 433 J 1c (.tr*. Messiah],. ther e shall nirprise 'J he S'-r*
pent, Prince of aire, and drag in Chaines '1 hrough all hi,
rcalmc. 1799 Siikkidan Pizarra 11. i, A seivant of mine,
1 hear is missing, whether surprised or treacherous 1
know not.
Jig. 159a Kvi> Sp. 'J'rag. 111. x. 00 Thy tresses, Ariadi.es
twines, Wherewith my lihertic thoti ha-1 surprisde.
i* c. To hold in one's power, occupy. Obs.
1540 Act 32 Hen. I'll/, c. 24 Considcryng..that the Isle
of l<hoodcs..is surprised bv the Turke. 1607 Hkkkkm ft
Weuster Sir '/*. Wyat A 2 b, With me, that in my bandes.
Surprise the Soueraigntie.
i* d. To rescue or deliver as by force, 'snatch®
(from something). Obs. rare
1687 Lond. Gaz. No. 2258/2 As also in your unparalell'd
Clemency, by which you liavc surprized your distressed Sub¬
jects from the jaws of Ruinc.
3. To come upon unexpectedly; to take unawares;
to take or catcii in the act; hence fg. to find or
discover (something) suddenly, to delect.
X592 Solinran .?■ Pcrs. it. ii. 264 If the Goucrnour Surprise
me hcerc, I die by mai.shall law. 1655 tr. Sorei's Com. Hist.
Francion xii. 22 The Italian seeing himself surprized did.,
intrcat him to give him leave to be gone. \GCz J. Daviks
tr. Maitdclslo's Trav. 244 We were surprized by a calm,
which kept us in the same place all that day. 1665 P. Hi nry
Diaries .y Lett. (i83z) xCS A meeting at Wrexham .suipri.Ml,
..some payd 5,b some went to prison for 3 months accord,
to the Act. a 1700 Evelyn Diary 2 Feb. 1665, I saw a masq
pcrform'd at Court by 6 gentlemen and Gladys, surprizing his
Majesty, it being Candlemas-day. 1726 Pofk Odyss. xix.636
Ulysses will surprize the unlinish'd game. 1803-6 Wokdsw.
Ode Intim. Innnort. x.jS High instincts before which our
mortal Nature Did tremble like a guilty Tiling surprised.
X879 J. Grant in CassetI's Techn. Editc. IV. 96/1 In order
to surprise Nature in her wonders, he was wont to perambu¬
late the garden..lantern in hand. 1C80 Ghovk Diet. Mus.
I. 202/1 note, In the Finale..we almost surprise the change
of style in the act of being made. xS86 Kuskin Prx'crit.i
II. vi. 193, I never travelled in bad weather unless surprised
by it. 1S90 Maaktens Sir J. Avelingh xv. He had sur¬
prised an ugly secret about a Government tender.
*|*b. ?To ' overtakeanticipate. Obs. rare*1.
1591 Nasme Prognost. A 4, The effects cannot surprise the
cause.
f c. causativcly. To introduce unexpectedly,
' spring' upon some one. Obs. rarer-1.
1769 Chron. in Ann. Keg. 75/r To support the re-election,
lest any candidate in the opposite interest should have beer.
..attempted to be surprized upon the county,
•j* 4. To implicate or ensnare (a person) as by a
sudden proposal or disclosure. Obs.
1642 Suncshy Diary (1836) 91 Not willing to use his old
friendship..in a way to surprize his judgments. 1667 Mil¬
ton L. ix. 354 Least by some fairc appecring good sur¬
pris'd She [sc. Reason] dictate false, and mBsinlorwe the
Will. 1702 Vanurugm False Friend v. i, If I did not know
he war. in love with Leonora, I could bo easily surprized with
what he has told me.
b. To lead unawares, betray into doing some¬
thing not intended.
1696 Phillips (ed. 5), To Surprise,, .to lead a Man into
an Error, by causing him to do a thing over hastily. 1711
Addison S/eet. No. 112^3 If by chance be has been sur¬
prized into a short Nap at Sermon. 1742 Act 15 Geo. II c.
30 Person.', who have the Misfortune to become I.uii.itick>,
may..be liable to be surprised into unsuitable Marriages.
x8x8 Scorr lirt. Midi, ii. Many., whose feelings surprised
them into a very natural interest in his behalf. XS73 Black
J r. Thuie xvii, He had never yet met any woman who liud
so surprised him into admiration.
5. To affect with the characteristic emotion caused
by something unexpected ; to excite to wonder by
being unlooked-for. + Formerly also in stronger
sense (cf. Surprise sb. 4 a), to astonish or alarm ;
also, to excite to admiration. Often pass., const.
at (f -with) or inf. ; colloq. to be surprised at = to
be scandalized or shocked at.
1655 Theophania 103 Alcxandro acquainted him with the
occasion of their coming thither, with which he was exceed¬
ingly surprised at first. 1687 A. Lovm.l tr. Therenet's
Trav. t. 248 They., have Secrets which surprize the
most knowing, many thinking them to be knacks of
Magick. 1692 L'Hstrangk Fables Ixxi, People were not
so much Frighted, as they were Surpriz'd at the Bigness,
and Uncouth Deformity of the Camel. 17x9 Dk Foe Crusoe
1. (Globe) 156, I was exceedingly surpriz'd with the Print of
a Man's naked Foot 011 the Shore. X768 Goi.dsm. Good-n.
Man 111. i, You'll be surpriz'd, Sir, with this visit. 1794 Mas.
Radcuekk Myst. I 'tlolphn xlvii. The apparition of the dead
comes not ..to terrify or to surprise the timid. 1816 ScoiT
Old Alorf. xyv, Mnrhrnz .was curprBed at lie degree of
agitation which Balfour displayed. 1833 T. Hoon Parsed*
Dan. m. vi, ' You surprise me.' ' I till you truth,' said
George. *860 Tyndai i. Glue. 1. xii 8.8, I was surprised. ,W
find some veins of white ice. 1908 R. Bagot A. Cuthecrt
x.\i. 256 Ami yet you tn!k our language well—really very
well. I nm agreeably surprised.
a/sol. 1634 Earl Roscov. F.ss. Transl. Verse 146 On
sure Foundations let your Fabrick Rise, And with inviting
Majesty surprise. 1781 Cowit.r Charity 544 The turns arc
quick, the polBh d points surprise. 1845 R. \V. Hamilton
Pop. Et/ue. ii. (1846) 30 it is..to be doubted, whether any
class of Society be so strictly moral [as the poor], The
statement may at first surprise.
•j* G. Cookery. To dress or serve in the manner of
a 1 surprise \ Obs.
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